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INTRODUCTION
T HE discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
were initially designed to expedite the litigation process by ensur-
ing that each party would have the ability to learn its adversary's
position, as well as the evidentiary basis for that position, prior to
trial.2 The theory underlying the rules was that a broad pretrial
inquiry into the facts would result in a greater measure of justice at
trial by "transforming the sporting trial-by-surprise into a more rea-
soned search for truth.' '3 Later amendments to the discovery rules,
particularly those enacted in 1970,4 sought to simplify the discovery
process and to overcome abuses arising from technical interpretations
of the rules by those bent on thwarting rather than advancing the
rules' underlying purposes. 5 Thus, the discovery rules are intended to
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45. See generally W. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary
System 29-37 (1968).
2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947); cf. Mackerer v. New York Cent. R.R.,
1 F.R.D. 408, 410 (E D.N.Y. 1940) (The rules' purpose "is to cut through the maze of
technicalities which have heretofore existed, and to enable the court to do a greater measure of
moral justice under the law.").
3. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1063
(2d Cir. 1979); see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (the
discovery rules are intended to "make a trial less a game of blindman's buff [sic] and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent"); Comment,
Federal Discovery in Concurrent Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52 Tul. L, Rev. 769, 770
(1978). See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104, 114-15 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
4. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Order of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Mar. 30, 1970, 393 U.S. 979 (1970) (effective July 1,
1970).
5. Professor Cohn has aptly summarized the 1970 amendments: "In 1970, the discovery rules
were overhauled to reflect the experience of the preceding three decades. One purpose was to
reduce the time that judges were to spend on discovery matters. Objections to interrogatories no
longer go automatically to a judge for a ruling, but await the interrogator's decision as to whether
the objection is well taken, whether the information might be obtained by some other means, and
whether the matter is important enough to warrant judicial intervention. Also, the good cause
requirement for motions to force the production of documents and other tangible things has been
replaced by a mere request of another party for the production of such items. Again, a court
becomes involved only when the party requesting discovery seeks an order compelling production
that was refused or objected to. Thus, the mold of federal discovery, particularly as recast in
1970, is to leave the discovery process to counsel." Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local
Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 253,
254 (1979) (footnotes omitted). See also Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
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make a reality of the policy expressed in rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that all litigants are entitled to "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." 6
The present discovery rules function adequately in noncomplex cases
in which few parties and witnesses are involved and the pertinent
documentary evidence is of reasonable proportions. 7 Nevertheless,
although the rules have opened the door to truth in many actions, they
have not succeeded in preventing obstructive and abusive tactics by
attorneys whose intentions run counter to the spirit of rule 1. Nowhere
is the problem more apparent and the abuse more flagrant than in
complex civil litigation, particularly class actions and multiparty secu-
rities and antitrust cases. 8 When the issues, potential evidence and,
accordingly, the scope of discovery are broad, tbe rules cease to be
self-executing and become dependent in large measure upon the good
faith and reasonableness of counsel. 9 Unfortunately, counsel have
often failed to demonstrate a commendable level of good faith and
reasonableness in complex litigation. 1
Although the sheer size of complex civil actions is sometimes to
blame for the difficulty of conducting efficient and uncontroversial
discovery,1 1 counsel themselves are more frequently the cause of
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery
(1967), reprinted in 43 F.R.D. 211, 218-19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft of 1970
Amendments].
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see In re Fertilizer Antitrust Litigation. [1979-21 Trade Cas- (CCH)
62,894, at 79,180 (E.D. Wash. 1979); Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64, 66 tD.N J 1961). Renfrew.
Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 264, 264 (1979).
7. See note 39 infra.
8. Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219. 222 (1978); see Becker.
Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe
Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 269-71 (1978); Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good
Intentions Gone Awry?, National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 70 F.RD. 79, 199, 202-05 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Pound Con-
ference]; Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 Ariz St- LJ.
475, 476-77.
9. Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem. Inc., 54 F R.D_
551, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litigation, MDL No. 314. at 2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (Raby, Magis.); see note 452 infra.
10. See, e.g., CFTC v. Rosenthal & Co., 74 F.R.D. 454. 455 iN-D I!1. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 605 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1979); SCM Societa Commerciale S.P A v Industrial &
Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 111-13 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
11. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F. RD 497, 505-08 (1979)_ This
difficulty arises in complex litigation because of the large number of documents and witnesses
typically involved, requiring massive review of papers, extensive attention paid to admins-
trative detail, frequent travel and the examination and reexamination of witnesses by several
counsel. For a discussion of the discovery process that often develops in complex litigation, see
Second Circuit Unit Asks Comment on Proposed Discovery Rule, N.Y. L I.. Nov 15. 1978. at 1.
col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit Commission Proposal]. Even the mere scheduling of
discovery in a multiparty case involving several different counsel can become a difficult task
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discovery problems. 12 Often, inquiring counsel do not tailor discovery
requests to the issues. Nor are their requests always motivated by a
desire for discovery alone. Responding counsel obfuscate issues, bury
facts and pertinent documents amidst irrelevancies, object irresponsi-
bly, or simply block or refuse to answer patently proper discovery
requests. 13 Indeed, because experienced counsel know that the courts
rarely have either the time or the will to become embroiled in the
details of a particular discovery dispute, 14 harassment and obstruction
are all too often the order of the day. Realizing the expense and delay
entailed by discovery motions, obstructing counsel in effect challenge
their adversaries to indulge in costly motions for rulings, or to com-
promise potentially important aspects of their discovery.
Opposing counsel-the victims of discovery abuse-are confronted
with a pragmatic choice: either move on to another topic or risk
becoming bogged down in a procedural morass that can derail discov-
ery indefinitely. 15 Moreover, unless the movant reveals its entire
theory of the case in its papers-a course of action it may be reluctant
12. See, e.g., CFTC v. Rosenthal & Co., 74 F.R.D. 454, 455 (N.D. I1. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 605 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1979); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). See also Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process,
44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Court Sanctions].
13. Cf. Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113, 115 (1). Conn. 1971) ("The spirit of the
discovery rules does not in any case support meticulous objections and evasive answers from
experienced counsel."). See also United States v. IBM Corp., 79 F.R.D. 378, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Powerlock Syss., Inc. v. Duo-Lok, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 50, 52 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
14. See, e.g., Bell v. Automobile Club, 80 F.R.D. 228, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 601 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1979). This problem has prompted a call for more active
judicial supervision of discovery, particularly in complex civil actions. See Manual for Complex
Litigation § 1.10, at 14 (1978) (footnote omitted): "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contemplate that discovery in the ordinary case will be directed by counsel with infrequent
intervention by the judge when counsel are unable to agree. This usual pattern, however, may be
ineffective in complex cases if they are to be processed expeditiously. Both the bench and bar
have long been in nearly unanimous agreement on the fundamental principle that a complex case
must be managed by a judge with a firm hand." See also Pollack, supra note 8, at 223-25;
Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, Pound Conference, supra note 8, at 107-09.
15. Doskow, Procedural Aspects of Discovery, Ninth Annual Postgrad. Conference of the
Columbia Law School Alumni Ass'n, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D.
479, 498, 503-04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Conference]. Frequently, discovery
disputes are referred to United States magistrates for supervision and rulings pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976). The binding effect of their rulings appears clear. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco
Auto Serv., Inc., No. 75 Civ. 921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1976) (Goettel, Magis.). For a detailed
study of the use of magistrates, see Committee on the Federal Courts, The Magistrate System in
the Southern District of New York, 33 Rec. A. B. City of New York 212, 215-22 (1978). Prior to
the development of the magistrate system, the use of special masters in complex cases had been
growing. See, e.g., Budget Dress Corp. v. Joint Bd. of Dress & Waistmakers' Union, 24 F.R.D.
506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc., 21 F.R.D.
347, 351-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Kaufman, Use of Special Pre-Trial Masters in the 'Big' Case, 23
F.R.D. 572, 575, 580 (1959); Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise Discovery in the
Southern District, New York, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1959).
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to take at an early stage of the litigation-the court may misinterpret
the pertinence or nature of the discovery involved. If the latter occurs,
the court may not only deny the relief requested, but may also
comment unfavorably on material issues, which can affect the ultimate
disposition of the case. 16 Finally, counsel are well aware that the
courts have demonstrated an extraordinary reluctance to impose sub-
stantive sanctions for discovery abuse;' 7 judges are hesitant to deprive
litigants of their day in court simply because of errors by counsel that
are not directly related to the merits of the case.'
To counter the most blatant and chronic of these discovery abuses,
this Article develops and explains an alternative system of discovery
rules applicable solely to complex civil litigation-the Federal Discov-
ery Rules for Complex Civil Actions (Proposed Rules), set forth in full
in the Appendix. 19
I. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BASES FOR NEW DISCOVERY
RULES APPLICABLE TO COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure envisioned that
the trial judge would play a major role in the development of discov-
ery. 20 The latitude permitted both questioner and responder was to be
circumscribed by the court's ever-watchful eye. 21 Thus, certain discov-
ery requests could not be undertaken unless first approved by the
court. 22 Moreover, a party objecting to a discovery request could not
16. See In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litigation, 449 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In
Colocotronis, an cion based on an alleged breach of a fiduciary relationship, the defendant
asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to the plaintiff's request for certain documents.
Id. at 829. In the course of upholding the attorney-client privilege assertion, the court stated in
dicta that "[tihe fact the [defendant] occupied a central position in these transactions and that (the
defendant] managed the loans whose profitability would inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs does
not mean that these agreements established a special fiduciary or trust relationship .... Rather,
these agreements are arms-length contracts between relatively sophisticated financial institutions
and do not establish fiduciary relationships . I..." Id  at 833 (citation omitted). This remark
dearly addressed the ultimate issue in the case, a result counsel for the plaintiffs could not have
anticipated. See also In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
17. See notes 374-75 infra and accompanying text.
18. See Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957); Renfrew, supra note 6, at 273-74;
Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1033, 1034 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Emerging Deterrence]; Note, Standards for
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 27 Me. L. Rev. 247, 253 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Discovery Sanctions]; notes 374-75 infra and accompanying text. But see Ali v. A & G Co., 542
F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 637 (1962) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
19. See pp. 997-1004 infra.
20. See Pollack, supra note 8, ht 221.
21. See Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, Proceedings of the Seminar on Practice
and Procedure Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 111, 118-21 (1960).
22. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (1938).
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unilaterally decline to respond; rather, he was compelled to move first
for a protective order. 23 Unfortunately, these procedures proved un-
wieldy in actual practice. The courts spent too much time sorting out
discovery disputes that should and could have been resolved by
counsel. 24 Concurrently, too much of the litigant's time and money
was being expended on discovery motions.
The 1970 amendments to the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 25 therefore, sought to reduce drastically the role of the
courts in developing and scheduling discovery.2 6 The 1970 amend-
ments thrust the burden upon counsel to attempt, in the first instance,
to reach accommodations and practical agreements on discovery mat-
ters. 27 Only after that attempt failed would the court entertain a
discovery matter, principally upon motion of the inquiring party
seeking to test objections asserted by the respondent. 28 But, just as
the pre-1970 rules proved too confining, the 1970 amendments have
proved too liberal, at least insofar as complex civil litigation is con-
cerned.2 9 The general lack of judicial supervision has led to overly-
broad discovery requests, obstructive tactics and continual bickering
over what will or will not be answered or produced. 30
Recognizing these problems, the American Bar Association (ABA)
established, in 1976, a Task Force of its Section of Litigation to study
discovery abuses and to recommend a course of action to alleviate
them. 3' The Task Force proposed a series of detailed changes in the
federal discovery rules, primarily designed to narrow the scope of
23. Id. 30(b).
24. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) and 34(a), Preliminary Draft of
1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 252, 256-57. See also Speck, The Use of Discovery in United
States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132, 1151 (1951).
25. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Order of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Mar. 30, 1970, 398 U.S. 979 (1970) (effective July 1,
1970).
26. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 219.
27. See Brown, Proposed Changes to Rule 33 Interrogatories and Rule 37 Sanctions, 11 Ariz.
L. Rev. 443, 446-47 (1969); Rosenberg, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, Columbia
Conference, supra note 15, at 490-91 (1968); note 24 supra.
28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Several federal district courts, in an effort to reduce their
motion calendars, had adopted local rules so providing even before the 1970 amendments. E.g.,
N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 2301-4); S.D. Fla. Gen. R. 10(I)(2); N.D. Ill. Gen. R. 12(d); E.D. Mich. R.
IX(k); S.D.N.Y. Gen. R. 9(f). Indeed, 55 of the 94 federal districts have such a rule. See Cohn,
supra note 5, at 262 n.52. Several states have the same requirement. See, e.g., Rules of Supreme
Court, State of New York, County of New York, § 660.8(b)(6)(ii).
29. See Pollack, supra note 8, at 221-23.
30. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations- A Blueprint for the Justice System
in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 289-90 (1978); see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,
176 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975). See generally
Perlman, The Federal Discovery Rules: A Look at New Proposals, 15 New England L. Rev. 57
(1979).
31. See American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, Report of the Special Committee for
the Study of Discovery Abuse (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA Task Force Report).
(Vol. 48
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discovery, 32 discourage evasive answers33 and provide for "early judi-
cial control" of discovery by means of a pretrial conference at which
discovery would be framed and scheduled.3 4 More recently, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States35 issued its own set of proposed
amendments to the federal discovery rules, partially accepting and
partially rejecting the Task Force proposals. In March 1978, the
Judicial Conference circulated its proposed amendments for public
comment;36 in February 1979, following receipt of those comments,
the Conference issued a revised set of proposed amendments.3 7
The proposals of the ABA Task Force and the Judicial Conference
are meritorious. Indeed, the Proposed Rules set forth in this Article
reflect several of their proposals. But the Task Force and Judicial
Conference proposals are not specifically tailored to complex civil
actions and, therefore, inadequately address many troublesome discov-
ery abuses peculiar to such litigation.38 In addition, because they
attempt to encompass all types of litigation, certain aspects of those
proposals are necessarily vague and generalized. To the contrary, the
Proposed Rules recognize that different types of actions spawn differ-
ent discovery problems and thus require different responses. The
Proposed Rules are based upon the theory that special rules should be
adopted for complex civil actions because it is in these actions that the
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 24-25.
34. Id. at 5-8.
35. Congress established the Judicial Conference in 1922, Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2,
42 Stat. 838, to "carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of
practice and procedure . . . prescribed by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). The
Judicial Conference is comprised of federal judges from each circuit and is chaired by the Chief
Justice. Id. The Judicial Conference's primary responsibility is to recommend amendments to the
federal procedural rules which, under id. § 2072, are transmitted by the Supreme Court to
Congress and become law unless rejected by Congress. See 374 U.S. 861, 870 (1963) (statement of
Black, J., and Douglas, J.); Editorial, Black-Robed Secrecy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19. 1980. § A, at
26, col. 1. The Judicial Conference's standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Advisory Committee) drafts all proposed changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure See,
e.g., Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5. See generally Annual Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 6-7 (1958).
36. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1978), reprinted in 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Judicial Conference
Amendments].
37. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1979), reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Revised Judicial
Conference Amendments]. The Judicial Conference's proposed amendments have recently been
approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress to take effect August 1, 1980- Order
of Apr. 29, 1980, 48 U.S.L.W. 3707, 4497 (U.S. Mlay 6, 1980); see note 35 supra. Three justices
dissented, believing that the amendments are not sufficiently far-reaching to effect positive
change. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4499 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38. See Becker, supra note 8, at 276.
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principal abuses arise and recur.3 9
Some commentators, however, have expressed doubt that new rules
are necessary or appropriate to meet this particular problem. 40 They
reason that the current rules are flexible enough to permit increased
judicial supervision, and recommend that the courts require pretrial
conferences and issue discovery orders to maintain tight control of
discovery from start to finish. 4 1 In addition, doubt has been cast upon
the ability of draftsmen to formulate rules that cannot be circumvented
by crafty counsel. 4 2 This philosophy led to the development of the
39. Pollack, supra note 8, at 222 ("Although widespread, the dissatisfaction with the
discovery process is directed at a limited field of cases. Few, if any, abuses of discovery exist in
connection with ordinary litigation. A vast majority of the civil cases filed do not have any
discovery at all-not even one 'exchange' of discovery.... It has been estimated that almost one
of every nine cases tried does not use some discovery. Nonetheless, the field of cases in which
discovery is subject to abuse is limited only in terms of number of filings. The cases subject to
abuse predominate in their demands for judicial attention. The rub occurs in the so-called
complex cases."); see Schwab, Discovery in Complex Securities Litigation, in New Directions in
Securities Litigation 42 1, 423 (1976) ("Discovery in complex securities litigation is, of course,
subject to the same discovery rules as other litigation. But simply to look upon discovery issues in
securities litigation as a variant of issues encountered in other cases is to miss opportunities and to
overlook problems which are largely unique to the complex cases."). See also Revised Judicial
Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 332. Discovery problems relating particularly to
complex litigation have troubled commentators for years. See, e.g., McAllister, The Big Case:
Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 28 (1950); Yankwich, "Short
Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 63-64 (1951); Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1000-07 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Discovery Developments]. Yet, to date, no
new rules specially designed for such cases have been proposed.
40. Pollack, supra note 8, at 221-24, 227; Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8, at 480-81, 492.
41. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 8, at 223; cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979)
("[U]ntil and unless there are major changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must
be had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse.").
42. Pollack, supra note 8, at 223. Similar debate exists as to whether discovery abuse is really
such a prevalent problem at all. Chief Justice Burger has opined that "there is a widespread belief
that pretrial procedures are being used excessively and that the process is lengthening litigation."
Interview, How to Break the Logjam in the Courts, U.S. News & W. Rep., Dec. 19, 1977, at 24.
See also Goldstein, Business and The Law: Big Business and Antitrust, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23,
1979, § D, at 4, col. 1. In 1976, this problem was discussed at a National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice held in St. Paul, Minnesota.
70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). As a result of the conference, dubbed "the Pound Conference" in honor of
former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound, the ABA designated a Follow-Up Task Force
to continue the dialogue and study begun at the conference. The Follow-Up Task Force issued
this report on civil litigation discovery: "Substantial criticism has been leveled at the operation of
the rules of discovery. It is alleged that abuse is widespread, serving to escalate the cost of
litigation, to delay adjudication unduly and to coerce unfair settlements. Ordeal by pretrial
procedures, it has been said, awaits the parties to a civil lawsuit." American Bar Association,
Report of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Pound Conference Follow-Up]. But this view is not universal. See
Goldstein, Lawsuits and Privacy, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1978, § A, at 15, col. 1, quoting one
leading commercial litigator, as follows: "The practice in many areas of the law has been to make
discovery a sporting match and an endurance contest." The author quoted a high Justice
Department official, however, as cautioning: "Certainly that is true in some places. But the
dimensions are not fully known." Id. Finally, the author noted the dissenting views of other
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Manual for Complex Litigation by the Federal Judicial Center.4 3 The
Manual emphasizes orderly administration of civil litigation through
designated "waves" of discovery, beginning with what might be called
the identification stage, progressing to a substantive discovery--or
discovery-on-the-merits-phase, and culminating in an issue determin-
ing and narrowing phase. Each discovery phase is to be directed by the
court in a regimented series of pretrial conferences and orders. 44
The difficulty with the latter analysis is two-fold: first, not every
case requires the kind of judicial supervision that it envisions; and
second, it does not address or provide mechanisms for the prevention
or deterrence of abuses. 45 In short, the problem is not the scheduling,
but the conduct of discovery. Although the Manual for Complex
Litigation recognizes the need for special procedures for complex
actions, it neither articulates specific procedures nor attempts to illus-
trate the conduct to be prevented. In addition, to rely upon judicial
supervision alone erroneously assumes that all judges are capable of
decisive and swift management of pretrial proceedings. 46 Many federal
experienced judges and litigators. Id. Similarly, a 1978 study of the problem concluded: "Abuse,
like the story of Mark Twain's death, is greatly exaggerated." Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8,
at 476. This discrepancy seems to be due to the distinction between the average case and the
complex case. See Pollack, supra vote 8, at 222.
43. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14. Congress established the Federal Judicial
Center in 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Sat. 664, "to further the development and adoption of
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1976).
The Center conducts research on procedures of court administration, recommends improvements
for the conduct of litigation and provides continuing education for federal judicial personnel. Id.
§ 620(b).
44. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, §§ 1.00, 1.50-1.70, 2.00, 2.20-2.50, 3.00,
3.11, 3.21, 4.00, 4.21-4.23, 5.22.
45. For example: "The suggested procedures of this Manual will prevent abuse of discovery in
complex cases by any and all parties if the judge fairly, speedily, and firmly employs the
procedures described hereinafter.
"If the judge assumes special judicial control of the case, ascertains counsel's current views of
the issues, denies improper or unnecessary use of the class action, firmly controls and expedites
the schedules for class action issue discovery, allows early discovery to narrow the issues,
schedules early submission and determination of preliminary legal questions to narrow issues, and
denies requests for abusive discovery, it will be impossible for any party to engage in abusive
discovery." Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 0.60, at 28-29 (citations omitted).
Several judges have praised this aspect of the Manual. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8, at 270-71.
See also CFTC v. Rosenthal & Co., 74 F.RD. 454, 455 (N.D. Ill. 19771, appeal dismissed, 605
F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, the experience of many counsel in complex actions
indicates that specific rules of conduct are needed to prevent abuses in such litigation. See, e.g.,
In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.RID. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 1975); In re New
York City Mun. Sec. Litigation, MDL No. 314 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (Raby, Magis.)
(Manual for Complex Litigation's procedures failed to curb serious abuses in discovery).
46. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on the Federal Courts,
Report Evaluating the Individual Assignment System in the Southern District of New York After
Three Years Experience, reprinted in 69 F.R.D. 493, 503, 507-08 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
S.D.N.Y. Report]; see United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 495-96 (1st Cir.), cerf. denied, 397
U.S. 1037 (1970). See generally Kaminsky, Available Compromises For Continued Judicial
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judges are struggling just to keep current with their trial calendars. 47
Others, despite having exceptional talent for other aspects of their job,
fail to understand the peculiar characteristics of complex cases. 48
Moreover, a discovery conference or other form of supervision con-
ducted by a hesitant or arbitrary judge, or one who lacks a true
appreciation for what is transpiring outside the courtroom, can exacer-
bate, rather than alleviate, discovery abuses.
It is submitted that, to alleviate discovery abuses effectively, the
abuses must first be openly acknowledged. A set of specific ground
rules must then be prescribed that leave no doubt as to the proper
procedures for counsel to follow when those situations arise. 49 The
Proposed Rules articulate such ground rules together with a revival of
judicial supervision and control, rather than merely suggesting one
course of action to the exclusion of the other. They emphasize that
counsel for all the litigants involved should endeavor to work out
discovery procedures and plans privately, but always subject to the
possibility of specific instructions from and prompt intervention and
control by the court. Admittedly, it is embarrassing for the Bar that
such minute details and essentially elementary moral principles must
be codified. Counsel should honor the spirit rather than merely the
letter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; of course, many do.
Nevertheless, during the past four decades, too many attorneys have
failed in this respect, tainting the conduct of complex litigation for
those who have succeeded.
II. RULE 1: DESIGNATION OF "COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS"
Once the premise that there should be special discovery rules for
complex litigation is accepted, the next task is to ascertain whether a
particular civil action is "complex." Rule 1 of the Proposed Rules
establishes a methodology for designating complex actions and explains
the significance of such a designation.
A. How An Action Is Designated
Rule 1(a) of the Proposed Rules permits any party, or the court on its
own motion, to initiate an inquiry into whether an action should be
designated a "complex civil action." Although a court can make such a
Selection Reform, 53 St. Johns L. Rev. 466, 471-72 (1979). But see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 177 (1979).
47. See S.D.N.Y Report, supra note 46, at 503-05.
48. See note 46 supra.
49. Cf. Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civilized,




designation "at any time after commencement of the action," the rule
seeks to ensure that all parties that have appeared have an opportunity
to be heard before the court reaches its decision. It is expected that the
parties will have a general notion of the scope of the discovery
contemplated and of the claims or defenses likely to be tried. Thus,
their input into the designation decision is desirable.
The question of possible designation is normally expected to arise
after joinder of issue in the pleadings and the serving of the initial
discovery requests, because the nature of the defendant's answer and
the scope of each party's requests will shed light on whether the
discovery process will indeed be complex. Counsel's differing ap-
proaches to the issues may affect the complexity of an action,5 0 or the
parties may simply not wish to finance or authorize extensive discov-
ery. Some actions, however, may be so obviously complex and detailed
that, merely upon a review of the complaint, the complex designation
will be a foregone conclusion. 5 '
B. Which Actions Should Be Designated
Rule 1(c) of the Proposed Rules gives a court the power, "in the
exercise of its discretion," to determine whether the complex civil
action designation should apply, "taking into account such factors as
the court deems appropriate in the particular circumstances pre-
sented." Rule 1(c) obviously grants a court wide latitude in making the
complex designation. This latitude appears necessary to preclude
complex designations for potentially complex actions in which discov-
ery is not handled in a "complex" manner. In addition, it ensures the
inclusion of otherwise simple actions that have been made "complex"
by extensive or complicated discovery requests.512 Also, because the
50. For example, given the apparent ability of defense counsel to seek discovery of class
members, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (T7th Cir 1971).
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972); see Freeman, Current Issues in Class Action Liatgation,
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of the United States. 70
F.R.D. 247, 251, 277-80 (1974). the defendant's discovery plans can convert even the narrowly
conceived class action into a complex civil action. See, e.g., 1050 Tenants Corp v Jakobson. 503
F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
51. As discussed at notes 55-56 iylfra and accompanying text. the approach of the Manual for
Complex Litigation and several of its supporters has been that some types of cases. such as
antitrust actions or class actions, are necessarily complex This is an erroneous assumption
Private antitrust actions under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 15. 26 (1976), such
as dealer termination actions, sometimes involve only two or three parties and a very discrete and
confined subject for discovery. Likewise, although class actions frequently involve many parties
and broad claims, they too sometimes involve only one or two defendants and a narrow question
or trial period. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv , Inc , 461 F Supp 350. 352, 354
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (scope of the antitrust action was limited. even though the potential liability was
one million dollars).
52. In addition to the example previously mentioned, note 50 supra, impleading extra parties
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Proposed Rules, as outlined below, provide for extensive judicial
supervision of the discovery process, a potential exists for further
burdening the federal courts' overcrowded dockets unless the respon-
sibility for applying those controls is placed upon the courts only when
necessary; that is, in complex actions, not all actions. 53
The second sentence of rule 1(c) enumerates certain factors that a
court should consider in deciding whether to designate a case a
complex action. It provides:
In general, but without limitation of the court's discretion in this regard, the designa-
tion "complex civil action" is intended to apply to those civil actions in which any of
the following ... exist: production of voluminous documents has been or is expected to
be requested from any party; or more than five (5) pretrial depositions have been
noticed or are expected to be conducted by any party; or more than twenty-five (25)
interrogatories have been or are expected to be propounded by any party.
By placing the word "or" between the examples in this sentence, the
rule emphasizes that the existence of any one may suffice to create a
complex discovery situation.5 4 The court's discretionary inquiry, how-
ever, is not limited to the factors expressed; they are simply guideposts
exemplifying the spirit that should underly the court's analysis.
The Manual for Complex Litigation gives similarly broad latitude to
the court in identifying complex actions. The Manual defines "complex
litigation" as encompassing "one case or two or more related cases
which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary
treatment, including but not limited to the cases designated as 'pro-
tracted' and 'big.' "55 In addition, the Manual seeks to amplify upon
this rather generic definition by listing several common examples of
complex actions:
as third-party defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14, and the ability to bring in extra parties as
defendants-by-counterclaim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h), can convert an otherwise simple action
into a complex action. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 309, 311-12
(J.P.M.L. 1971); Third-Party Complaint, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Allyn, No. 74 Civ.
4372 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 28, 1979).
53. As then President of the ABA Laurence E. Walsh, a former federal judge, stated at the
1976 Pound Conference: "There (is] a great deal of talk about judicial supervision of discovery,
yet, I always wonder how it is going to be accomplished in a busy court. I know that with the
pressures on the judge to do that which only he can do, it seems unduly burdensome to ask him to
deal with this more mechanical problem of discovery." Pound Conference, supra note 8, at 228.
54. The examples specified are mere rules of thumb based on the experience that discovery Is
more likely to become a complicated and time-consuming matter when they occur. Indeed, as has
been observed in past studies, more than half of the civil actions pending in the federal courts
involved no discovery at all and, of those that involved dis~overy, only 15% had five or more
discovery events. P. Connolly, E. Holleman & M. Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and the Civil
Litigative Process: Discovery 28-29 (1978); Pollack, supra note 8, at 222; see Schroeder & Frank,
supra note 8, at 476-77. But cf. Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 488 (use of discovery found to be
broad in all private civil actions).




Cases of the following types may require special treatment in accordance with the
procedures in this Manual: (a) antitrust cases; (b) cases involving a large number of
parties or an unincorporated association of large membership; (c) cases involving
requests for injunctive relief affecting the operations of a large business entity; (d)
patent, copyright, and trademark cases; (e) common disaster cases, such as those
arising from aircraft crashes; (f) individual stockholders', stockholders' derivative and
representative actions; (g) products liability cases; (h) cases arising as a result of prior
or pending Government litigation; (i) multiple or multidistrict litigation; (j) class
actions or potential class actions; or (k) other civil and criminal cases involving unusual
multiplicity or complexity of factual issues.-6
In contrast, rule 1 of the Proposed Rules is premised on the concept
that cases cannot be defined as complex merely because they are "big"
or because they raise certain federal questions. Certainly these are
characteristics that a court should consider in determining whether to
designate a civil action as complex. More important, however, a court
must balance these characteristics against the other factors involved to
determine whether the controls and supervision contemplated and
required by the new rules will actually expedite or will merely add to
the burdens of pretrial discovery.5 7
C. Significance of Complex Civil Action Designation
Under the Proposed Rules, designation of a case as a "complex civil
action" simply triggers application of the enumerated controls for the
discovery process.58 The Proposed Rules are designed to be used in
tandem with the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, but the former rules "shall be deemed controlling" when a
corflict exists between the two.59
Rule 1(d) of the Proposed Rules further provides that the complex
designation "shall have no effect upon the merits of the action and the
conduct of the trial," except as may be expressly provided in the rules
themselves. The second sentence capsulizes the policy of the rules:
"Such designation and these rules are intended to expedite, simplify
and economize the conduct of pretrial discovery, in order to advance
the policy of rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that all
litigants are entitled to a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action." It is, of course, assumed that the courts will construe the
Proposed Rules to achieve this purpose. The rules are, to a large
extent, self-executing and absolute in their directives. Nevertheless, as
56. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 0.22. See also McDonald, Identification
of "Big Case" and Assignment to a Single Judge, 23 F.R.D. 587 (1958).
57. Cohn, supra note 5, at 287; see Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8. at 483-86.
58. Rule 1(b) provides that "all discovery in [a complex civil] action shall be conducted
pursuant to these rules, together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
59. For example, rule 4(d) of the Proposed Rules requires that identifying interrogatories be
answered within 14 days rather than the 30 days permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). See pt. %'(C)
infra.
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with all statutory rules, judicial interpretation will set the tone for
counsel's voluntary adherence to them. 60
III. RULE 2: SCOPE OF DISCOVERY IN COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
The controversy surrounding discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure has centered, to a great extent, around the determina-
tion of the proper scope of discovery. The basic issue is whether
discoverable matter should encompass all matter that is "relevant," or
whether the test should be somewhat more limited. In addition, once a
proper test is adopted, it must be determined whether it should be
made applicable to "the subject matter of the action," or "the issues,"
or "the claims or defenses raised in the action."'6' The choice of one of
these alternatives, or a combination of them, will undoubtedly affect
the conduct of discovery proceedings and influence the course of
litigation.
A. The "Reasonable Bearing" Standard
As originally adopted in 1938, rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provided for discovery of "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." '62 Thus, "relevance" was the test, and "subject matter of the
action" the bounds for discovery. Furthermore, early judicial interpre-
tation made it clear that "relevance" was to be broadly construed. 63 In
60. The provision of rule 1(b) that the Proposed Rules predominate over the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would set a tone for construction of the new rules and is intended to apply to
situations of direct conflict between the two sets of rules. But it is not intended to strip the courts
of their important power to control unanticipated abuses under or misapplications of the Proposed
Rules by, for example, the "protective orders" provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The latter rule
provides that "the court . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Id.
61. The views of many commentators and judges on the question of the scope of discovery are
affected by their belief in the importance of notice pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 7-16, and their
concern about the effect that specific discovery scope standards would have on the status of
such pleadings. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 8, at 274-75; Pollack, supra note 8, at 222.23;
Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8, at 481. "Notice pleading" refers to the philosophy underlying
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 that pleadings should be brief and state only the "ultimate" facts necessary to
give notice to one's adversary of the nature of the claim being asserted, rather than detail all
evidentiary facts. Development and disclosure of evidentiary facts is left to pretrial discovery.
See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319,
322-23 (2d Cir. 1957). One report on discovery concluded, however, that "abuses are not so much
in the subject matter scope of discovery . . . but in its practical administration." Report of the
ASU Discovery Conference on the Advisory Committee's Prop.osed Revision of the Rules of Civil
Procedure (Discovery) (1978), reprinted in Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8, at 495 app.
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1938).
63. See, e.g., Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1943); Pezza v.
Williams-Bauer Corp., 3 F.R.D. 355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Newcomb v. Universal Match
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1946, a sentence was added to rule 26(b) which, although not intended
to alter the relevance standard, 64 has in fact done just that. That
sentence provides: "It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.'65 Thus, in the context of pretrial discovery, "relevant" does
not mean "admissible" as "relevant" is construed at trial. Rather,
"relevant" matter, in effect, means any matter "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." This phrase has
become the talismanic watchword for counsel conducting discovery. 66
The "reasonably calculated to lead to .. .admissible evidence" test
has proved to be a generally useful and acceptable one. Although a
particular matter may not bear directly on the claims in a case, and
might thus be inadmissible at trial, it may provide counsel with
important background information during discovery, enhancing coun-
sel's understanding of the context in which the issues arose. 67 Com-
mentators, however, have concluded that the scope of discovery under
the present rules provides a vehicle for abusive requests and for undue
protraction and proliferation of discovery. 68 Former Attorney General
Griffin Bell, for example, has often offered the following anecdote:
Corp., 25 F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); accord, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505
(1947).
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1946); see 4 J. Moore Federal Practice. ' 26.5611], at 26-116 (1979).
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, reprinted in 5 F RD. 433, 454 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as 1946 Advisory Comm. Notes].
65. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1946).
66. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202 (S.D N Y_ 1977), Miller v
Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 138-39 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Quaker Chair Corp- v Litton
Business Syss., 71 F.R.D. 527, 530-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1158-59 (D.S.C. 1974); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F R-D. 164,
170-71 (D. Del. 1973). See also Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1974).
67. See, e.g., Milner v. National School of Health Tech., 73 F R-D. 628, 631-32 (E.D. Pa-
1977); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 120 (S.D Ohio 1976); Vollert v-
Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1349-50, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975), Apicella v McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Dow Corning Corp, v. Surgitek, Inc., 61
F.R.D. 578, 579-81 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58
F.R.D. 348, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
68. Justice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court recently summarized this view- "There us
a very real concern in the legal community that the discovery process is now being overused.
Wild fishing expeditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm. Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the
individual, high costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the discovery process as a
lever toward settlement have come to be part of some lawyers' trial strategy." Erickson, supra
note 30, at 288. That view, interestingly, is similar to the fears expressed when the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended in 1946 to broaden the scope of discovery See, e g,
Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recom-
mending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 353 (1946).
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"When I left the practise in 1961 to go on the bench, the familiar
statement of a trial lawyer was that 'I am on trial' or 'I will be on trial.'
Upon returning last year [1977] it had changed to 'I am on discovery'
or 'I will be on discovery.' "69 Indeed, many experienced litigators in
complex cases, particularly commercial cases, have never or rarely
tried cases; discovery itself has become a full time occupation.
Because of the broad scope of discovery in complex litigation, the
process consumes so much time that cases sometimes cannot be
synthesized for effective trial presentation.7 0 The discovery process has
become, for both sides, a litigation weapon to discourage and prevent
prosecution of claims, to force a settlement or merely to wear down an
adversary. 7' Counsel, regrettably, often look upon discovery as a meal
ticket or annuity rather than as a quick and inexpensive quest for
evidence.7 2 These were obviously not the intentions of the draftsmen
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 and should not be per-
mitted to thwart the right of litigants to their day in court.
When the ABA Task Force reviewed the discovery rules in the
mid-1970s, it concluded that narrowing the scope of discovery under
rule 26(b) was "the most significant" revision it could suggest to
counter discovery abuses in civil cases. 74 The Task Force proposed
that the first sentence of rule 26(b)(1) be rewritten to limit discovery to
"any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by
the claims or defenses of any party."75 The Task Force offered the
following rationale for the change:
[S]weeping and abusive discovery is encouraged by permitting discovery confined only
by the "subject matter" of a case.. rather than limiting it to the "issues" presented.
69. Pollack, supra note 8, at 222; see Goldstein, supra note 42, at col. 2.
70. In one antitrust case, the court was confronted with requests for production of literally
"'hundreds of millions of documents.' " Kirkham, supra note 8, at 203; see Xerox Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 75 F.R.D. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The problem of ineffective trial presentation is illustrated
by the Justice Department's antitrust suit against IBM, presently in its fifth year of trial. See In re
IBM Corp., [1980-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,202, at 77,970-71 (2d Cir. 1980).
71. Former Federal Judge Rifkind has observed: "The theory [of the discovery rules] was that
[they] would prevent pleading from being a 'game of skill' and prevent trials from becoming
'sporting matches.' The practice-in many areas of the law-has been to make discovery the
'sporting match' and an endurance contest. Is this a luxury which an overtaxed judicial system
can afford?" Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, Pound Conference, supra note 8,
at 107 (footnote omitted).
72. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court
decried the practice of placing the burden of discovery in complex cases upon associates and
paralegals to build expenses, without regard for the need to do so. Id. at 741. The Court also
condemned the use of protracted and in terrorem discovery tactics to force settlement of meritless
claims. Id.; see SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp.,
72 F.R.D. 110, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
74. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 2-3.
75. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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For example, the present Rule may allow inquiry into the practices of an entire
business or industry upon the ground that the business or industry is the "subject
matter" of an action, even though only specified industry practices raise the "issues" in
the case. 7
6
Although the Task Force acknowledged that the line between "issues"
and "subject matter" is indistinct, it hoped that the recommended
change would induce the courts "not to continue the present practice of
erring on the side of expansive discovery. '77 Similarly, the Task Force
explained that it left the last sentence of rule 26(b)(1) intact because it
assumed "that the rubric 'admissible evidence' contained in that sen-
tence [would] be limited by the new relevancy which emerges from the
term 'issues,' rather than from the more comprehensive term 'subject
matter.' "78
The Judicial Conference, however, found the Task Force proposal
unacceptable. When the Conference issued its Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
March 1978, it proposed that the scope of discovery be limited to
matters "relevant to the claim or defense," 79 rather than to matters
"relevant to the issues raised by the claims or defenses."810 The
Conference explained its rejection of the ABA Task Force proposal as
follows:
The [Judicial Conference] doubts that replacing one very general term [subject matter]
with another equally general one [issues] will prevent abuse occasioned by the
generality of language. Further, it fears that the introduction of a new term in the
place of a familiar one will invite unnecessary litigation over the significance of the
change.8'
Noting that the ABA Task Force acknowledged the difficulty of
distinguishing "issues" from "subject matter," the Conference conclud-
ed that the latter term "should be eliminated.18 2
Unfortunately, it is no easier to determine what matter is relevant to
a "claim or defense" than it is to determine what matter is relevant to
an "issue" in a case. Both terms apparently represent a narrowing of
"subject matter," but neither term is ever defined. Perhaps because of
this inadequacy, the Judicial Conference dropped its proposed changes
for rule 26(b) when it issued its revised draft in 1979, leaving the rule
exactly as presently formulated.8 3 In short, the Task Force and the
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. The Task Force also reported its belief that "the parties should be able to agree upon
[the] definition" of the issues. Id.
78. Id.
79. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 623.
80. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
81. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 627.
82. Id. at 627-28.
83. See Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 330-32.
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Judicial Conference efforts have not helped to clarify the scope of
discovery. The real problem is to define "relevant" and "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," because
that phraseology of rule 26(b) represents the language most counsel
refer to when disputes arise.84
Concededly, the Proposed Rules do not provide a foolproof solution
to this problem. But the rules do adopt an approach that should be
easier to implement than that of the Judicial Conference. Rule 2(a)
provides:
Discovery in any action designated as a complex civil action... shall be permissible as
to any matter, not privileged, that has a reasonable bearing upon any issue in the
action .... Discovery shall be permissible beyond, and shall not be limited to, the tests
of relevance or admissibility of evidence at trial.
The phrase "reasonable bearing upon any issue" is, of course, new
and will present its own definitional problems. Yet, some change in
language is necessary to accomplish a reassessment of the scope of
discovery. Otherwise, past interpretations will likely inhibit any im-
provement in the presently unacceptable state of affairs. The test in
rule 2(a) is intended to reflect two concepts: first, that "issues" is the
more appropriate general standard and second, that although a "rea-
sonable bearing" test will continue to include within the scope of
discovery matter that is not strictly relevant, it will nevertheless close
the floodgates to unreasonable requests opened under' present rule
26(b). 85
First, "issues" is a more appropriate standard than "claim or de-
fense" because, by pleading virtually anything as a claim or defense, a
litigant can easily defeat the purpose of the latter phrase, which is to
narrow the scope of discovery. Further, the issues of a case are more
pertinent in the determination of the litigation, and courts have
extensive experience in issue-finding, which, under certain other pro-
84. See Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 624.
85. The Supreme Court, in effect, suggested a "reasonable bearing upon any issue" standard
in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 11978) (discovery is permissible as to
"any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any
issue"); accord, Quaker Chair Corp. v. Litton Business Syss., Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527, 530-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Parion Theatre Corp. v. RKO Theatres Inc., 319 F. Supp. 378, 379-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 203 F. Supp. 230, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Authority for this standard can also be found in the 1946 Advisory Committee Note to rule
26(b)(1) when the Judicial Conference broadened the scope of discovery beyond "relevant to the
subject matter" to include relevant matter "reasonably calculated to lead to . . . admissible
evidence": "Of course, matters entirely without bearing . . as direct evidence . . . are not
within the scope of inquiry .. " 1946 Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 64, at 454. A special
standard for the scope of discovery in complex litigation is not an entirely novel concept. In some
federal districts, the scope of discovery is subject to local rule. E.g., N.D. Ohio Complex
Litigation R. 4(a); see Cohn, supra note 5, at 273-74. See also In re Fertilizer Antitrust Litigation,
[1979-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,894, at 79,180-81 (E.D. Wash. 1979) (examples of the types of
controls on the scope of discovery that courts may exert in complex litigation).
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cedural rules, is a task they must undertake. 86 Moreover, by requiring
the parties and the court to focus upon the issues in defining the
parameters of permissible discovery, the proposed rule can aid in
crystalizing the issues for trial, which should expedite both discovery
and the trial itself.
Second, the "reasonable bearing" test would replace the confusing
"relevant" test, which has one meaning for discovery and another for
trial. 87 The courts should determine the limits of "reasonable bearing"
as it applies specifically to the scope of discovery. This determination
may, in some cases, be somewhat arbitrary and subjective, but the
Proposed Rules, in any event, contemplate increased judicial supervi-
sion of complex litigation "to ensure adherence . . . to this 'reasonable
bearing' standard"; 88 it is an underlying premise of the rules that more
judicial oversight is needed in such actions. The parties have it within
their power to reduce the court's oversight and potentially harsh
rulings by agreeing privately to limit discovery; failing that, however,
the court should accept this responsibility. 89
B. Privilege Objections
Rule 2(b) of the Proposed Rules grapples with the chronic problem
of abusive objections to discovery for evidentiary privileges. Both rule
2(a)90 and rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9
expressly recognize the right to assert such objections. Under rule
26(b)(1), however, parties often assert objections, based on the
broadest possible construction of a privilege, solely to block inquiry
into sensitive areas. 92 Also, disputes have arisen concerning the extent
86. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment); see United States v Allen, 578 F.2d
'236, 237 (9th Cir. 1978); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Liberian Oceanway Corp.. 398 F_ Supp- 104, 109
(D.P.R. 1975).
87. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
88. Rule 2(a), Appendix.
89. Cf. note 77 supra (ABA Task Force agrees with this conclusion)
90. Rule 2(a) provides: "Discovery ... shall be permissible as to any matter, not privileged
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides: "'Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter.
not privileged .... " Privileged matter, under the discovery rules, is that covered by"- 'privileges'
as that term is understood in the law of evidence," United States v Reynolds. 345 U S. 1, 6
(1953) (citing Fed. R_ Civ. P. 34). Most state evidentiary privileges are available in federal civil
litigation. Fed. R. Evid. 501. The Federal Rules of Evidence require a balancing test to
determine whether a particular privilege should be recognized in a particular case Apicella v
McNeil Laboratories, 66 F.R.D. 78, 81-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 2 J Weinstein & M Berger,
Evidence T 501[02], at 501-19 (1978). See generally Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in
Federal Civil Litigation, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 923 (1975). See also Sola Elec Co. v Jefferson
Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 339 F Supp 942. 944-45 (S D N Y .
aff'd, 470 F.2d 778, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 411 U.S 966 (1973)
92. This problem also arises with respect to work product objections under Fed. R Civ. P
26 (b)(3). See Brennan v. Engineered Prods., Inc., 506 F.2d 299, 303-04 (8th Cir 1974), Duplan
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to which a party asserting a privilege objection must reveal the basis
for and the factual circumstances of the privilege, in order that his
adversary may challenge the assertion and obtain a court order to
disclose the information. 93 When a litigant claims, for example, that
the attorney-client privilege protects a particular conversation, the
question arises whether he must identify the subjects discussed and the
documents seen, or whether these are matters covered by the privi-
lege. 94 Although many privilege objection disputes are bona fide,
counsel too often take an extreme position by refusing to allow
revelation of even the mere fact that a privileged communication
occurred.
Rule 2(b) of the Proposed Rules establishes a framework for analyz-
ing privilege objections, without invading the privileged communica-
tions themselves. The rule provides that the responding party must
state the basis for the claim of privilege and identify the matter to
which the claim purportedly applies, thus enabling the inquiring party
to test the claim if it wishes.95 The required identification would
include the nature of the matter-for example, a discussion, letter or
memorandum-and the date, persons involved, place and, in the case
of a document, the title or other pertinent description.
Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1973); Republic
Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557-58 (2d Cir. 1967); Midland Inv, Co. v. Van
Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). It also arises with respect to anticipated
expert testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule
26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. Ill. L.F.
895; Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U 11. L.F. 169, 188-90; Comment,
Discovery of Expert Information Under Rule 1.280 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 566, 568-69 (1974).
93. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. of America v. Talisman, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 490, 491*
(E.D. Mo. 1975); Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 370 (D.D.C. 1973); Sun Oil Co. v. United
States, 514 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (Ct. Cl. 1975). See also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman Inc., 74
F.R.D. 80, 84-85 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
94. The classic statement of the attorney-client privilege is contained in Judge Wyzanskl's
opinion in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950): "The
privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2)
the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without
the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client." Id. at 358-59; see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515-17 (D. Conn.), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients:
The Control Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424 (1970).
95. This statement must be made "on the record of his deposition if the privilege was asserted
there or otherwise in writing promptly after the privilege is asserted." Rule 2(b), Appendix; see In
re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364, 370 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
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The rationale of rule 2(b) is that the inquiring party is entitled to
know that a privileged communication took place. In most circum-
stances, adverse inferences cannot be drawn at trial against the
responding party from its assertion of the privilege. 96 Thus, harm
should not result from revealing the fact of the privileged communica-
tion. Furthermore, disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the
communication will facilitate a court's review of the claim of privilege
because most privileges are available only if certain conditions existed
at the time of the communication. For example, the attorney-client
privilege is lost if the matter is disclosed to a person not a party to the
attorney-client relationship. 97 Rule 2(b) compels the party asserting the
privilege to reveal the fact of disclosure to a third party in order to
deter assertion of an unfounded privilege when such disclosure has
occurred. Presumably, because counsel and litigants, under other
provisions of the Proposed Rules, would face sanctions for willfully
thwarting discovery 98-in this case, failing to reveal the fact of
disclosure-they will be less inclined to assert strained privilege objec-
tions the true purpose of which is to block legitimate inquiry.
The last sentence of rule 2(b) provides: "Counsel may agree among
themselves that, to facilitate pretrial discovery, information to which a
privilege is claimed shall be disclosed in discovery without waiver of
either the privilege or the rights of the responding party to assert it and
any other party to contest it thereafter." Such private understandings
among counsel are common under the present rules, and should be
encouraged to facilitate full disclosure. Some counsel are, however,
uncertain as to the binding nature and validity of such an understand-
ing;99 rule 2(b) would eliminate such doubt and make clear the official
96. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965); Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1968); Tallo v.
United States, 344 F.2d 467, 468-70 (1st Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Durkee, 147 F. 99,
101-02 (2d Cir. 1906). This rule does not apply, however, in the case of certain privileges, such as
the privilege against self-incrimination in civil cases. See United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14
F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926), aft'd, 275 U.S. 13 (1927); Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the
Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 121, 144-49 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459-60 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding
that the defendant's prior production of documents constituted waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege); see C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 93 (2d ed. 1972). Interesting
waiver questions are presented when the disclosure occurred at a "joint defense" conference. See,
e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. Hunydee v.
United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965) (admission at a joint conference held to be
within attorney-client privilege). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8
Colum. J. L. Soc. Prob. 179 (1972).
98. See pt. VII infra.
99. This uncertainty is due to the strict view of the waiver of a right to claim a privilege. As
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approval of this informal procedure. 100 For example, counsel some-
times inquire into a privileged communication for particular informa-
tion, the disclosure of which is harmless. Thus, the responding party
will not object to disclosing the particular information, but may fear a
later challenge that it has waived its right to claim the privilege as to
the rest of the communication. Rule 2(b) would enable litigants to
avoid such dilemmas. By encouraging fuller disclosure, this provision
may also alleviate some of the suspicion surrounding claims of privi-
lege10' and eliminate unnecessary motions to test privilege claims
concerning insignificant information.
The latter provision is made voluntary rather than mandatory, so as
not to compel a party claiming the privilege to surrender its protections
arbitrarily. It is intended that no negative inference be drawn from a
refusal to enter into the type of agreement provided for by the last
sentence of rule 2(b). Counsel, therefore, should endeavor to promote
both use of the provision and the spirit of disclosure that it seeks to
stimulate.
C. Confidential Information
Rule 2(c) of the Proposed Rules addresses the situation in which
assertedly confidential, but not privileged, information is requested.
explained by the Advisory Committee Notes to the Supreme Court's proposed, but not enacted,
rule 511 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: "[I]n the confidential privilege situations, once
confidentiality is destroyed through voluntary disclosure, no subsequent claim of privilege can
restore it ... ." Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 511, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 259 (1972).
100. Authority for this provision of rule 2(b) can be found in the provision of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(8) that permits the court to review the allegedly privileged matter in camera and then
determine its nature. This procedure is the most common method of testing a claim of privilege.
See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1979); SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1302, 1304 (D.D.C. 1974). The existence
of this procedure negates the contention that, in the context of counsel's private resolution of
discovery disputes, restricted disclosure constitutes a waiver of the privilege even though the
parties agree that disclosure will not have that effect. Nevertheless, the use of the in camera
procedure has been criticized on the ground that disclosure to the court may constitutes such a
waiver. Cf. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United State5, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (Ct, Cl.
1958) (to require submission of documents to a judge for in camera inspection may compromise
the purpose of a privilege, the open expression of opinion); Note, Discovery of Government
Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 168-70 (1976) (same)
[hereinafter cited as Government Discovery].
101. This suspicion may be traced to Professor Wigmore's view that all persons must give
testimony and that testimonial privileges should be severely restricted. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 2285, 2290 (McNaughton ed. 1961); see, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-92
(1972); C. McCormick, supra note 97, § 77, at 156. But see Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778,
783 (2d Cir. 1972) (newsman not required to disclose confidentid sources during civil discovery),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). See generally 4 J. Moore, supra note 64, 26.6013].
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When business competitors are parties to a case, whether on the same
or opposing sides, they may be reluctant to reveal confidential infor-
mation about their respective businesses. 0 2 Such information, how-
ever, generally does not qualify as a trade secret1 0 3 and frequently is
only marginally confidential. Yet, as a practical and financial matter,
the litigants may view its disclosure as a serious threat to their
businesses. Under the present discovery rules, much time is lost in the
motion practice generated by such confidentiality objections. Frivolous
claims of confidentiality have been asserted to cause delay and disrup-
tion, to drive up discovery expenses and to make it difficult for
opposing counsel to assimilate and understand the information being
sought. 10 4 Confidentiality orders, limiting disclosure to counsel and
preventing counsel from revealing the information to their clients, are
often requested in the hope of depriving opposing counsel of their
clients' assistance, rather than out of a genuine fear of business
harm. 105
Rule 2(c) seeks to prevent confidentiality objections from disrupting
102. See, e.g., Chesa Intl Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234, 236-37
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389-90 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies
En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); National Util. Serv_, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Centrifugal Foundry, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 30, 31-32 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Trinagle Mfg. Co. v.
Paramount Bag Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 540, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). See also 9 Conn. L. Rev 326
(1977).
103. The cases provide only limited protection for trade secrets, as contemplated by Fed. R_
Civ. P. 26(c)(7). See Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (loth Cirj, cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965); Triangle Ink & Color Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 61 F R.D. 634,
636 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 235 F. Supp, 856. 857 (S.D.N Y.
1964). But cf. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 411 (N.D.N.Y_ 1973) (limited
protective order granted); International Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392, 394
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (determination of whether information was a trade secret deferred until trial)
Confidential information should be granted protection similar to, but not greater than, that
afforded to trade secrets.
104. In addition, new types of privileges are constantly being claimed and litigated. See, e.g.,
United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 92, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), which denied the existence of
a "scholar's privilege" and emphasized the general rule that it is "the duty of every person to give
evidence pursuant to lawful process." Id. at 95; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972)
(denying the existence of a journalist's privilege). Contra, Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390-91 (ND. Cal. 1976) (claim of scholar's privilege upheld),
This is not to say that all such "new" privileges are frivolous or improper- A witness is entitled to
litigate the question of privilege if acting in good faith. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv, 470 F.2d
778, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); United States v, Liddy, 354 F.
Supp. 208, 213-14 (D.D.C. 1972). Unfortunately, unlike the privilege claimed in Baker, not all
such claims are asserted in good faith. See cases cited note 105 infra.
105. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D 40, 47-49 (S.D-N.Y 1975); Xerox
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Printing Plate Supply Co. v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 818, 818-19 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v Lever Bros.,
193 F. Supp. 254, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 207 (1962). But see
American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.RD. 680, 684-85 (D.R I. 1959J
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the orderly progress of discovery, while preserving the right to protec-
tion of bona fide confidential information. Although rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which covers the scope of discov-
ery,10 6 contains no exception for confidential information as such, rule
2'6(c)(7) contemplates such protection in appropriate circumstances. 107
Rule 2(c) requires litigants to reveal confidential information, but a two
week confidentiality "order" would automatically attach. During that
period, only those persons present at the deposition or who received
the written response in which the confidential information was re-
vealed can make use of it, and their use is limited to the prosecution or
defense of the case. In addition, during the two week period, any
person or party wishing to extend the confidentiality order may apply
to the court for a confidentiality order of whatever length of time it
deems necessary. This provision does not prevent any party that
anticipates a confidentiality problem from moving for a ruling, before
the problem arises, 108 on whether certain information should be sub-
jected to a confidentiality order of limited or permanent application.
Such an anticipatory motion should not delay discovery, but should be
made expeditiously as soon as counsel perceives the problem. 109
Under rule 2(c), counsel may also apply to the court for relief from
the automatic two week period if the period is oppressive or prejudi-
cial. For example, counsel may need the assistance of a non-
participant to evaluate the effect of the disclosed matter on other
discovery scheduled to take place within or immediately following the
two week period. Under these circumstances, if the court finds that the
106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see pt. II(A) supra.
107. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7) authorizes an order that "confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way" if "good cause"
is shown. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rejecting
the analogy to trade secrets).
108. Questions of confidentiality commonly arise during depositions. See, e.g., Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1976). See also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973). Therefore, when feasible, the anticipatory motion should be made prior to the deposition
session at which it is expected to arise. It is worth noting that simply because a party claims a
privilege in discovery does not bar it from obtaining discovery from its adversary. United States
v. 47 Bottles, 26 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.J 1960), aff'd and rev'd in part, 320 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963).
109. Motions of this type should not have to be made through formal channels. As Judge
Pollack has counseled: "The Judge must make himself regularly available in Chambers to mediate
any dispute that arises between counsel. He should arrange to see them in the next day or two
after a request for a meeting-informally, without papers-and listen to the controversy. In the
vast majority of cases he will resolve the matter orally and on the spot. The lawyers will take care
of memorializing the resolution by a simple letter between them-if the oral direction Is
inadequate in the circumstances. If the question is more formal and requires papers, the
conference will have identified the issue to be submitted and briefed. Experience will prove this
route to be a rare occurrence." Pollack, supra note 8, at 225.
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confidentiality objection was asserted to thwart such other discovery,
rather than in good faith, sanctions should be imposed against the
objecting party, its counsel, or both.11°
D. Duplicative Discovery Requests
Rule 2(d) of the Proposed Rules attempts to control the practice of
using interrogatories, depositions and even document requests to seek
identical information, either to harass opposing counsel or because of a
lack of confidence in the effectiveness of a single request. 11 Control-
ling such abuse is not a new concept; indeed, some state procedural
rules contain provisions to the same effect.1 12
Because it is not always possible at the time of the request to
determine which method will best elicit the requested information, 113
rule 2(d) should not be construed to bar duplication altogether. The
rule's directive, however, is clear: counsel should avoid harassing and
unduly burdensome discovery methods. Moreover, the courts should
not hesitate to strike unnecessarily duplicative discovery requests, even
if the requests are not technically improper. 1 4 For example, counsel
sometimes pose interrogatories requesting narrative or chronological
information that is more appropriately provided by deposition.'-,
Under rule 2(d), parties are encouraged to avoid such questions if a
knowledgeable deponent is available." 6
Nevertheless, situations may arise in which an interrogatory is an
110. See Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 873 (D.D.C.
1973); pt. VII infra. See also Government Discovery, supra note 100, at 172-73.
111. See, e.g., In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Fishman v. A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704, 705 (D.V.I. 1975); Boyden v.
Troken, 60 F.R-D. 625, 626 (N.D. Mll. 1973). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3) provides that the court may
direct, on motion for a protective order, "that ... discovery . . . be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery." Rule 2(d) of the Proposed Rules
would eliminate the need for such a motion by making the concept of nonduplicative discovery a
general guideline for complex actions.
112. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 201(a) (1975) provides, for example: "Duplication of discovery
methods to obtain the same information should be avoided." See Kiely, Re-discovering Discovery:
A Fresh Look At the Old Hound, 10 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Procedure 197, 198 n.4 (1977).
113. The courts have made it clear that, generally, the different methods of discovery are
complimentary and not mutually exclusive. Stonybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165,
167 (D. Conn. 1961); see United States v. National Steel Corp., 26 F.R.D. 603, 606 (S.D. Tex.
1960); Bullard v. Universal lfillwork Corp., 26 F.R.D. 144, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). But see
Franchise Programs, Inc. v. Mr. Aqua Spray, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
114. See cases cited note I1l supra.
115. See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428, 429 (N.D. I1. 1976).
See also Triangle Mfg. Co. v. Paramount Bag Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 540, 542-43 (E.D.N.Y.
1964).
116. For example, a participant at a series of meetings would be a knowledgeable depondent
to trace a certain discussion running through those meetings.
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appropriate prelude or companion to a deposition,'" 7 and rule 2(d) is
not intended to bar the use of both methods in those situations.
Similarly, as discussed in the next section, duplication of discovery is
sometimes appropriate to obtain admissions and to preempt dispute at
trial over facts learned in discovery. 118 For example, deposition ques-
tions should be permitted as to whether certain transactions are
reflected in books and records that have been produced in response to
a document request, to obtain simple, usable admissions of those
matters at trial. 119 Similar questions as to the contents of documents
should also be permitted, because they may expedite the trial and
obviate the need to introduce the documents into evidence at trial. 120
Because duplication of discovery is appropriate under some circum-
stances, rule 2(d) is drafted as a suggestive rather than a mandatory
rule. Rule 6 of the Proposed Rules nonetheless provides the potential
"hammer" of sanctions for unreasonable violations of the rule, and is
expected to deter flagrant violations of its spirit as well as of its letter.
E. Facts Already Known to Inquiring Party
Although not expressly provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, courts generally permit discovery of facts known by the
inquiring party and of facts known to the public generally. 12 Use of
discovery with respect to such facts has two recognized and approved
purposes: to obtain sworn admissions for use at. trial, and to preempt
later dispute over the pertinent facts and issues. 122 Questioning into
such matters, however, can be overly broad, and is sometimes used
solely to protract discovery and to harass an adversary. For example, a
117. See Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (S.DN.Y.
1962). See also O'Brien v. IBEW, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1186-87 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
118. See, e.g., Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co v. Loew's Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347,
352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
119. See, e.g., Shank v. Associated Transp., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 472, 473-74 (M.D. Pa. 1950);
Lay, Plaintiff's Practical Uses of Discovery Techniques, in The Practical Lawyer's Manual of
Pretrial Discovery 99, 101-02 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Savini, 25 F.R.D. 275, 276 (D. Mass. 1960); Bairn & Blank, Inc.
v. Philco Distribs., Inc., 25 F.R.D. 86, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
121. Cohn v. Dart Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 792, 793 (D. Mass. 1976); United States v
Beatrice Foods Co., 52 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D. Minn. 1971); Blau v. Lamb, 20 F.R.D. 411, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813
(1963).
122. 4 J. Moore, supra note 64, 'r 26.59. "The simple method of proof afforded by admissions
of facts which his opponent could not in honesty deny should not be unavailable to a party simply
because these facts may be within his own knowledge. . . . Inquiry as to matters within the
party's own knowledge or of general public knowledge is valuable also for the purpose of tying




prior discovery request may have already elicited the information
sought. In these circumstances, a protective order is appropriate. 123
Rule 2(e) of the Proposed Rules codifies the permissibility of discov-
ery of known facts. It also prohibits questioning if its purpose or
usefulness is counter-productive, and is intended to discourage
obstructive objections to proper questions. For example, the contents
of records may not be in dispute, but the questioner may still need or
wish to know the extent of a witness's knowledge about them at
different times, or that his opponent does not contest their accuracy. 12 4
Likewise, general facts about an industry, location or product at issue
may be mutually known, 2 - yet, the questioner may need admissions
about such facts for trial. Although a notice to admit'2 6 can often
achieve the same result, the freedom to inquire granted by rule 2(e)
should achieve the result with less delay and paper work, an especially
desirable goal in complex civil litigation.
When there is a factual dispute between the parties, however, it
cannot be said that the opposing party's or witness's version of the
facts is "known" to the questioner. Thus, rule 2(e) would not apply; the
opposing party is permitted to elicit the degree of dispute and test the
basis for, and propriety of, his opponent's or the witness's version of
the facts.
127
F. Other Aspects of Scope of Discovery
The principal trouble areas under the present discovery rules with
respect to complex civil litigation are addressed in the Proposed Rules,
but the Proposed Rules are not intended to replace the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure altogether; the latter rules have many specific,
workable aspects. 128 Thus, rule 2(f) of the Proposed Rules provides
that, "except as otherwise specifically provided," the scope of discovery
123. See, e.g., Hikel v. Abousy, 41 F.R.D. 152, 155 (D. Mid. 1966), Klein v Leader Elec
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 624, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1948); United States v American Locomotive Co-, 6
F.R.D. 35, 37 (N.D. Ind. 1946).
124. See, e.g., Wilmington Country Club v. Horwath & Horwath, 46 F R D 65, 66-67 (E-D
Pa. 1969).
125. See, e.g., Needles v. F W. Woolworth Co., 13 F.R.D 460, 461 CE D Pa 1952).
126. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.
127. See, e.g., Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F Supp 1080. 1101-04 (D
Minn. 1974). See also United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968). Justice Brennan has
explained: "Pretrial discovery ... can truly be employed as a scalpel to lay bare the true factual
controversy, and therein lies the basic worth of the procedures toward the attainment of the ideal
of dispositions according to right and justice." Brennan. The Continuing Education of the
Judiciary in Improved Procedures, 28 F.R.D. 42, 49 (1960).
128. Rule 1(b), however, provides that. in the event of conflict between these two sets of
rules, the provisions of the Proposed Rules shall control. See note 59 supra and accompanying
text.
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under the Proposed Rules shall be the same as is permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 129
IV. RULE 3: DEPOSITIONS IN COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
Complex civil litigation normally involves extensive depositions,
often protracted both in length and number. 130 Rule 3 of the Proposed
Rules is designed to control abuses occurring in connection with such
depositions.
A. Deposition Scheduling
Rule 3(a) of the Proposed Rules requires the prompt determination
of a detailed deposition schedule, either by private agreement among
the parties or, when they cannot agree, by the court.' 31 This deposi-
129. An example of a discovery scope dispute which has been adequately resolved by the 1970
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the one which existed over whether and
when discovery of contentions is appropriate. Several decisions illustrate the pre-1970 disparity of
views on this matter. Compare United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 93, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and Katz
Exclusive Millinery, Inc. v. Reichman, 14 F.R.D. 37, 38 (W.D- Mo. 1953) with United States v.
Aluminium, Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 758, 763 (D.N.J. 1966); Lunn v. United Aircraft Corp., 25 F.R.D.
186, 189-90 (D. Del. 1960) and United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 595-96 (D.
Md. 1963). See also Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 149 (S.D,N.Y. 1969);
United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). Fed.
R. Civ. P. 33(b) now provides that contentions are appropriately discoverable through use of
interrogatories, rather than depositions. See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp,, 59
F.R.D. 500, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But cf. 4 J. Moore, supra note 64, 9 26.56[3], at 26-169 ("Rule
33 should not be taken as introducing a technical objection to the mode of inquiry."). Rule 33(b)
wisely provides for the court to oversee this form of discovery to ensure that it is used at a time
when the responding party has had a sufficient opportunity to gather his other proof, and that the
question is not merely a device to harass. During depositions, it remains permissible to ask
questions on opinions as to facts. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 54 F.R.D.
474, 477-78 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 1307 (3d Cir. 1972); Falk v. United States,
53 F.R.D. 113, 115 (D. Conn. 1971); Umphres v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1116,
1116-17 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Cases decided subsequent to adoption of the 1970 amendments have
generally construed rule 33(b) broadly, while sensibly limiting it to opinions and conclusions that
bear on the issues in the case. Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080,
1101-04 (D. Minn. 1974); Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 61 F.R.D. 411, 413-14
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 59 F.R.D. 500, 502-03 (N.D.
Ill. 1973). See also Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Because
these considerations are consistent with the purposes of rule 2 of the Proposed Rules, there is no
need for a new rule addressing these issues.
130. See Kirkham, supra note 11, at 505-07.
131. The proposed amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) is not drastically different in concept.
It would authorize any party to request a "discovery conference" with the court at any time "after
commencement of an action." Following the conference the court would enter an order inter alia
"establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, If any; and
determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the
proper management of discovery in the action." As a prelude to that order, the new rule would
require that the request for the conference include "a [proposed] plan and schedule of discovery"
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tion schedule is to be fixed no later than twenty days after the action is
designated a complex civil action. Counsel are encouraged to reach
agreement among themselves 132 to reduce the likelihood of dispute
over other aspects of the depositions. Absent such agreement, each
party is required to submit their suggested schedules to the court to
coordinate and finalize. The twenty days allotted for this process may,
in some instances, prove too brief, particularly if the action is desig-
nated a complex civil action at its commencement. 33 But it should
allow sufficient time for counsel to review the issues and basic facts
and to meet and discuss their respective views and schedules. If, after
some time elapses, counsel finds the deposition schedule deficient, rule
3(a) expressly permits each side to alter or add to the deposition
schedule, subject to the court's review and approval, either by agree-
ment or notice of deposition. Thus, a requirement of prompt initial
scheduling should not prejudice the parties, but will rather stimulate
prompt discovery and prevent undue delay in the initiation of discov-
ery.
The last sentence of rule 3(a) also permits the parties to schedule
depositions either "by name of deponent or, if the identity of the
proposed deponent is not known, by such job or other description as is
possible." This aspect of the rule is taken from rule 30(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 134 but unlike the latter, it is not
and a statement of any limitations and other orders proposed with respect to discovery. Revised
Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 330-32. See also ABA Task Force Report,
supra note 31, at 4-6. The balance of rule 3(a) provides many of these powers to the court.
132. The Proposed Rules adopt the rationale of the ABA Task Force in this regard: "The
Committee is also aware . . . that judicial time is precious and should be husbanded. The
suggested Rule attempts a compromise among these conflicting themes. It continues to impose
principal responsibility upon the litigating Bar for the preparation of a case. Accordingly, in the
great majority of cases, opposing counsel should be able, without judicial intervention, to
formulate an appropriate plan and schedule of discovery in relation to issues readily defined by
agreement. Good practice would then dictate that counsel reduce their agreement to writing to
permit ascertainment if a dispute arises later. In addition, a court may well require that it be
informed of such an agreement.
"In those instances, however, where the parties cannot agree either upon the definition of issues
or upon a plan and schedule of discovery, the court should be available upon the request of either
party to resolve differences." ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 5-6.
133. It is anticipated that the complex designation will normally be made only after initial
discovery requests are served, because such requests will generally have a bearing on whether the
action should be so designated under rule 1. When that is not the case, the court can, in its
discretion, briefly extend the 20 day period of rule 3(a).
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) provides: "A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as
the deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental
agency and describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested.
In that event, the organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or
managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for
each person designated, the matters on which he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a non-party
organization of its duty to make such a designation. The persons so designated shall testify as to
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limited to corporations, associations and partnerships. Rule 3(a) en-
compasses all situations in which the examining party does not know
the name of the person it wishes to examine, but can accurately
describe the job or position that the deponent holds-for example, the
margin clerk in a brokerage firm, the doctor or nurse who treated an
airline accident victim or the particular sales representative in an
antitrust action. 3s Rule 30(b)(6), however, permits the deposed orga-
nization to choose the person to testify and to select the specified
category of information with respect to which the witness will testify,
allowing the organization to pick among its employees and thereby to
hold back the particular knowledgeable person the examining party
would want to depose. 136 Under rule 30(b)(6), therefore, if the examin-
ing party insists on examining a particular witness, it will be con-
fronted with the prospect of further expense and delay and a possible
motion by the deposed organization for a protective order to prevent-
duplication of discovery. 137 Rule 3(a) closes the loophole contained in
rule 30(b)(6) by not permitting the organization to choose its witness or
to select the subject matter.
To a certain extent, "identifying interrogatories"'138 can avoid this
entire problem by bringing forth the names and positions of all
knowledgeable witnesses. The last sentence of rule 3(a), however,
gives the examining party the ability to schedule depositions even
before such interrogatories are answered, or even without having to
resort to them. This ability can save time and expense for all parties
and the court.
matters known or reasonably available to the organization. This subdivision (b) (6) does not
preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules." General
descriptions based solely on identifications such as "having knowledge of the facts" or "tile
transaction at issue," have been held insufficient. See, e.g., Amato v. Barber S.S. Lines, Inc., 30
F.R.D. 69, 69-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Williams v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 19 F.R.D. 285, 285-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169, 171-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
135. See, e.g., Shenker v. United States, 25 F.R.D. 96, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (the "captain" or
"master" of a vessel), aff'd, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964); Aston
v. American Export Lines, 11 F.R.D. 442, 442 (S.D.N.Y 1957) ("master" of a vessel).
136. For an illustration of how narrowly and carefully drawn designations can reduce the
potential for abuse in this area, see V.O. Machinoimport v. Clark Equip. Co., 11 F.R.D. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
137. It has also been held under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) that the witness designated by the
corporation is the only witness considered to be the corporate party, so that other corporate
employees or representatives, besides officers or agents, of course, are to be treated as non-parties
for the purposes of depositions. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80, 83
(W.D. Okla. 1977). This has potential significance for the use of depositions at trial, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 32, and, thus, is an important factor to resolve before trial. See also Terry v. Modern
Woodmen, 57 F.R.D. 141, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
138. For a definition of "identifying interrogatories," see rule 4(a) of the Proposed Rules,
Appendix and pt. V(A) infra.
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B. Control of Deposition Procedure
Rule 3(b) of the Proposed Rules grants the court broad powers when
scheduling depositions to determine how, where and on what matters
depositions can and will be taken. Included within the scope of the
court's powers would be everything from the sequence of questionings,
to the length of the depositions, to the manner in which they will be
conducted-for example, stenography, telephone or videotape. ,39 The
court is empowered to strike any proposed deposition entirely, or, less
drastically, to limit its scope or subject matter.
It is also intended under rule 3(b) that counsel raise all anticipated
objections and problems at the time the depositions are scheduled
pursuant to rule 3(a). 140 Such objections might include, for example,
proposed time-frame limitations, territorial restrictions, industrial re-
strictions and confidentiality objections. Requiring the anticipated
objections to be set forth early would enable the court to rule on them
before controversies arise in the midst of depositions. 141 If the court
finds that a party has unreasonably failed to raise an anticipated
objection at the time of scheduling, it would have the power, which it
should not hesitate to exercise, to deny relief on the matter or to order
sanctions against that party. 142
In ruling at the outset of discovery on the scope of discovery to be
covered in the depositions, the court must carefully avoid prejudicing
the case or otherwise preventing its full development. 43 The court
should permit reasonably broad latitude in discovery, as contemplated
by rule 2(a). 1 4 4 Arbitrary cut-off dates or other such restrictions
suggested by counsel should normally be overruled. The court should
139. The Judicial Conference's amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b) provides for possible
depositions by telephone, or other non-stenographic means, by stipulation of the parties or order
of the court. Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 332-36; see ABA Task
Force Report, supra note 31, at 9-17. See also Lucas v. Curran, 62 F RtD. 336 (ED. Pa. 1974);
Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
140. See pt. IV(A) supra.
141. This is consistent with the type of powers which the court would have at the discovery
conference envisioned by the Judicial Conference's and ABA Task Force's proposed amendments
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). See note 131 supra. In appropriate circumstances, the court would still
have the power to limit or even terminate an on-going deposition to prevent harassment or
unreasonable conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d); see, e.g., Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237,
239-40 (D.R.I. 1957); Miller v. Sun Chem. Corp., 12 F.R.D. 181, 182 (D.N.J. 19S2), Krier v.
Muschel, 29 F. Supp. 482, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); cf. Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, SO F.RID. 379,
380 (D.V.I. 1970) (motion to terminate the examination denied because facts did not indicate that
examination was "annoying, embarrassing or oppressing"); Clark v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 2 F.R.D.
94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (same), modified, 137 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1943).
142. See rule 6(a), (c) of the Proposed Rules, Appendix; pt. VI infra.
143. See, e.g., Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Delta Corp., 71 F RID. 697, 701-02
(,V.D. Okla. 1976); United States v. Lomar Discount Ltd., 61 F.RD. 420, 423 (N.D. I1. 1973),
aff'd, 498 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974).
144. See pt. mI(A) supra.
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not, however, permit unreasonably broad or boundless discovery
requests and should enforce adherence to the reasonable bearing test of
rule 2(a). 4 5 In any event, as the depositions progress, the court can
and should reconsider and reopen the issue of the proper scope of the
depositions upon a showing of good cause or abuse. 146
C. Interruption of Depositions
Depositions in complex civil actions are often left uncompleted for
further questioning or for review of documents requested or learned of
for the first time during the initial deposition. For the most part, the
Proposed Rules should help minimize open depositions by requiring,
for example, that document requests with respect to each deposition be
made and complied with, whenever possible, prior to the deposi-
tion. 147 Occasions will inevitably arise, however, in which matters are
left unresolved during a deposition-for instance, when a witness
agrees to check on a matter or to look for a record not readily available
at the site or at the time of the deposition.
Under the present rules, open and uncompleted depositions have led
to disputes as to whether the next scheduled deposition should be
conducted before the open deposition is completed. 148 A questioner
may prefer to finish deposing each witness before beginning the next
deposition, fearing that the next deposition or depositions will alert the
witness to matters that will influence his testimony, or to unrealized
pitfalls in it. Also, the deposed party may want subsequent witnesses
to have the benefit of reading the full testimony of prior witnesses
before testifying on the same matters. Implicit in these observations is
the reality that a witness's recollection is often refreshed or reshaped by
other events in the case and by what he or she hears. In addition,
counsel schedule depositions strategically and, in preparing witnesses
for deposition, generally call prior testimony to their attention. On the
one hand, the deposed party attempts to schedule its witnesses with a
view to who will be a strong lead-off witness, who can best tell the
"party-line" and who will perform better as a follow-up witness. On
the other hand, the questioner will schedule witnesses in terms of
145. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 141 supra.
147. See rule 3(d) of the Proposed Rules, Appendix; pt. IV(D) infra.
148. The 1970 amendment creating Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) does not address the problem of
uncompleted depositions. Compare Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 50 F.R.D. 251, 264 (N.D. Miss.
1970), vacated on other grounds, 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972);
and Armstrong Cork Co. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 16 F.R.D. 389, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(denying priority of completions) with Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlcin, 288 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.
1961); Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 9, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) and Fox v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 202, 203-04 (D. Del. 1951) (adopting a rule that one deposition
must be completed before the next is begun).
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whose story he believes he can best penetrate or who has the most
detailed knowledge. In a corporate case, for example, the timing of an
executive officer's deposition relative to those of his subordinates is a
matter of careful planning and forethought, so that one side or the
other may refuse to proceed until a particular witness has been
deposed. This causes delay in the completion of discovery and may
result in the protraction of a deposition merely to stall discovery and
derail the case. 149
Rule 3(c) of the new rules will eliminate this practice by providing
that "[t]he failure to complete any deposition within the time period
scheduled or allotted for it . . . shall not affect or defer the conduct of
any other deposition [in the schedule]"; further, "[t]he uncompleted
deposition shall be completed as soon as practical within the schedule
of depositions on a date or dates to be agreed upon by counsel or,
failing that, fixed by the court." The theory underlying rule 3(c) is that
facilitating prompt completion of discovery in a complex civil action is
more important than the strategy of deposition sequences.' 50 Rule 3(c)
will, in some cases, favor the questioner and in others the deposed
party. It should, however, force all parties to make realistic assess-
ments, at the time the deposition is scheduled, of how long each
deposition will last and what the sequence of witnesses will be. It
should also provide incentive to the party that believes the sequence of
depositions is important to work against its delay. Rule 3(c) should, in
any event, prevent the case from becoming bogged down because of a
few unfinished depositions.
Rule 3(c), on first reading, may seem prone to the abuses it seeks to
correct. Deposing counsel may attempt to schedule an inordinate
amount of time for certain witnesses to protect against an uncompleted
deposition. Also, counsel wishing to delay may try to stall the deposi-
tion on preliminary matters to use up the allotted time period before
the questioner reaches the heart of his inquiry. Finally, if one counsel
uses the full time period to examine a witness, there may be no time
left in the session for cross-examination, frustrating the cross-
examining counsel's planned inquiry and forcing him to prepare again
to cross-examine at a later session. Nevertheless, determined control
by the court under rule 3(a) and the judicious use of sanctions under
rule 6151 should counter these practices and prevent serious abuse. As
149. A description of such tactics under the old priority rules can be found in Caldwell-
Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 11 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See
Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475, 477 (1959);
Discovery Developments, supra note 39, at 955.
150. But cf. Midland Inv. Co. v. Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 50 F.R.D. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (taking a contrary view of the relationship between depositions, priority and expedition in a
complex action).
151. See pt. VII infra.
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previously explained, the rationale of the Proposed Rules is that, as a
general matter, increased judicial control is necessary in complex civil
actions.' 5 2 This control should be used to check any new abuses that
arise under the Proposed Rules, as well as those abuses the rules are
designed to correct. 153
D. Document Requests for Depositions
One of the chronic delaying aspects of present discovery procedure
in complex civil actions is counsel's inability or failure to coordinate
depositions with document productions. 154 Depositions are conducted
in piecemeal fashion to uncover the existence of relevant documents
and, because rule 34(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
parties to take up to thirty days to respond to a document request,'"5
then left open to await production of these documents for use in
questioning. Counsel ask endless questions concerning the existence of
documents, driving up the cost of the depositions and wasting the time
of all concerned. In short, those determined to delay can easily play the
game of document "cat-and-mouse" to frustrate and wear down their
adversaries in endless depositions. 156
152. See pt. I supra.
153. In this respect, the Proposed Rules agree with the Judicial Conference's comment that
"abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the court as soon as abuse is threatened."
Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 332. The importance of broad
supervisory powers of the courts in discovery matters has often been demonstrated. See, e.g.,
Stark v. Photo Researchers, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 18, 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Apicella v. McNeil
Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50
F.R.D. 179, 180 (D. Vt. 1970).
154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(5) provides that a deposition notice "may be accompanied by a
request made in compliance with Rule 34 for the production of documents and tangible things at
the taking of the deposition." See Marcoux v. Mid-States Livestock, 66 F.R.D. 573, 580 (W.D.
Mo. 1975). Such a request, however, is subject to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, including
its 30 day production period. The rule was amended in 1970 to overrule the prior rule that
forbade a deposition notice to compel production of documents. See Harrison v. Prather, 404
F.2d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 1968). The pre-1970 party seeking such productions had to serve a
subpoena duces tecum with his or her deposition notice, and was subject to the requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (1946) that "good cause" be shown for the documents to be produced. Samoff
v. Williamsport Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 313 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (M.D. Pa. 1970), qff'd,
451 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1971). See also United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); United States v. IRM Corp., 81 F.R.D. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Advisory Committee
Note to the 1970 amendment made it clear, however, that the new procedure was intended for
production of "few and simple" documents only and that, if "many and complex documents" are
sought, it might be appropriate for the deponent to seek a protective order remitting the examiner
to rule 34 alone for that phase of his or her document discovery. Preliminary Draft of 1970
Amendments, supra note 5, at 244-45.
155. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
156. Under current practice, although the witness can be compelled to disclose the existence
of documents at his deposition, he cannot be compelled to produce them there merely an oral
request. Samoff v. Williamsport Bldg. & Constr Trades Council, 313 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (M.D,
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Documents play a crucial role in the conduct of depositions in
complex civil actions; thus, better coordination between document
requests and depositions is essential if discovery in such actions is to be
expedited and its costs controlled. Rule 3(d) of the Proposed Rules
attempts to minimize this problem by requiring the parties, whenever
possible, to make and respond to all document requests with respect to
a planned deposition prior to the deposition. At present, this procedure
is sometimes used by counsel on a voluntary basis, invariably with
positive results.15 7 Rule 3(d), therefore, does not contemplate that
depositions await the expiration of the usual thirty days between a
document request and the response thereto. Instead, the second sen-
tence of rule 3(d) provides:
Whenever possible, counsel who plan to question at a deposition shall request those
specific documents that he or she believes are needed for the orderly, complete and
uninterrupted flow of the deposition . . ; whenever possible, such documents shall be
provided to such counsel (subject to objection, if any) at least three (3) days before the
deposition.
Rule 3(d)'s procedure is not intended to permit overly broad document
requests; hence, it refers only to "specific documents." If extensive
requests are necessary for the efficient conduct of a deposition, how-
ever, they should be made in accordance with rule 5 of the Proposed
Rules15 8 and rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 9 The
court should take those requests into account when fixing the deposi-
tion schedule under rule 3(a) of the Proposed Rules.
The phrase "specific documents" refers not only to individually
designated documents, but also applies to specific, readily identifiable
documents or groups of documents, such as memoranda written by the
deponent, that are obviously pertinent to the deponent's testimony. If
the depositions take place after the general document production under
proposed rule 5 and present rule 34, the likelihood is that these
"specific documents" will have been included and produced. Rule 3(d)
enables discovery of those documents that may not have been pro-
duced in response to the general requests or the existence of which has
only come to light in other, more recent, discovery. If depositions are
proceeding prior to the general document production, such as when the
questioner already knows which specific document or documents relate
to the witness and wishes to proceed with the deposition limited to
Pa. 1970), af'd, 451 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1971). This causes additional paperwork and needless
delay in obtaining documents.
157. The Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14. § 2 20. specifically endorses thi.
procedure: "[Pireliminary first wave discovery may include the documents necessary for an
efficient examination of witnesses at depositions .
158. See pt. VI infra.
159. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
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those specific documents, rule 3(d) would enable the latter more
expeditious form of deposition-document discovery.160
Rule 3(d) is not intended to restrict any party from seeking discovery
of other documents. Because its purpose is to expedite the conduct of
depositions, the rule's last sentence provides that other documents can
be requested during or after the deposition, or, if the deposition is left
open, pending resumption. Rule 3(d) also permits questions at the
resumed deposition session relating to newly produced documents, the
existence or pertinence of which were, in good faith, first discovered at
the earlier deposition session.1 6 1 Thus, if a deposition has been left
uncompleted, the parties are encouraged to complete any document
productions logically related to it that were not anticipated when the
deposition was begun. Prompt request for and production of such
documents is needed to ensure a fair deposition. Permissible document
requests during or after the deposition are subject, however, to the
qualification that additional document requests that could readily have
been but were not made before the deposition cannot be the basis for
an adjournment of the deposition. 162 Because the parties will know
that they run the risk of waiving or losing their right to ask questions
relating to such documents, this qualification should provide incentive
to litigants to make their document requests promptly and thoroughly,
rather than to attempt to use such requests to delay the depositions.
E. The Role of Counsel at Depositions
Of all the discovery abuses addressed in the Proposed Rules, per-
haps the most distressing are those committed by witnesses' counsel at
depositions. Counsel have demonstrated a stubborn disregard for the
spirit of the deposition discovery rules as a quest for the truth.
Interruptions, obstruction, thinly-veiled coaching and instructions not
to answer thwart discovery and demean the profession. Of course, not
all counsel are guilty of such abuses and, to be sure, it is sometimes the
questioner's provocative conduct or grossly improper questions that
elicit these responses. Unfortunately, the smooth functioning of the
discovery process can no longer rely upon judicial admonition on a
160. Rule 3(d)'s initial phrase "unless otherwise ordered by the court" is intended to permit
the court to alter this procedure if abused. It is expected that the rule 3(d) procedure will normally
be implemented without difficulty, but there may be exceptional circumstances requiring more
direct judicial control over it; this phrase in rule 3(d) is intended to encompass those exceptional
circumstances. The phrase is not, however, intended to be interpreted as opening a loophole to
avoid rule 3(d)'s required procedures.
161. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 26 F.R.D. 172, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See
also Richland Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 480 (D.S.C.
1966).
162. Cf. Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 77 F.R.D. 712 (1). Md. 1978) (regarding the present
relation between document requests and depositions).
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case-to-case basis. 163 Abuses by witnesses' counsel are sufficiently
prevalent and unwarranted to require express prohibition by rule.
1. Directions Not to Answer
Perhaps the paradigm example of obstruction is counsel's instruction
to the witness not to answer a question that counsel fears. or simply
does not like when the witness is confronted with the ultimate direct
question or his version of events is penetrated by persistent question-
ing. Knowing that there is no judge present, the witness's counsel may
reason that he can rehabilitate the witness either by preventing a
crucial admission or by challenging the questioner to interrupt the flow
of questioning to seek a judicial ruling. 164 More often than not, by the
time a ruling is obtained, the witness has a prepared, coached answer
with which to respond.
Directions not to answer in these circumstances violate the basic
principles of the discovery rules 165 and are nothing but a veiled
obstruction of justice. Litigation is not a sporting event in which the
adage "winning isn't everything, it's the only thing" can be tolerated.
Recognizing this, some courts have issued express rulings prohibiting
counsel from instructing witnesses not to answer, with successful
results. 166 Particularly in multi-party or multi-district actions, such
rulings have expedited depositions considerably and have reduced the
cost of discovery. 167
In Shapiro v. Freeman, 168 the court aptly synthesized the problem
163. Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
164. This practice is so common that, despite Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)'s esplicit requirement that
"[e]vidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections," certain commentators brazenly
recommend it. See, e.g., Kornblum, The Oral Civil Deposition: Preparation and Examination of
Witnesses, in The Practical Lawyer's Manual of Pre-trial Discovery 3. 17-18 (1973). Professor
Moore suggests that a deponent may decline to answer a question that he believes "is not relevant
to the subject matter of the pending action." 4A J. Moore, supra note 64, T 37,0212], at 37-32; see
id. T 30.59, at 30-111. The authorities cited by Professor Moore for this view do not, however,
address this question. In addition, Professor Moore's view appears to have been squarely rejected
by the courts. See cases cited note 166 infra.
165. See INTRODUCTION supra.
166. See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir, 1977); United
States v. IBM Corp., 79 F.R.D. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 FRD.
518 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re New
York City Mun. Sec. Litigation, MDL No. 314 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) (Raby, Magis 1; In re
Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litigation, MDL No. M-21-19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13. 1978) (Tenney, J.)
(pretrial order); see Preyer v. United States Lines Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd,
546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976); Pollack, supra note 8, at 226; cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman Inc.,
74 F.R.D. 80, 83-84 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (deponent who objects to questions on ground of
relevancy must answer the question and note his objection on the record).
167. See cases cited note 164 supra.
168. 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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and the correct response. A private plane had crashed into the home of
a young girl, allegedly causing her psychiatric shock and leading to a
negligence suit against the pilot's estate.169 When the defense sought
discovery of the child's prior behavior at school from school officials,
the plaintiff's counsel instructed the officials not to confer with the
defense counsel. Subsequently, when the officials were deposed, they
were instructed by the plaintiff's counsel not to answer questions
posed. 170 Finding the conduct of the plaintiff's counsel obstructive, the
court imposed sanctions against them, stating:
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . clearly permit[s] a liberal
examination of Sherrill Shapiro's teachers. In addition, Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules
unequivocally mandates that during depositions upon oral examination "evidence
objected to shall be taken subject to the objections." Thus, even if the plaintiffs'
attorney believed the questions to be without the scope of the [prior] order, he should
have done nothing more than state his objections. It is not the prerogative of counsel,
but of the court, to rule on objections. Indeed, if counsel were to rule on the propriety
of questions, oral examinations would be quickly reduced to an exasperating cycle of
answerless inquiries and court orders. Alternatively, if the plaintiffs' attorney believed
that the examination was being conducted in bad faith, that the information sought
was privileged, or that the deponents were being needlessly annoyed, embarrassed, or
oppressed, he should have halted the examination and applied immediately to the ex
parte judge for a ruling on the questions, or for a protective order, pursuant to Rule
30(d). He had no right whatever to impose silence or to instruct the witnesses not to
answer, especially so when the witnesses were not even his clients.' 7'
Unfortunately, other courts have not consistently followed this ruling,
and it has not gained the widespread acceptance necessary to induce
counsel to adhere to its dictates as a matter of voluntary practice. 172
Rule 3(e) of the Proposed Rules converts the rationale espoused in
Shapiro v. Freeman into a firm directive applicable to all complex civil
litigation: "Unless otherwise ordered by the court, counsel in a complex
civil action may not instruct a witness not to answer a question except
on the ground of privilege; all testimony shall be taken subject to and
over the objection of the witness or his counsel." The preamble clause
"[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court," is intended to allow some
latitude for the responding counsel to seek a ruling in extreme cases of
impropriety by the questioner. The phrase is not intended, however, to
create a loophole for obstruction by repeated or unnecessary interrup-
tion of the deposition on frivolous and insignificant matters; the courts
169. Id. at 309.
170. Id. at 309-10.
171. Id. at 311-12 (footnotes omitted).
172. Cf. Macrina v Smith, 18 F.R.D. 254, 256-57 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (defendant osteopath
could properly refuse to answer questions he claimed were outside his field of training or practical
experience). But see Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D.




should swiftly impose sanctions when the provision is being so
abused. 173
2. Coaching of Witnesses
Rule 3(f) of the Proposed Rules addresses a more subtle aspect of
counsel abuse: coaching of witnesses in the midst of questioning.
Rarely is outright coaching the problem; counsel in complex civil
actions tend to use more sophisticated, less obvious methods. Usually,
the problem arises through off-the-record "asides" or at breaks in the
questioning. 174 Sometimes, hand or voice-modulation signals are also
employed. 175
Questioning counsel are helpless to defend against this obstruction
by the witness's counsel. The questioner can have a reference inserted
in the record as to what is transpiring, but that never adequately
captures the true flavor of the events or their significance. For obvious
reasons, stenographically recorded testimony reads dryly, and the
abusing counsel can simply insert a denial on the record to confuse it.
More important, however, a protest on the record cannot cure the
damage that results from such abuse, such as distortion of the witness's
testimony and possible concealment of the truth. 176
Rule 3(f) is not designed to bar all conferences between counsel and
witnesses at depositions. Counsel, after all, attend the deposition to
advise their clients and protect their rights. 177 The question is when, to
what extent and in what manner appropriate conferences should be
allowed. Rule 3(f), in addressing four situations, two rather specific
and two more general in nature, seeks to retain the witness's important
right to counsel while curbing abuse of that right by counsel.
First, rule 3(f) bars counsel from "interrupt[ing] the questioning in
any deposition to confer with a witness off the record between the
imposition of a question and the answer to be given." Whether or not
173. See pt. VII infra.
174. See, e.g., In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litigation, MDL No. 314. at 8 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 1979) (Raby, Magis.).
175. That practice has been improperly recommended by some commentators. See, e.g..
Kornblum, supra note 164, at 18 ("You should sit next to your client and lightly place your hand
on the client's arm as soon as the objectionable question is asked, This should be a prearranged
signal to the client to refrain from answering the question."); cf. Ratner, Plaintiffs' Attorneys
Hows and Whys of Plaintiffs' Depositions, in The Practical Lawyer's Manual of Pre-Trial
Discovery 33, 35 (1973) (witness should be instructed prior to testifying not to answer questions
that his counsel objects to).
176. Although counsel may note on the record that the witness has been coached or that his
counsel has obstructed the normal flow of question and answer, the witness's coached response
will remain on the record and the questioner will have been deprived of an admission which
might have been obtained but for the obstructive conduct.




innocently intended, such interruptions create the disturbing inference
that counsel is coaching his witness. 178 To assure the integrity of the
deposition, interruptions should not be tolerated. Counsel can always
confer with the witness on the record or, following the answer, off the
record, but the questioner is entitled first to hear an untainted answer
from the witness. The witness is permitted to add to an answer after
such an off the record conference, but the questioner is entitled to have
the sequence and the substance of the original answer-conference-
revised answer apparent on the record.
Second, rule 3(f) prohibits counsel from "confer[ing] with the wit-
ness about the questioning . . . during any temporary break in that
questioning during a deposition session." This provision is directed at
the short recesses called by the witness or counsel in the midst of
questioning at a single deposition session; for example, the five minute
"lavatory recess" that becomes a cram session conducted by the
witness's counsel. 179 Recesses should be requested for valid purposes
only, and should be confined to such purposes, particularly when the
questioning has reached a sensitive area of the interrogation.
A deposition should approximate, as nearly as possible, the steady
flow of questioning at a trial; it is not designed to be a forum for
counsel's "canned" testimony. The second prohibition of rule 3(f),
therefore, seeks to assure each questioner an uninterrupted flow of his
or her questioning. Indeed, during short recesses at a trial, it is
generally understood and commonly directed by the court that counsel
should not confer with a witness currently on the stand; °80 this
procedure should apply during depositions as well. The provisions of
rule 3(f), however, should not affect lunch breaks or day-to-day breaks
in the deposition. Presumably, the questioner will agree to such breaks
only after completing a discrete area or subject of testimony; thus, any
additions or changes by the witness following extended breaks will be
readily apparent in the record. 1I Because such conferencing occurs at
trial, it is consistent to afford that right in the midst of extended breaks
in the deposition. Nor does the rule prohibit conferencing during
breaks between questioning by different questioners-for example,
178. Magistrate Raby discussed such conduct in In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litigation,
MDL No. 314, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1979) ("(Sluch a tactic is both discourteous and improper.
. . . Further conduct of this variety will not be tolerated . . ").
179. To prevent such cram sessions, questioning counsel are sometimes compelled to perform
the unpleasant and embarrassing task of "shadowing" the witness and the witness's counsel to the
lavatory during the break.
180. Cf. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 83-85 (1976) (counsel may confer with witness
but may not coach him); United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613, 614 (4th Cir.) (counsel may
confer with witness for purpose of obtaining exhibit with respect to which witness was to be
questioned), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 955 (1964).
181. For a discussion of how and when to create a complete record of off-the-record events,
see Kornblum, supra note 164, at 15-16.
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between direct examination and cross-examination. Cross-examination
is generally the appropriate time to clarify earlier testimony; changes
made through questioning by a different counsel will be apparent on
the record, so that the original questioner can point out the change and
put forth any appropriate argument.
Third, rule 3(f) prohibits the "suggest[ion] [of] answers to the
witness by counsel's objections or any other means in the course of the
questioning." This proscription is designed to make explicit the impro-
priety of counsel's telling the witness what to say, whether overtly or
by covert signals. The most common such abuse is the conversational
objection, in which counsel purports to comment on the question's
purpose or ask the questioner if he means a particular thing, but in the
process alerts the witness to the response that counsel hopes he or she
will give. 182 If an extended discourse on the objection is necessary,
which is rare, it should be conducted outside the presence of the
witness.
There is no justification for counsel's use of signals to the witness; it
is a form of cheating. Rule 3(f), coupled with the threat of sanctions
for failure to heed its dictates,18 3 will impress that message upon all
counsel. Although the rule concededly cannot completely eliminate
such conduct, it should, by making an express pronouncement, deter
counsel who might otherwise believe that their actions are not neces-
sarily improper.
Finally, rule 3(f) requires that counsel not "otherwise disrupt or
interfere with the orderly and fair conduct of the deposition." This
omnibus clause codifies what should be a basic policy of cooperation
among counsel for the conduct of depositions in complex civil actions,
and provides the court with sufficient latitude to curb any other abuses
by counsel that flout or depart from this policy. Thus, the last portion
of rule 3(f) should be given broad construction to achieve the goal of
adherence to the rule's basic purpose to promote, in depositions, a
good faith search for truth.
182. Many judges refuse to allow discussions of objections before the witness and jury at
trial, requiring those matters to be taken up with the court at side-bar, in the robing room, or in
closed session at court. The purpose of this procedure is to prevent witnesses from being
influenced by matters extraneous to their testimony. See United States v. Whiteside, 404 F. Supp.
261 (D. Del. 1975); R. Keeton, Trial Tactics and Methods § 5.5 (2d ed. 1973). But cf. United
States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1976) (witnesses not excluded during prosecutor's opening
statement because no prior showing of why failure to exclude might prejudice defendant), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977). This rationale is similar to that underlying Fed. R. Evid. 615 which
permits the court to exclude witnesses from the trial until their testimony is taken. See, e.g.,
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976); Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786, 788 (9th
Cir. 1967); Braswell v. Wainwright, 330 F. Supp. 281, 283 (S.D. Fla. 1971), modified, 463 F.2d
1148 (5th Cir. 1972). This exclusion rule also applies at depositions. Williams v. Electronic
Control Syss., Inc., 68 F.RID. 703 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
183. See pt. VII infra.
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F. Deposition Corrections and Execution of Transcript
Last minute, unexplained transcript alterations are an occasional,
yet annoying problem in complex civil litigation. 18 4 Most witnesses
and counsel hesitate to make major changes in deposition answers, but
circumstances sometimes require even the most conservative persons to
alter an answer. 18 5 Although transcript corrections or changes usually
are not of major significance to the case, sometimes they can alter the
entire meaning of an answer. l8 6 Rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure affords a witness the opportunity to make corrections
or alterations in the transcript of a deposition before signing it, and
requires that the witness also state the reasons for the changes; 18 7 the
courts have consistently required the witness to include a justifying
explanation for such alterations. l88 In practice, the questioner is
permitted to read aloud the original answer and the corrected answer
to call the change to the court's or jury's attention. The stated reason
for the change is also usually read to counter any unfair inference from
the mere fact of change. 189 The court and jury can then weigh the
change and determine for themselves the effect it should be given.
Basic fairness is and should remain the standard for such altera-
tions. As long as the examiner has a chance to confront the witness as
to the change, the examiner can raise little objection to it. 190 This does
184. A witness is entitled to consult privately with his or her counsel regarding the transcript
and any alterations he or she wishes to make in it. Rogers v. Roth, 477 F.2d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir.
1973); Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961).
185. For example, the stenographic reporter may make errors that change the meaning of an
answer. Compare "I did it. Sometimes it seemed proper" with "I did it sometimes. It seemed
proper."
186. See, e.g., Turchan v. Bailey Meter Co., 21 F.R.D. 232, 233 (D. Del. 1957) ("yes"
changed to "no").
187. Fed. R. Civ. P 30(e) states, in pertinent part: "When the testimony is fully transcribed
the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him,
unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes
in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by
the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition
shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the
witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign."
188. See, e.g., Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 311 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194, 195 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
189. See Rogers v. Roth, 477 F.2d 1154, 1158-60 (10th Cir. 1973) (illustrating the proper
procedure to follow at trial regarding deposition changes). See also Usiak v. New York Tank
Barge Co., 299 F.2d 808, 810 (2d Cir. 1962).
190. Often, the deposition will be reopened to permit further questioning with respect to the
changes. See, e.g., Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961); Do
Seversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). But cf. Allen & Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (further cross-examination not
needed because the changed testimony was consistent with original testimony).
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not suggest that the right to confront will satisfy an examiner who
elicited an admission during the deposition that the witness has since
changed. Only if the examiner is denied the right to confront, how-
ever, will the significance of the change, no matter how dramatic, be
perhaps too prejudicial to allow into evidence at trial. ' 9' The standard
of fairness affords the proper balance: it permits the examiner a
maximum opportunity to test the alteration and emphasize it.
Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 192 illustrates the current
status of the law on these points. A plaintiff's witness from Europe,
who was questioned for more than a week,193 made extensive changes
and corrections in his deposition answers by annexing a sworn state-
ment consisting of twelve pages. In the annexed statement, he detailed
the changes and corrections, and gave reasons for each. The defendant
claimed that seventy-three changes were "material matters of sub-
stance" and moved to disallow them on various grounds, arguing that
the witness did not have the right to make material changes and that,
in any event, changes could not be made by a separate statement. The
defendant also argued that the changes were so material that the
deposition was rendered useless, requiring the witness to be recalled
and reexamined. 194 The court rejected all of these contentions, holding
that "the Rule places no limitations on the type of changes that may be
made by a witness before signing this deposition. . . . [T]he witness
may make changes of any nature, no matter how fundamental or
substantial." 195 The court further stated:
The Rules are to be liberally construed. Here the witness appeared before the notary
before whom the deposition had been taken, stated the changes he had made. initialed
them, and gave the reasons for the changes. He then swore to his changes and the
reasons therefor. Under these circumstances, we find that Rule 30(e) has been
adequately complied with. 196
The court reasoned that, although a recall is sometimes appropriate,
the nature of the particular corrections in the case before it was not so
material as to require a recall. ' 97
Allen demonstrates the propriety of changes of any sort when made
in a manner reasonably complying with the dictates of rule 30(e). It
also shows, however, that the rule can thwart an examiner who, in
good faith, seeks to probe the reason for the changes by recalling the
witness, especially when there is a substantial likelihood that the
191. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
192. 49 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
193. Id. at 339. The deposition transcript totalled 1,200 pages.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 340.
196. Id. at 341.
197. Id.; see note 190 supra.
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witness will be unavailable at trial. The former aspects of Allen appear
entirely proper; the latter, however, may be too restrictive, particularly
when the changes are substantive.1 98
Rule 3(g) of the Proposed Rules attempts to retain the benefits of the
Allen rationale while resolving its deficiencies. It recognizes the right of
a witness to change a deposition answer. Changes are not necessarily
nefarious or untruthful, 199 and the witness should be given a chance to
justify the change if so desired. But, unlike rule 30(e), rule 3(g)
additionally requires promptness in making the change and provides
an absolute "right to recall" the witness for further examination
regarding the change. The right to recall is designed to ensure that the
examiner has an opportunity to confront the witness, to test the
witness's resolve in making the change and to inquire into other
matters that the change makes pertinent, but which the questioner had
deferred investigating because of the original answer. Additionally, to
assure all sides a full opportunity to see that the truth is probed and
explained, rule 3(g) grants the right to recall a witness to any party
participating in the deposition, including the witness's own counsel.
To prevent a wholesale reopening of the deposition, rule 3(g) ex-
pressly limits the right to recall to "the subject matter of the change or
correction." Use of the phrase "subject matter" recognizes that the
change or correction may refer to new areas or require questions
beyond the express language of the change or correction. This phrase
does not suggest, however, that any remotely pertinent topic may be
examined in the recall session. A reasonable nexus to the transcript
alteration must be shown; and, of course, counsel must avoid repeti-
tion of questions previously asked.200
The right to recall is optional and must be requested under rule 3(g)
"within twenty (20) days of receipt of [the] correction or change." Also,
the rule requires that the transcript be presented to the witness "for
review and signature... promptly after the deposition session" and be
signed and returned "within twenty (20) days of receipt thereof or...
be deemed to have [been] signed. . . as transcribed without correction
or change. '20 1 These provisions should ensure promptness in complet-
198. The courts sometimes do bar deposition changes if the changes are substantive and the
witness is unavailable at trial. See, e.g., Architectural League v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 311
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court refused to allow the changes by a non-party witness who was
unavailable at trial, even though the opposing counsel had cooperated in attempting to secure the
witness's presence at trial).
199. See, e.g., Rogers v. Roth, 477 F.2d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir. 1973) (changes in deposition
transcripts are "contemplated and on occasion . . . obviously necessary').
200. Otherwise, the deposition may be terminable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) for harassment
and annoyance. See note 141 supra.
201. Although the court may not order the deposition to be signed, Mortensen v. Honduras
Shipping Co., 18 F.R.D 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), it can deem the deposition signed or admit It
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ing the deposition and resolving the matter of changes so that the
deposition process does not unduly delay discovery.
A potential loophole in the rule is the absence of a specific time
limitation for presentation of the transcript to the deponent. This
ambiguity is unavoidable, however, simply because the examiner
cannot control the stenographic reporter or the reporter's business
schedule. Nevertheless, it is expected that the transcript will be
prepared by the reporter and submitted to counsel within two to three
weeks and no later than thirty days following the testimony. If a longer
delay is the fault of the questioner, rather than of the reporter,
sanctions are appropriate.202 If the reporter is at fault, presumably the
court could take appropriate action to rectify the problem. Counsel are
expected to raise this matter with the court promptly, and the court
should encourage its quick resolution.
Recognizing the profound effect transcript alterations can have upon
the case, rule 3(g) also codifies the existing rule that the questioner may
read the original answer and the corrected answer at trial, 0 3 and, if "a
portion of a deposition. . is corrected or changed for a reason other
than grammatical or transcription error," the stated reason for the
change must be read. This provision seeks to achieve uniformity in the
manner in which deposition transcript changes are handled at trial.2 0 4
Counsel's knowledge at trial of the practical consequences of transcript
changes will enable them to reach early decisions on other aspects of
discovery, such as whether to seek a witness recall, or which other
documents or depositions they should investigate on the point in issue.
The final phrase of rule 3(g) preserves all evidentiary objections
arising out of transcript corrections and the stated reasons therefor. If
the transcript correction or the reason therefor runs afoul of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, a proper objection will lie, preventing
hearsay and other improper evidence from finding its way into the case
through the vehicle of transcript changes. The court should not,
however, permit the responding party to abuse this provision by
making a significant transcript objection, justifying it with an objec-
tionable reason, and then allowing that party to object to the reading
of the reason at trial. The Federal Rules of Evidence afford the court
sufficient latitude to admit into evidence otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence, or to exclude otherwise admissible evidence when justice re-
quires, 205 and the courts are expected to utilize these provisions to
achieve the purposes underlying rule 3(g).
into evidence unsigned, Porter v. Seas Shipping Co., 20 F.R.D. 103, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See
also Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972).
202. See pt. VII infra.
203. See note 189 supra.
204. Id.
205. Fed. R. Evid. 403, 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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G. Scope of Cross-Examination
Counsel sometimes raise a technical but troublesome objection dur-
ing depositions when a party interposes questions on cross-examination
that go beyond the scope of the direct examination without having
first served notice that it wishes to depose that particular witness. 20 6
The present law is not entirely clear on who should prevail when this
occurs. Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that "[e]xamination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as
permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence." 20 7 Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
"Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.
The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination. '20 8 On their face, these
rules limit a cross-examining party to the scope of direct examination,
but leave open the possibility for the court, in its discretion, to broaden
the inquiry. Significantly, both former rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 20 9 and the federal courts prior to adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 210 took a restrictive view on the permissi-
ble scope of cross-examination at depositions.
There was and still is, however, nearly universal condemnation of
the restrictive rule by commentators on federal procedure and evi-
dence. Professor Moore has noted that the restrictive rule was easily
and regularly avoided because of the broad provisions of rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 1 regarding the use of depositions at
trial or elsewhere. 212 He has also criticized the rule for requiring the
wasteful service of cross-notices of deposition.2 1 3 Judge Weinstein and
Professor Berger, after noting the disapproval of the rule by both
Professors Wigmore2 1 4 and McCormick, 215 have found the rule im-
206. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).
207. Id. 30(c).
208. Fed. R. Evid. 611(b).
209. Fed. R. Civ. P 43(b) (1938) provided that "the witness . may be cross-examined by
the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his examination in chief." The rule was
repealed when the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975.
210. See, e.g., Moyer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1942); Spray Prods.,
Inc. v. Strouse, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 211, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1962); (f. Hood v. United States, 365 F.2d
949, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (trial court correctly compelled witness to answer on cross-
examination).
211. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a).
212. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2) permits any party to use a deposition of an adverse party "for
any purpose." Fed. R. Civ. 15. 32(a)(4) provides that if only part of a deposition is read at trial,
"any party may introduce any other parts." See 4A J. Moore, supra note 64, 30.58, at 30-105.
213. 4A J. Moore, supra note 64, 30.57, at 30-78.1-102.
214. 3 J. Wigmore, supra note 101, §§ 1885-1890.
215. C. McCormick, supra note 97, § 24, at 50-51.
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practical and a cause of unnecessary and counter-productive con-
troversy over the proper scope of cross-examination.2 1 6 They argue
persuasively that the quest for truth, not mere gamesmanship, should
be the aim of examination at deposition and trial. t7 Judge Weinstein
has concluded:
Why then, despite the disapprobation of most legal writers and its tendency to promote
discord does the restrictive rule endure as the majority rule and the rule which will
continue to apply in federal courts? Probably primarily because it represents an
approach to litigation which was formerly in vogue and has not yet fallen completely
into disrepute, an approach which viewed litigation as a game between the parties
which could only be won by strict adherence to the rules regardless of whether the
rules promoted the ascertainment of truth. Such an approach is at variance with the
aims of the federal rules of evidence expressed in Rule 102, the emphasis in Rule 401
on the reception of all relevant evidence, and the provisions in Article VI which
implement the policy of admissibility by abolishing incompetencies in Rule 601 and by
abrogating the rule against impeaching one's own witness in Rule 607.38
Nevertheless, the consensus is that the restrictive rule still governs2 19
and that the adoption of rule 611(b) and the repeal of rule 43(b) have
made "very little change in the practice" on this matter.2 20
A restrictive interpretation of the right of cross-examination during a
deposition appears to misconceive the deposition's basic purposes and
requires formalism and gamesmanship to too great a degree. The other
parties do not know, when they receive the deposition notice, what the
scope of direct examination will be; they learn this only at the
deposition. Opposing counsel's planned inquiry on cross-examination
can be curtailed merely by the questioner's limiting direct examination
to selected topics. Yet, under the rationale of depositions, if a witness
has general knowledge of import to the case, all parties should be
permitted to probe it. On the one hand, it can be argued that the
strategy of limiting cross-examination by limiting direct examination
can be avoided by the simple expedient of serving a cross-notice of
deposition to protect one's right to broaden cross-examination; the
other parties have a right to know beforehand which counsel are
anticipating extensive questioning of the witness. On the other hand,
the cross-notice procedure leads to unnecessary and time-consuming
paperwork. To allow the search for truth to proceed without unneces-
sary expense and technical interruption, more flexibility is needed.
216. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 91, 611(02]. See also Degnan, Non-Rules
Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6 Utah L. Rev. 323, 336 (1959).
217. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 91, 611[02], at 611-24 to 611-31,
218. Id. at 611-29 to 611-30 (footnote omitted).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977). See also Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 825 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U,.&
955 (1978).
220. 4A J. Moore, supra note 64, 30.58, at 30-105.
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Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence221 permits the court,
even at trial when the parties presumably know from prior discovery
what matters the witness will cover in his or her testimony, to loosen
the restraints on cross-examination. 222 Certainly, no less latitude should
be granted in discovery.
Proposed rule 3(h) would end this debate in complex civil actions by
providing that cross-examination during a deposition "shall not be
limited in scope to the subject matter covered on direct examination,
regardless of whether a cross-notice of deposition has been served by
the cross-examining party." Of course, if counsel attempts to compli-
cate an otherwise simple deposition with an unduly extended or
irrelevant cross-examination, the present discovery rules permit resort
to the court for a protective order terminating the deposition. 223 A
deposition should not be the battlefield for the determination of the
extent to which cross-examination during a deposition will be admis-
sible at trial. Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 224 and
the Federal Rules of Evidence 22 5 will control that issue. 226 For exam-
ple, although rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
a party to notice and take its own deposition, 227 rule 32(a) limits the
right of a party to read aloud its own deposition at trial. 228 This
limitation would continue under the Proposed Rules. In complex civil
actions, however, rule 3(h) of the Proposed Rules is intended to
supercede that portion of rule 32 that permits an objection at trial to
the admissibility of a deposition cross-examination on the ground that
the scope of the cross-examination went beyond the scope of the direct
examination. 229
221. Fed. R. Evid. 611(b).
222. United States v. Drake, 542 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1050
(1977).
223. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d); see note 141 supra.
224. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32.
225. Fed. R. Evid. 402-411, 602, 608-610, 701-704, 802-805, 1007.
226. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 907 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
920 (1979).
227. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a) provides that "any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination." See, e.g., Richmond v. Brooks, 227
F.2d 490, 492-93 (2d Cir. 1955); Van Sciver v. Rothensies, 122 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir. 1941).
228. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) allows the use of depositions by any party for impeachment, id.
32(a)(1), but otherwise restricts depositions to use by an "adverse party," id. 32(a)(2); see, e.g.,
Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 308 (5th Cir. 1978); Lassiter v. United States
Lines, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 49(0 F.2d 1407 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. Pike
& Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: II, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1436,
1445-46 (1938) (a "party testifying on his own behalf [is] subject to the same limitations as other
witnesses').
229. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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V. RULE 4: INTERROGATORIES IN COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
No discovery device has been characterized by more controversy
than written interrogatories under rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 230 The ABA Task Force has commented that "[n]o [other]
single rule was perceived by the Bar at large ... as engendering more
discovery abuse. ' '2 3 1 The abuses range from the service of voluminous
interrogatories filled with nitpicking questions, on the part of the
questioning party, to evasive answers, blanket objections and refusals
to respond, on the part of the answering party. 232 Moreover, the very
usefulness of interrogatories has been openly challenged. For example,
Judge Pollack, formerly a leading trial lawyer in complex litigation,
has observed: "Interrogatories as commonly utilized today in nearly
every instance are a device to shirk preparation of a case-they are
more often than not 'a lazy lawyer's way to obtain evasive answers'.
The use of the product of interrogatories at trial is virtually nil." '2
33
In order for interrogatories to serve as an efficient discovery device
in complex civil litigation, their use must be governed by a new set of
guidelines. Rule 4 of the Proposed Rules attempts to provide such
guidelines; no other rule is more crucial to achieving the overall
purposes of the Proposed Rules.
A. Types of Interrogatories
Rule 4 first distinguishes between the different types of inter-
rogatories according to their various purposes; "identifying," "expert"
and "substantive." 2 34 Because each type serves a different purpose,
rule 4 makes each subject to discrete requirements. And, to keep the
use of interrogatories under control, rule 4(d) requires that they be
served "in separate sets, each limited to one type and titled to indicate
which such type of interrogatories are involved."
Rule 4(a) defines identifying interrogatories as "those which elicit
merely the names and addresses of witnesses and potential witnesses or
the file description or title, location and custodian of documents and
other physical evidence. ' 235 Normally, counsel would serve such inter-
230. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33; see Kirkham, supra note 8, at 203.
231. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 20; see Prelminary Draft of 1970 Amend-
ments, supra note 5, at 252; Cohn, supra note 5, at 276; Rosenberg, supra note 27, at 490;
Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8, at 478. But cf. Doskow, supra note 15, at 500 (arguing that
depositions engender the most controversy).
232. See Kirkham, supra note 8, at 203.
233. Pollack, supra note 8, at 224.
234. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) similarly distinguishes between different types of interrogatories,
with respect to required supplementation of prior complete responses.
235. See, e.g., Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 371-72 (D.D.C. 1973); Cleo Wrap Corp. v.
Eisner Eng'r Works, 59 F.R.D. 386, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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rogatories prior to other discovery requests, such as depositions or
document requests, to help set the scene and reveal the cast of
characters.236 If the responding party is a large public corporation, use
of identifying interrogatories to obtain this type of information is
preferable to seeking the information through depositions of individual
officers, no one of whom will know all the desired information. Expert
interrogatories are "those seeking the information discoverable under
rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Such informa-
tion includes (1) the identity of the expert expected to testify, (2) "the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify," (3) "the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify," and (4) "a summary of the grounds for each opinion" the
expert is expected to state. 237 Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) specifically recognizes
that interrogatories are a suitable, indeed preferable, device for elicit-
ing this information, at least in the first instance. 238 Substantive
interrogatories are characterized in rule 4(a) as "all other inter-
rogatories, such as those asking for the factual circumstances of the
underlying transactions involved in the action, those directed at the
merits of the action and those seeking to amplify upon the contentions
of the parties. '239 Because interrogatories of this type commonly lead
to abuse and are of only questionable value, rule 4 attempts to curb
both their excessive use and the evasive answers given in response to
proper interrogatories.
It is not always easy to distinguish between identifying and substan-
tive interrogatories: for example, in a case involving the alleged
misappropriation of the clients of a business, an interrogatory that
requests an identification of all such clients misappropriated, or an
interrogatory that requests specification of the documentary evidence
of a particular allegation, is arguably both identifying and substantive.
Because they seek a listing of persons or documents, these inter-
rogatories will normally fall within the category of identifying inter-
rogatories, but follow-up interrogatories seeking details of the acts of
misappropriation, for example, would be substantive interrogatories,
236. Cf. Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 66, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (illustrating
how such interrogatories can become abusive when not reasonably confined in scope). See also
Shang v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 77 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (mem.).
237. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i); see, e.g., Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D.
624 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
238. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). The court may thereafter permit other discovery of the
expert's opinions and testimony by, for example, deposition. Id. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii); see, e.g., Herbst v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975); cf. Wilson v. Resnick,
51 F.R.D. 510, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (production of reports denied because requesting party was
adequately informed as to nature and substance of expert physician's testimony). See also
Graham, supra note 92.
239. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigati.on, 76 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Il. 1977);
Johnson v. W. H. Stewart Co., 75 F.R.D. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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which must be propounded separately from the identifying inter-
rogatories. 240 If the nature of an interrogatory is truly unclear, rule 4
deems it a substantive interrogatory and therefore subject to the
greater judicial control and limitations envisioned for such inter-
rogatories. 24 1
B. Permissible Number of Interrogatories
To a great extent, the controversy over interrogatories concerns their
use as tools of harassment. Interrogatories may subject a party to
endless and overly-particular questions, chiefly designed to make the
prosecution of a claim or the assertion of an affirmative defense a
costly and painful experience.2 42 Further, debates inevitably arise as to
the sufficiency of answers to interrogatories, yet very few of the
answers are ever consulted at trial.2 43 In addition, interrogatories
frequently contain extensive and confusing definitions and answering
instructions which serve to complicate further the process of respond-
ing and objecting. Consider, for example, the published lament of one
attorney in the multidistrict Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation:244
[T]here is presently on file a first set of plaintiffs' joint consolidated interrogatories
comprising 176 pages. The 155 numbered interrogatories are subdivided into about
1,800 separate parts. Because of extensive cross-referencing among the interrogatories,
the total number of questions posed for the defendants runs into the tens of thousands.
Some interrogatories, for example, each ask thirty-five questions about eleven different
beef products. Thus, these interrogatories actually represent over 12,000 separate
questions. Further, the interrogatories cover the time span of the last fourteen years.
In some cases information is sought dating back to the year 1940 and even back to the
early years of the century. In one interrogatory the defendant is asked to "identify"
each and every telephone call made or received by its employees since 1963 while the
particular defendant, engaged in the business of publication of news concerning the
meat industry, was about its work in gathering such industry news. Another inter-
rogatory even demands identification of all personnel of the defendant company since
the year 1940, whose spouse or other relatives within the second degree, as defined by
civil law, have held stock in, made loans to, or have served as an officer, director, or
employee of another company in the beef industry.
4
1
In a word, such a situation is absurd. Yet, it is not at all uncommon in
240. See rule 4(b), (c), Appendix.
241. Id.; see, e.g., Professional Adjusting Syss. of America, Inc. v General Adjustment
Bureau, 373 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Williams v. Thomas Jefferson Univ .343 F Supp
1131 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
242. See, e.g., SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research
Corp., 72 F.RtD. 110, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See also Halder v. International Tel. & Tel Corp.,
75 F.R.D. 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555 (W.D. Va.), vacated, 64
F.RD. 732 (W.D. Va. 1972) (upon joint oral motion for good cause shown),
243. Pollack, supra note 8, at 224; see cases cited note 278 infra.
244. 419 F. Supp. 720 (J.P.M.L. 1976).
245. McElroy, Federal Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 682
(1977).
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complex civil actions, 246 although, fortunately, the abuse does not
often rise to the level found in the Beef Industry case.
The problem has not gone unnoticed. The Supreme Court has
remarked on the "social cost" of such abuses, 247 and there is a
growing, albeit reluctant, trend in the federal judiciary toward the use
of sanctions to deter such harassment. 248 The Federal Judicial Center's
Manual for Complex Litigation also takes specific note of the problem
but, unfortunately, passes the responsibility to the district courts:
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the number of written, carefully drawn
interrogatories that are required in a complex case is very limited. To eliminate the loss
of time and expense resulting from unnecessary and redundant written interrogatories,
a court may by local rule or order limit the number of interrogatories that may be
propounded by a party to a prescribed number, in the absence of special leave of
court.
249
Some district courts have adopted such local rules.,50 State courts have
adopted similar rules, placing a duty on counsel to "avoid undue
detail, and to avoid the imposition of any unnecessary burden or
expense" by their use of or response to interrogatories. 251
The history of rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
mirrors the initial high expectations for the value of written inter-
rogatories, and the harsh reality that their unlimited use has spawned.
As originally adopted in 1938, rule 33 merely established the right to
serve interrogatories and the time and procedure for responses to
interrogatories; if there were objections, no response was required until
the court had ruled on them. 252 In 1946, the rule was substantially
246. See, e.g., In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1975);
Jarosiewicz v. Conlisk, 60 F.R.D. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Krantz v. United States, 56 F.R.D. 555
(W.D. Va.), vacated, 64 F.R.D. 732 (W.D. Va. 1972) (upon joint oral motion for good cause
shown); cf. Alexander v. Parsons, 75 F.R.D. 536, 539 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (mere fact that
discovery is burdensome is not sufficient to bar such discovery, provided information sought may
lead to discovery of admissible evidence).
247. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
248. See Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.Zd
1062, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1979); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633,
636 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr, An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions
After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Clubs, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145 (1979);
Emerging Deterrence, supra note 18, at 1034-35; notes 432-38 infra and accompanying text.
249. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 1.501, at 107-08.
250. See, e.g., N.D. Ill. Gen. R. 9(g). This rule has been recommended as a model by the
Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 1.501. See also M.D. Fla. Gen, R. 3.03(a);
Cohn, supra note 5, at 277-78 (noting that other districts have instead prescribed uniform
interrogatories for certain cases).
251. See, e.g., Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 213(b), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110A, § 213(b) (1975); Klely, supra
note 112, at 204.
252. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (1938) provided: "Any party may serve upon any adverse party
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or
private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in
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revised to provide, inter alia, a new procedure to cope with the
growing number of objections to interrogatories. 25 The objecting
party now either had to answer or, on its own motion, seek judicial
relief.2s 4 This procedure reflected the then-prevailing view that the
growing interrogatory problem was primarily attributable to the re-
sponding party. 25 5 Indeed, the Advisory Committee to the Judicial
Conference expressed its continued faith in interrogatories as an inex-
pensive alternative to depositions, and rejected any notion of limiting
the permissible number of interrogatories:
There is no reason why interrogatories should be more limited than depositions,
particularly when the former represent an inexpensive means of securing useful
information.... [T]he number of or number of sets of interrogatories to be served may
not be limited arbitrarily or as a general policy to any particular number, but... a
limit may be fixed only as justice requires to avoid annoyance, expense, embarrass-
ment or oppression in individual cases.2
6
By 1970, disillusionment had begun to set in. The Advisory Com-
mittee took special note of the excessive bickering that charactetizes
interrogatories:
There is general agreement that interrogatories spawn a greater percentage of objec-
tions and motions than any other discovery device.... [A]lthough half of the litigants
its behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The
answers shall be signed by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories
have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories
within 15 days after the delivery of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and
for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Objections to any interrogatories may be
presented to the court within 10 days after service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion; and
answers shall be deferred until the objections are determined, which shall be at as early a time as
is practicable. No party may, without leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to
be answered by the same party." See, e.g., Kingsway Press Inc. v. Farrell Publishing Co., 30 F.
Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Tudor v. Leslie, 1 F.R.D. 448 (D. Mass. 1940).
253. See 1946 Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 64, at 461.
254. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (1946) provided: "Any party may serve upon any adverse party
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or
private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such
information as is available to the party. Interrogatories may be served after commencement of the
action and without leave of court, except that, if service is made by the plaintiff within 10 days
after such commencement, leave of court granted with or without notice must first be obtained.
The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers
shall be signed by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories have
been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within
15 days after the service of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for
good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Within 10 days after service of interrogatories a
party may serve written objections thereto together with a notice of hearing the objections at the
earliest practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to which objection is made shall be deferred
until the objections are determined." See, e.g., Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632
(W.D. Mlich. 1965); Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
255. See 1946 Advisory Comm. Notes, supra note 64, at 461-62.
256. Id. (citations omitted).
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resorted to depositions and about one-third used interrogatories, about 65 percent of
the objections were made with respect to interrogatories and 26 percent related to
depositions.2 -
7
The Advisory Committee also acknowledged that a "tardy response to
interrogatories is common, virtually expected. '25 8 Reflecting the new
view that the questioning party was responsible for much of the
problem, rule 33 was further amended in 1970. The new rule revises
the procedure for stating objections and, if the parties are unable to
resolve privately the responding party's objection, now requires the
questioning party to take the initiative in seeking a court ruling. 25 9
The application of the 1970 version of rule 33, however, has not
been encouriging, at least insofar as complex civil actions are con-
cerned. Although motion practice over interrogatories has apparently
decreased, their effective use has seriously diminished. 260 Rather than
risk an adverse ruling or endure the delay and expense of a motion, the
recipient of inadequate answers or groundless objections generally
ignores the response, 26 1 and turns to depositions or documents to
uncover the information that the interrogatories have failed to elicit.
The result has been an ever-growing sense of frustration and lack of
confidence in the utility of interrogatories for other than ministerial
matters or general identification purposes. Rarely do broadly-worded
interrogatories addressed to the merits evoke useful answers. On
matters of substance, simple answers generally are given only in
response to precisely drafted interrogatories, limited to a particular
factual issue or evidentiary item. 262
In an effort to resolve these problems, the ABA Task Force pro-
posed new, strict limitations on the use of rule 33. The Task Force
recommended that rule 33(a) be amended to provide:
Any party may serve as a matter of right upon any other party written interrogatories
not to exceed thirty (30) in number to be answered by the party served or, if the party
served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmen-
257. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 252. See also Speck, supra note
24, at 1157.
258. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 252.
259. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) currently provides, in pertinent part: "Each interrogatory shall be
answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event tile
reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. . . . The party submitting the
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other
failure to answer an interrogatory." The Advisory Committee explained this provision as follows:
"If objections are made, the btirden is on the interrogating party to move under Rule 37(a) for a
court order compelling answers, in the course of which the court will pass on the objections. The
change in the burden of going forward does not alter the existing obligation of an objecting party
to justify his objections." Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 253.
260. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
261. See Doskow, supra note 15, at 503-04.
262. Such interrogatories are also known as "pin-point" or "rifle-shot" interrogatories.
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tal agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available
to the party. Each interrogatory shall consist of a single question. Interrogatories may,
without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action
and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon
that party. Leave of court, to be granted upon a showing of necessity, shall be required
to serve in excess of thirty (30) interrogatories.26 3
The Task Force asserted that a "numerical limitation on inter-
rogatories filed as a matter of right [is] the soundest approach to
limiting interrogatory abuse and to enhancing better use of inter-
rogatories as a discovery mechanism. ' 264 Its selection of a limit of
thirty interrogatories "was based on direct Committee experience with
existing practice in certain jurisdictions. ' 265
In its proposed amendment of rule 33(a), the Judicial Conference has
rejected the Task Force's numerical limitation concept, explaining that
"[i]n the judgment of the [Advisory] Committee, such a general,
nationwide limitation is unwise .... [T)he limitation, subject to leave
of court, will involve the courts in endless disputes without guidelines
for their resolution. ' 266 The Judicial Conference would prefer to leave
the matter to the federal district courts for promulgation of individual
local rules, reasoning that "a district familiar with the generality of its
business and the habits of its bar" can best determine what "a
reasonable number of questions" should be for its area. 267 Its amend-
ment would, therefore, merely empower the district courts "by action
of a majority of the judges thereof" to limit the number of inter-
rogatories as that majority sees fit.2 68
The problem with the approaches of both the Judicial Conference
and the ABA Task Force is that they attempt to prescribe remedies on
the basis of geography rather than type of litigation. Not every case
requires the same controls on interrogatories. Special rules for complex
civil actions can begin to curb abuses in those cases without disrupting
the utility of interrogatories in other, less complex cases. 269 Rule 4 of
the Proposed Rules is premised on the theory that substantive inter-
rogatories are effective in complex civil litigation only when limited in
size and scope. 270 Also, rule 4(a) distinguishes substantive inter-
263. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 18 (amendments in italics).
264. Id. at 20.
265. Id. The Task Force did not, however, explain what its experience consisted of or
identify the jurisdictions involved. Id.
266. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 64849. This language
in the Advisory Committee Note was deleted from the 1979 revised amendments. Revised
Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 326.
267. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 649; see note 250 supra.
268. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 646.
269. See Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484, 485 (D. Md. 1969).
270. Id.; Breeland v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 26 F.RID. 119, 120-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
Note, Limiting the Scope of Litigation, 1979 U. Ill. L.F. 211, 225-29.
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rogatories from identifying and expert interrogatories, recognizing that
different considerations are involved with respect to each.
Because identifying and expert interrogatories provide a relatively
inexpensive and efficient method of pretrial disclosure for the limited
topics they cover, 271 rule 4(b) permits any party to propound whatever
number of identifying and expert interrogatories as "are necessary to
enable it to prepare for trial or conduct other permissible pretrial
discovery," subject only to the proviso that they must be "reasonable in
number, scope and subject matter." Also, under rule 4(d), identifying
and expert interrogatories must be answered within fourteen days,
rather than the thirty days applicable to substantive interrogatories, so
as to shorten the waiting period for such preliminary information. 272
Identifying information is often a necessary precondition to other
discovery requests and, consequently, should be supplied as soon as
practicable. In the rare instances in which such information is truly too
difficult to obtain within the fourteen day period, an extension of time
can be granted by opposing counsel or the court. 273 Moreover, under
rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the responding party
may supplement or amend its response, if necessary, after first answer-
ing to the best of its ability. 274
The procedures governing substantive interrogatories are more re-
strictive. Rule 4(c) of the Proposed Rules limits counsel to thirty-five
separate substantive interrogatories, subject to the right to apply for
the court's permission to serve further interrogatories of the same type.
271. See Thompson, How to Use Written Interrogatories Effectively, in The Practical
Lawyer's Manual of Pretrial Discovery 72 (1973); notes 235-38 supra and accompanying text.
272. The pre-1970 version of rule 33(a) required that all interrogatory answers be served
within 15 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (1946); note 254 supra. The Advisory Committee to the 1970
amendments noted that this provision had proved too short a time period for most interrogatories.
Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 252. This criticism appears well taken
only as to substantive interrogatories; thus, proposed rule 4(d) still provides 30 days for answers
to them.
273. See, e.g., EEOC v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co., 74 F.R.D. 628, 630 (W.D. Pa.
1977); cf. Mid-America Facilities, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 497, 498 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (responding party should object to interrogatory rather than request the court by motion to
permit a deferred response).
274. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) provides: "A party who has responded to a request for discovery
with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to ;upplement his response to
include information thereafter acquired. . . ." See, e.g., Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc.,
509 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975). Rule 26(e) further provides,
however, that supplementation is required for identifying and expert interrogatories, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(e)(1), and that a party must amend an answer that he knows was incorrect or Is no longer
true, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). The court can also order supplementation, or the Interrogating
party can serve a specific request for supplementation, prior to trial, to require It. Fed, R. Civ. P.
26(e)(3). Several district courts have local rules providing directives on the matter of supple-
mentation. Cohn, supra note S, at 279; cf. Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151, 160-61
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (demonstrating the limitations on the right to amend prior interrogatory answers).
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The rule also directs all parties and the court to "ensure that duplica-
tive substantive interrogatories are not served," and that those sub-
stantive interrogatories which are served "represent good faith in-
quiries into matters of substance in the action." If substantive inter-
rogatories fail to comply with these provisions, the court should strike
them and, when appropriate, direct sanctions against counsel.2 7 S
If the thirty-five interrogatory limit is exceeded, irrespective of the
good faith of counsel, "the court shall strike the entire set of inter-
rogatories and the interrogating party shall be deemed to have forfeited
the right to serve interrogatories as of right." Also, "[i]n determining
whether more than thirty-five (35) substantive interrogatories have
been propounded, the court may deem the subparts of an interrogatory
to be separate interrogatories." These provisions are designed to deter
counsel from the current, often abusive, practice of serving inter-
rogatories with sundry subparts, each of which seeks an extensive,
sometimes duplicative, response. 276 Because long narratives or dis-
courses are better sought on deposition, substantive interrogatories
should ask only simple and direct questions. Rule 4(d) encourages this
goal by expressly providing that "[e]ach interrogatory shall be sep-
arately stated and numbered and shall ask a single question without
unnecessary or excessive subparts." Thirty-five direct questions should
be sufficient to elicit the essence of any claim or defense and the basic
factual contentions underlying it.27 7 The knowledge that only thirty-
five substantive interrogatories will be permitted as of right should
induce counsel to propound "rifle-shot" rather than "scatter-shot"
interrogatories. Finally, when application is made for leave to serve
further substantive interrogatories, the court should consider the na-
ture of the substantive interrogatories previously served; if counsel
failed to heed the dictates or spirit of rule 4, the court should ordinarily
not permit him to serve any further interrogatories.
C. Answers to Interrogatories
A common obstacle to the effective use of interrogatories is that the
responses they elicit are often little more than self-serving verbiage that
thwarts the purpose of the question. 27 8 The responding counsel views
275. See pt. VII infra.
276. At present, the courts, after striking burdensome interrogatories, generally permit counsel
to rephrase and again propound interrogatories. See, e.g., In re United States Financial Sec.
Litigation, 74 F.RtD. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 1975). This knowledge too often encourages counsel to
attempt abusive interrogatories, because they will almost always receive a second chance to serve
proper questions.
277. Thirty-five questions are more than most local comparable rules provide. See note 250
supra.
278. See, e.g., Liquidometer Corp. v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 319, 323-25 (D. Del.
1959); Gelman v. Friedman, 143 F. Supp. 383, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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the answer as a vehicle to expound on other irrelevant matters which
dilute the question's pertinence, or to explain away an admission
that the interrogatory seeks and is entitled to elicit. Although the
questioning party can, of course, seek a court ruling to strike the
answer's extraneous matter,2 7 9 there is no guarantee its motion will be
granted. Thus, the costly and burdensome alternative of seeking a
pretrial ruling on the matter is not a reasonable solution for this
abuse. 280
The last sentence of rule 4(d) would make explicit what should be an
obvious rule, providing: "Answers [to interrogatories] shall be confined
to the questions asked and shall respond directly to them, without
evasion, obfuscation or unnecessary self-serving matter." If enforced
by the sanction provisions of proposed rule 6,281 this provision should
curtail most abuses in answering interrogatories. Using interrogatories
at all is of questionable utility unless counsel seriously undertake to
improve the quality of answers. Simple direct answers should be the
rule, not the exception. 282
D. The Option to Produce Business Records
The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
added a new concept to rule 33. An interrogatory that seeks informa-
tion contained in discrete, identifiable documents from which the
questioner can easily extract the information can now be responded to
by answering the interrogatory or by specifying and producing the
documents. 283 There are two essential predicates to the right to
exercise this option. First, the burden of ascertaining the answer from
the documents must be substantially the same for both sides, 284 and
279. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a), 37(a).
280. Doskow, supra note 15, at 503-04. Doskow states: "Of course most of the disputes over
discovery are resolved without court rulings. Many of those resolutions are genuine and
satisfactory compromises. Many of them, however, are really abject surrenders to the persistent
adversary or the stubborn one. As Professor Rosenberg said, the lawyers lick their wounds and
bear them. This is a matter of simple economics. There is a great temptation on the part of the
wealthy litigant-and also of the not so wealthy lawyer with plenty of time on his hands-to wear
down his opponent because it is simply too burdensome and expensive to seek a ruling. That
temptation will exist as long as the making of a motion and seeing it through to a decision
becomes in itself a 'federal case.' " Id.
281. See pt. VII infra.
282. To achieve this goal, the better rule under present case law is that, when it is reasonably
feasible for the respondent to research or ascertain the necessary information to answer the
interrogatory, it must do so and cannot simply disclaim knowledge in its answer. Flour Mills of
America, Inc. v. Pace, 75 F.R.D. 676, 680 (E.D. Okla. 1977); cf. La Chemise Lacoste v.
Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 171 (D. Del. 1973) (respondent must provide "readily available"
facts).
283. Fed. R. Civ. 1. 33(c).
284. Id.; see United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Il1. 1975);
Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 466, 470 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Budget
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second, the responding party must specifically identify the pertinent
documents from which the answer can be obtained. 28s The Advisory
Committee directed the responding party not to "impose on an inter-
rogating party a mass of records as to which research is feasible only
for one familiar with the records. '28 6 Counsel in complex litigation
have, nevertheless, flagrantly ignored these directives.
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation287 illustrates the problem as it
commonly arises in complex civil litigation. The plaintiff's counsel
asked each of several defendants whether it had entered into any
contract or agreement with their distributors for the sale of master keys
and, if so, to specify the date, parties and terms of those agreements.
One group of defendants responded that "if and to the extent" there
was any such agreement, the information requested could be found in
"defendant's files maintained at its Berlin, Connecticut plant." 288
Finding that this response violated the express dictates of rule 33(c),
the court held it insufficient.2 89 The court's opinion aptly captures the
intended purpose of the rule:
It would be antipathetic to the spirit of the discovery rules to assume that the newly
added Rule 33(c) was intended to diminish the duty of the parties to provide all
information requested. Since a respondent is required to answer proper interrogatories,
it is not plausible to assume that a response that an answer may (or may not) be found
in its records, accompanied by an offer to permit their inspection is sufficient. This is
little more than an offer to play the discredited game of blindman's [bluff] at the
threshold level of discovery. The challenged answers furnish no information whatever.
[T]he option afforded by Rule 33(c) is not a procedural device for avoiding the duty
to give information. It does not shift to the interrogating party the obligation to find
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354, 357 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Thomason v. Leiter, 52
F.R.D. 290, 290-91 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Another essential aspect of rule 33(c) is that the
information is readily ascertainable from the documents. As the court stated in Budget Rent-A-
Car: "[A] broad statement that the information sought is ascertainable generally from documents
and that those documents are available for inspection is not a sufficient answer under Rule 33(c).
Rather, the interrogated party must state specifically and precisely identify which documents will
provide the information to be elicited." The court noted that "Rule 33 cannot, therefore, be used
as a procedural device for avoiding the duty to give information by shifting the obligation to find
out whether information is ascertainable from the records which have been tendered." 55 F.R.D.
at 357 (citations omitted).
285. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(c); see In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641,
645 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nor. National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976); Budget Rent-A-Car v.
Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354, 357 (W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 53
F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Conn. 1971). Also implicit under this requirement is that the documents
actually contain the answer to the question. See, e.g., Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
286. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 255.
287. 53 F.R.D. 87, 88-89 (D. Conn. 1971).
288. Id. at 89.
289. Id. at 90.
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out whether sought after information is ascertainable from the files tendered, but only
permits a shift of the burden to dig it out once the respondents have specified the
records from 'where the answer' can be derived or ascertained. If the answers lie in the
records of the defendants, they should say so . ... 290
Unfortunately, this standard has rarely been followed in complex
litigation since Master Key.
Both the ABA Task Force and Judicial Conference recognized the
continuing nature of abuse under rule 33(c). To correct the problem
they have proposed to add the following sentence to the rule: "The
specification provided shall include sufficient detail to permit the
interrogating party to identify readily the individual documents from
which the answer may be ascertained."'2 91
This proposal, however, is insufficient to prevent abuse of the option
to produce business records in complex civil litigation. Rule 4(e) of the
Proposed Rules, therefore, suggests a broader revision. 292 First, to
curb the misuse of rule 33(c) by those litigants who avoid providing
basic factual information by substituting voluminous business records,
rule 4(e) strictly limits the use of the rule 33(c) option to situations in
which "the interrogatory calls for computations, statistical data, sum-
290. Id. Similarly, in In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976), the court stated: "[In contraven-
tion of Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(c), the documents adverted to were wholly unspecified .... By the
most liberal construction imaginable of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Metropolitan's 'answer' after four months fell drastically short of any minimal good
faith compliance." Id. at 645.
291. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 19-20; Preliminary Judicial Conference
Amendments, supra note 36, at 645-48; Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37,
at 340-41. The Task Force explained that its recommendation was "designed to eliminate the
mechanical response of an invitation to 'look at all my documents.'" ABA Task Force Report,
supra note 31, at 20. The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference further explained: "The
Committee is advised that parties upon whom interrogatories are served have occasionally
responded by directing the interrogating party to a mass of business records or by offering to
make all of their records available, justifying the response by the option provided by this
subdivision. Such practices are an abuse of the option. A party who is permitted by the terms of
this subdivision to offer records for inspection in lieu of answering an interrogatory should offer
them in a manner that permits the same direct and economical access that is available to the
party." Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 341.
292. See, e.g., Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 35-36 (3d Cir.
1979); Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 55 F.R.D. 354, 357 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Thomason
v. Leiter, 52 F.R.D. 290, 290-91 (M.D. Ala. 1971). This provision also comports with the apt rule
that the burden of showing that the rule 33(c) option has been appropriately invoked is on the
responding party; the interrogating party need not show its inappropriateness. See Daifon, Inc.
v. Allied Chem. Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 227 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976). As the
Thomason court explained, regarding the creation of the rule 33(c) option in 1970: "The theory
behind the amendment is to protect against abusive use of Rule 33. However, it is clear that the
new amendment is not designed to impose on an interrogating party a mass of records and
thereby make the ascertaining of the answers to the questions even more burdensome or
expensive on the interrogating party." 52 F.R.D. at 291.
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maries or other such abstracts of documents." The proposed rule
intentionally emphasizes computations and statistical data-for exam-
ple, prices and sales-because it is more likely that abstracting infor-
mation from such documents will truly be equally burdensome for both
sides. It does, however, permit use of the rule 33(c) option for
"summaries or other such abstracts of documents," because circum-
stances may arise in which the latter are also equally accessible to both
sides. 2 93
Second, rule 4(e) amplifies the requirements for use of the option
when the interrogating party seeks "narrative or other factual sum-
mar[ies]," for example, chronological summaries of events, conferences
or communications. By requiring that the answer identify each princi-
pal event in the narrative or other summary and then key each event
to specific, "individually identified" documents that provide a full
answer to the question, rule 4(e) should prevent the practice of massive
dumping of documents on an adversary solely to avoid revealing even
a bare framework for the facts at issue. 29 4 For example, an interroga-
tory may ask that the respondent list and summarize all meetings
between two entities on a particular subject during the pertinent time
period. If there are particular documents that detail events at the
meetings, the answer might give the dates and other identif)ing
information of the meeting and then refer to the specific notes,
memoranda, minutes or other papers that describe what transpired.
The responding party can, of course, also add further detail to its
answer to supplement the documents, but it need not extract or retype
them in making its response. By keying the events to particular
documents, the interrogating party will receive the details necessary to
ascertain the requested information and will have a readable answer
for use at trial, without having to prove or debate at trial which
particular documents provided the answer to the question.
Third, rule 4(e) requires the party invoking the rule 33(c) option to
assist the interrogating party in deriving the answer from the docu-
ments produced, and to present the documents in readily comprehen-
sible form. 295 This provision is intended to facilitate discovery of
certain documents commonly found in complex civil litigation, such as
reviews of computer outputs, invoices, ledgers and other documents
with symbolic references and abbreviations incomprehensible to the
untutored eye. Thus, rule 4(e) would not only obviate fears that such
documents will be misunderstood, but would also eliminate the need
293. But cf. Concept Indus., Inc. v. Carpet Factory, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 546 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
(responding party permitted to exercise rule 33(c) option even though the summaries were not
equally accessible to both sides).
294. See, e.g., Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 342-45 (10th Cir. 1975).
295. But cf. United States ex rel. Schneider, Inc. v. Rust Eng'r Co., 72 F.R.D. 195 (W.D.
Pa. 1976) (not necessary to cross reference documents with available index).
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for questioners to serve further interrogatories or conduct depositions
merely to comprehend the documents provided and to decipher their
contents. This provision will also make narrative memoranda and
correspondence containing complicated details or technical matters
more easily understandable.
E. Identification of Persons Participating in Response
Interrogatories served upon a large corporation or association fre-
quently require the assistance of several persons to respond to different
aspects of the different questions. 296 Yet, only one officer need sign the
responses returned by the organization. 297 Thus, interrogating counsel
cannot determine who prepared which portion of the responses, and
are left to guess which witnesses to depose or to call at trial, leading to
further discovery and delay.
Rule 4(f) of the Proposed Rules' resolves this problem by requiring
that each set of answers to interrogatories contain "a statement iden-
tifying which persons (other than counsel) participated in making the
answer to which interrogatories. '' 298 The exclusion for counsel reflects
an intent not to undermine the attorney-client privilege. Rather, rule
4(f) is intended to achieve the simple goal of enabling counsel to
identify those persons whose knowledge is relevant to the issues in the
case. 299 The same goal has been sought in the past through the use of a
separate, final interrogatory requesting identification of persons par-
ticipating in the preparation of the response. 30 0 Many attorneys find
296. For example, an interrogatory may ask for information about different departments of a
corporation or with respect to meetings attended by two or more persons from the same company.
If a completely accurate response is to be obtained, all persons involved should be consulted
regarding the questions posed.
297. See Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 508 n.34 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); cf. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204
(8th Cir. 1973) (a corporation must designate a person to answer on its behalf), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1162 (1974).
298. Rule 4(f) is consistent with the general provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) which
expressly permit discovery of "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter." Thus, it does not represent a departure from the present rule, but rather a
codification of prior practice and a reaffirmation of the propriety of interrogatories that have
sought such information in the past. See, e.g., CFTC v. Rosenthal & Co., 74 F.R.D. 454, 456
(N.D. Ill. 1977); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 434 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D, Tenn. 1976); Uinta Oil
Ref. Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 226 F. Supp. 495, 505 (D. Utah 1964); Banana Distribs., Inc. v.
United Fruit Co., 19 F.R.D. 493, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
299. It has been held, however, that a party cannot ask for a list of its adversary's trial
witnesses. EEOC v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 80 F.R.D. 317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United
States v. 216 Bottles, 36 F.R.D. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). But cf. Fidelis Fisheries, Ltd. v. Kristlna
Thorden, 12 F.R.D. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (party may request identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts).
300. See, e.g., Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories (No. 41), Berman Enterprises, Inc. v.
Local 333, United Marine Div., No. 77 Civ. 272 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 9, 1977) (on file with the
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such interrogatories objectionable because, as commonly phrased, 30
they conceivably require a listing of all persons who were consulted
about the language of the answer or who simply read it before it was
served. 30 2 This objection is overcome by rule 4(f)'s reference to persons
who participate in making the answer, rather than to persons preparing
or drafting it. This is more than a semantic difference. The provision
seeks to elicit the names of those with knowledge of the facts and those
who actually contributed that knowledge to the answer being served; it
does not seek the names of other executives who were consulted on the
wording of the answer or who merely proofread it.
In essence, the provisions of rule 4 are premised on the philosophy
that interrogatories should ask simple questions and elicit direct and
clear answers. Interrogatories and answers to interrogatories should be
tools of discovery and disclosure, not litigation weapons. If the Pro-
posed Rules are adopted, counsel and the courts should accord them
the necessary construction to achieve this purpose.
VI. RULE 5: DOCUMENT PRODUCTIONS IN COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
Document productions under rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have also become a vehicle for serious discovery abuse in
complex civil actions. As in the case of written interrogatories, the
abuses occur on both sides of the discovery request, ranging from
unreasonably broad document requests to concealment, and even
suppression, of important documentary evidence. 3 3 Rule 5 of the
Proposed Rules addresses the most chronic of these abuses.
A. Framing Discovery Requests
Document requests in complex civil litigation almost invariably call
for voluminous file searches and productions, far in excess of that
needed for the effective preparation of the requesting party's claim or
Fordham Law Review) ("Identify, by name, all persons who participated in or provided
information for the preparation of the answers to these interrogatories.").
301. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Answer to First Set of Interrogatories (No. 20), Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Jetco Auto Serv. Inc., No. 75 Civ. 921 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. S, 1975) (on file with the Fordham
Law Review) ("Identify each person other than outside counsel who participated in the prepara-
tion of [the plaintiff's] responses to these interrogatories and, for each, list which interrogatories
he or she participated in the preparation of responses to.").
302. Putting aside any legitimate debate with respect to this objection, proper procedure
requires the responding party nevertheless to answer that portion of the interrogatory which is not
objectionable and to decline to answer only the portion which is specifically objected to, pending
a ruling. See 4A J. Moore, supra note 64, 33.27, at 33-150. See also Dollar v. Long Mfg. N.C.
Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Floyd v. Margis, 64
F.R.D. 59, 61 (E.D. Wis. 1974); White v. Beloginis, 53 F.R.D. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Wurlitzer Co. v. EEOC, 50 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
303. Erickson, supra note 30, at 287.
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defense. 30 4 Sometimes, such requests are designed chiefly to harass and
delay by bogging an adversary down in a morass of paperwork.30 5
Often, however, the problem derives from counsel's good faith, but
overly-cautious, preparation of a case. In 1978, the Second Circuit
Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs in Civil Litigation
summarized the problem:
[S]ince the party making the demand typically lacks sufficient information to describe
the documents with specificity and knows only the subject matters as to which he
expects the opposing party's documents to relate, his Rule 34 demand calls for all
documents relating to those subject matters. Since he also expects that the opposing
party will narrowly construe the language of his demand so as to avoid producing
damaging materials, he attempts, in the first instance, to make that language all-
encompassing, and considerable time and expense is generally expended in the very
drafting of those requests. 30 6
Regardless of the motive underlying such excessive requests, they must
be controlled. The costs and difficulty of document discovery have
become intolerable and cannot be justified by attempted "carefulness"
or "completeness. '30 7
In response to this condition, the Second Circuit Commission pro-
posed a rule that would offer the litigants the alternative of using rule
34's current procedures, 30 8 or exchanging lists of the topics to be
covered and the available files with respect thereto before each docu-
ment review takes place. The requesting party would then decide
which of the documents it wishes to review. 30 9 This rule might be
304. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420, 425-27 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Sealand Terminal Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Uitts v. General
Motors Corp., 62 F.R.D. 560, 562-63 (E.D. Pa. 1974); M.S.A. Constr. Co. v. Crafts, Inc., 58 F. R.D.
215, 216 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
305. Such purposes clearly undermine the proper goals of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
See Zucker v. Sable, 72 F.R.D. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v.
Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 459, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v.
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 150, 152 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
306. Second Circuit Commission Proposal, supra note 11, at cols. 3-4.
307. Id.
308. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, a party may serve a written request for documents which must be
responded to within 30 lays. Generally, responding parties merely indicate in a written answer
whether they will produce the documents or object, in whole or in part, to the request; If there is an
objection, the ground is also stated in the response. Either simultaneous with the written answer or
shortly thereafter, the documents are produced for the requesting party's review and copying. The
written response does not list, categorize or comment upon the documents. This task is left to the
requesting party, as is the task of determining the pertinence of the documents produced to any
particular subject referred to in the request.
309. The rule, currently being revised following receipt of comments from the Bar, would
provide: "Any party seeking document production pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 34 shall give
notice at the time of serving his document request of his election to proceed by one of the following
two methods:
Option 1
1. The party seeking production shall serve a list of subject matters as to which he desires
production; such list to be as brief and concise as the issues allow.
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expected to reduce the expense of discovery, but not the scope of
requests or volume of objections. In addition, it presupposes that
counsel can determine which documents are pertinent from a list of file
folder titles. Although this proposal may work successfully with re-
spect to some files and documents, it is not likely to satisfy overly-
cautious counsel who would prefer to review virtually all of the files to
ferret out a lurking "smoking gun. '310
Rule 5(a) of the Proposed Rules attempts to alleviate the problem of
harassing requests by requiring that document requests "attempt in
good faith to avoid broadside verbiage, duplication and subject matter
not actually believed pertinent to discovery in the action," and that
counsel frame such requests as specifically as possible. Together with
rule 2(a)'s "reasonable bearing" standard for the scope of discovery, 31'
this provision should induce counsel to draft their document requests
more carefully and with greater particularity. If counsel fails to heed
these dictates, the court should strike the offending request or requests
2. The party opposing production shall state his objection, if any, to any listed subject matter, such
objections to be limited to the relevancy of the subject.
3. After rulings on relevancy objections, if any, the party making production shall:
(a) list the location of all files relating to those subject matters;
(b) identify the persons knowledgeable as to the organization and maintenance of the files at each
such location; or
(c) describe in detail the categories of documents at each much [sic) location; or.
(d) supply a list of the legends appearing on each file folder referring or relating to the subject
matters involved (such list may be made by xerographic or photographic copy of such file folder
legends).
4. If deemed necessary or desirable by the court, magistrate or master, interviews or depositions
may be conducted of file personnel, and (where lists of the legends of file folders have not been
provided) further description may be required of the content of the files.
5. A magistrate or master may also elect to conduct an on-site inspection of the files or interviews of
the appropriate personnel.
6. The party seeking production shall give notice(s) of the sequence in which he desires to inspect
the contents of files and may commence such inspection after having given the party making
production a reasonable opportunity to review those files initially for privileged, proprietary or other
confidential materials.
7. A list of any materials withdrawn from the files on grounds of privilege or confidentiality shall be
furnished to the party seeking production; and rulings on the production of such materials may be
sought by motion made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 37.
Option 2
1. Production may be sought, and objections may be interposed, in the manner provided by Fed.
R. Civ. P. Rule 34.
2. In ruling on objections, the court may impose limitations on the extent of the burden to be
incurred by the party making production, consistent with the fact that the party seeking production
has elected not to assume the burden of the file search but to cast that burden upon his opponent."
Second Circuit Commission Proposal, supra note 11, at cols. 2-3.
310. The rule was also criticized as impractical for ordinary litigation. Cohn, supra note S, at 287.
Drafted by counsel who were primarily involved in complex civil litigation, the rule was tailored to
such actions without sufficient consideration of its implications for and effects on noncomplex cases.
Id.
311. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
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and, when appropriate, impose sanctions for any unreasonable burden
that resulted from such request or requests.31 z
Broad document requests are appropriate in certain types of litiga-
tion. Monopolization antitrust cases, for example, demand an exten-
sive knowledge of both the industry and the scope of the defendant's
business. 313 Even in these cases, however, a substantial narrowing of
the scope of document production is usually possible. 314 Rule 5(a)
directs counsel to make such narrowing the rule rather than the
exception.
Although rule 5(a) attempts to ensure greater specificity, and thus
narrower scope, in document requests, it expressly 'permits requests by
category of document; for example, all correspondence, minutes or
contracts on a particular matter. 315 This provision recognizes that the
volume of documents involved in complex civil litigation makes it
unrealistic to require specification of individual documents. 31 6 To do
so would unduly disrupt the normal discovery routine in complex
actions by requiring extensive depositions and interrogatories before
document requests could be served. 317 Complex civil litigation nor-
mally proceeds in precisely the opposite fashion. 318 Thus, although
312. See pt. VII infra.
313. In a monopolization case brought pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976),
the court must determine the relevant product and geographic markets in which the monopolization
is claimed to have occurred. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 979-80 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1978); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd and rev'd
inpart, 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Woods Exploration & Prod.
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 304 F. Supp. 845,849-50(S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'dandrev'd inpart,
438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). See also United States v. Otter
Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Minn. 1971), modified, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
314. See, e.g., In re Fertilizer Antitrust Litigation, [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,894, at
79,180 (E.D. Wash. 1979) (scope narrowed by limiting time frame and geographic area); FTC v.
Lukens Steel Co., 444 F. Supp. 803, 806-07 (D.D.C. 1977) (time frame limited); Professional
Adjusting Syss. of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 1225, 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (geographical area limited); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. MGM, Inc., 54
F.R.D. 201, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (same). But cf. Quonset Real Estate Corp. v. Paramount Film Dist.
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (time frame limited if request in bad faith).
315. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) also permits a request for document inspection to designate the
documents by "item" or "category" with the proviso that they be described "with reasonable
particularity." What constitutes "reasonable particularity" depends on the particular facts of the
particular case. Mitsui & Co. (USA) v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 79 F.R.D. 72, 81-82
(D.P.R. 1978); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs& Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
316. Some states require such specification. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 3120 (McKinney
1970). See generally Rios v. Donovan, 21 A.D.2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Ist Dep't 1964); Johnson,
Drake & Piper, Inc. v. State, 57 Misc. 2d 846, 293 N.Y.S.2d 728 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Mustapich v.
Huntington Union Free School Dist. 3, 46 Misc. 2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
317. Thus, for example, the New York courts hold that document productions should await the
taking of depositions at which an identification of pertinent specific documents can be obtained.
Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 A.D.2d 587, 340 N.Y.S.2d 303 (4th Dep't 1973); Quirino v. New
York City Transit Auth., 60 Misc. 2d 634, 303 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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identifying interrogatories are often served early in the discovery
process, 3 19 document productions usually precede the depositions be-
cause depositions frequently delve into the details of documents pro-
duced by the witness or otherwise for purposes of his deposition. The
use of depositions to identify individual documents is far more limited
in complex civil actions than in other forms of civil litigation. In
negligence cases, for example, only a few pertinent documents are
usually involved and the oral testimony is not substantially keyed to
the documentary evidence.3 20 Rule 5(a) seeks to accommodate the
special requirements of complex litigation without sacrificing the need
to limit the currently unbridled document demands that prevail in such
actions.
Rule 5(a) also rejects, as did the ABA Task Force and the Judicial
Conference, 32 1 a return to the pre-1970 mode of document produc-
tions. The former rule 34 required the requesting party to make a
motion and show "good cause" to obtain documents from its adver-
sary. 3 22 In 1967, the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference
found the latter procedure unduly restrictive and cumbersome for the
court and the litigants. 3 23 Today, as then, document productions are
too essential in complex litigation to be made a matter of permission
rather than right. Within reason, the court and the discovery rules
should err on the side of full disclosure, not restrictive disclosure. Rule
5(a) is intended to deter unreasonable requests, but not alter the basic
right of litigants to obtain all documents having a reasonable bearing
on the issues in the case.
B. Nature of Responses and Document Productions
1. Manner of Response
Subparts (b) through (e) of rule 5 of the Proposed Rules grapple
with the reverse side of the document production problem in complex
318. Federal procedure permits document discovery prior to depositions. Buckley v, Vidal, So
F.R.D. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
319. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 26 F.R.D. 172, 173 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
Under current procedure, interrogatory answers can compel an identification of documents, but a
separate request is necessary to compel their production. Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D.
136, 140 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28, 30 (N.D. Ga. 1968). In
actual practice, however, it is not unusual for responding parties to attach specific documents to their
interrogatory answers as part of them.
320. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 8, at 476-77.
321. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 22; Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments,
supra note 5, at 256-57.
322. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (1946); see, e.g., Straughan v. Barge MVL No. 802, 291 F. Supp. 282,
284 (S.D. Tex. 1968). For a discussion of what constituted "good cause," see National Util. Serv.,
Inc. v. Northwestern Steel & wire Co., 426 F.2d 222, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1970); Southern Ry. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1968). The 1970 amendments abandoned this requirement.
Stark v. Photo Researchers, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
323. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 256-57.
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litigation: responses to document requests. In some instances, respond-
ing counsel simply refuse to produce pertinent documents, necessitat-
ing needless motion practice and injustices. 324 But this is not the
principal area of concern; indeed, rule 6 of the Proposed Rules would
provide the most realistic possible curb on such conduct: sanctions
against counsel and litigant. 325 More problematical are the abuses in
which the responding party attempts to drown its adversary in a sea of
documents, scrambled together in an unmapped mass, or to bury key
documents in the pile by "shuffling the deck," rather than producing
documents in their original form or in an otherwise orderly state. 326
The ABA Task Force took specific note of this "chicanery" 327 and
recommended that rule 34(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
be amended to provide: "When producing documents, the producing
party shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of
business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the
categories in the request that call for their production. ' 328 Unfortu-
nately, this proposal does not go far enough to cure such abuses. The
responding party must be subject to more specific requirements of
fairness and candor. Rule 5 of the Proposed Rules provides such
specificity.
Rule 5(b) directs the responding party to state "which documents or
categories of documents respond to which particular requests, with
sufficient specificity and identification to enable the requesting party to
ascertain readily the documents being referred to." In addition, rule
5(c) incorporates the ABA Task Force's recommendation by requiring
that documents be produced either "in the same form and categories as
they are kept in the ordinary course of business," or that they be
"otherwise organized and labeled to correspond to the particular
324. See, e.g., DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1974); Haney v.
Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 330 F.2d 940, 945 (4th Cir. 1964); Bell v. Automobile Club, 80 F.R.D.
228, 229-30 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal dismissed, 601 F. 2d 587 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Surg-O-Flex
of America, Inc.ov. Bergen Brunswig Co., 76 F.R.D. 654 (D. Conn. 1977).
325. See pt. VII infra.
326. See Erickson, supra note 30, at 289. Several other response abuses also plague complex
actions, such as withholding important documents until the eve of trial or until after pertinent
discovery as to them has already been conducted. See, e.g., Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536
F.2d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Krieger v. Texaco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1972);
United States v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 210 F. Supp. 88) (D.N.J. 1962).
327. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 22.
328. Id. The Task Force offered the following rationale for its recommendation: "[The proposed]
amendment . ..would prescribe the manner of document production and is responsive to a
reprehensible practice much discussed by the Committee-the deliberate attempt by a producing
party to burden discovery with volume or disarray. It is apparently not rare for parties deliberately to
mix critical documents with others in the hope of obscuring [their] significance." Id. The Judicial
Conference endorsed the Task Force's proposed addition to rule 34. Preliminary Judicial Conference




requests." This provision should protect against shuffling the deck to
bury key documents in unlikely places, a practice that misleads an
examiner into believing that there are no such documents. 329 Respond-
ing counsel should not be able to assuage his conscience by rationaliz-
ing that the documents were actually produced but that the examiner
simply missed them.
2. Explanation of Documents Produced
At present, the courts generally have not imposed an affirmative
obligation upon the responding party to explain the documents pro-
duced. 3 30 For example, in Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Par-
cel Service, Inc., 331 the plaintiff moved to compel the defendants "to
decipher the voluminous documents they [had] made available," claim-
ing that they could not understand or interpret the documents and,
thus, could not determine whether the production was complete or
adequate. The defendants argued that they had no "responsibility to
analyze [the production] for plaintiffs. '332 The court agreed and denied
the motion, stating: "The burden is on plaintiffs to make their own
case. So long as plaintiffs have access to all the relevant information, I
do not believe it is incumbent upon defendants to share this burden
any further. '333 Although it is impossible to determine from the
opinion what type of documents had been produced, and why the
plaintiff had difficulty understanding them, Broadway Delivery ap-
pears to adopt an unduly restrictive approach, requiring further time-
consuming and expensive discovery solely to interpret the discovery
already conducted. 334
If the documents are truly difficult to decipher, judicial economy
and fairness to the litigants call for a prompt explanation by the
producing party. 335 Accordingly, rule 5(c) requires that
329. See, e.g., Charron v. Meaux, 66 F.R.D. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); CTS Corp. v. Piher Intl
Corp., 59 F.R.D. 394, 395 (N.D. Il. 1973). See also In re King Resources Co., 75 F.R.D. 12 (D.
Colo. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
330. See, e.g., Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., [1979-1 ]Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,543, at 77,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). This is analogous to the predominance of cases declining to
require a party to produce the indices and analyses of its production. See, e.g., Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. AT & T Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314,
1341 (D.D.C. 1978).
331. [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
332. Id. at 77,148.
333. Id.
334. Other courts have taken a different approach, viewing the matter more equitably and
pragmatically. See, e.g., Lodge 743 v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Conn. 1963),
aff'd, 337 F.2d5 (2dCir. 1964), cert. denied, 380U.S. 908(1965).Seealso Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976); Xdrox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
335. Without such an explanation, discovery through document production can become no more
than an endurance contest. The Second Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and Costs
in Civil Litigation summarized this problem: "The opposing party customarily objects to the breadth
1980]
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[elach document production shall be accompanied by a readily comprehensible written
statement listing the groups and types of documents being produced, the titles and
folder legends of the files from which they came, the names of the persons and
department for whom any specific file was maintained, the location where the files
were and are maintained, the persons knowledgeable as to the organization and
maintenance of the files involved and (to the extent reasonably feasible) the identity of
the persons whose handwriting appears on the documents produced.
To facilitate any further discovery that the requesting party may wish
to undertake regarding the subject matter of the documents produced,
the rule does not require listing individual documents, but rather
general groups of documents: for example, memoranda on topic X,
correspondence on topic Y. Thus, the written statement of explanation
is expected to take the place of, and remove the necessity for, identify-
ing interrogatories as to those documents.336 Rule 5(f) requires that the
statement be signed under oath, and makes it "admissible at trial in
the same manner, for the same purposes and to the same extent as
sworn interrogatory answers." Receiving a rule 5(c) written statement,
therefore, would give the requesting party the same rights as if it had
instead received an answer to an identifying interrogatory. In short,
the written statement required by rule 5(c) would provide relief to
requesting parties in situations similar to Broadway Delivery without
placing an undue burden of explanation on the producing party.
3. Production of Copies
Another current abusive response tactic is the production of a
massive pile of papers, unstapled or otherwise segregated or
categorized, consisting of copies of the responding party's files. 337 The
and burden of the demand-again expending great effort in his submission. Lawyers and company
personnel are often dispatched to estimate the volume of documents involved... for file searches and
production. Negotiations are then held regarding the objections, and the party seeking production
files a Rule 37 motion with a supporting (and, again, typically extensive) memorandum. The
opposing party files his papers consisting of an equally long memorandum and affidavits particulariz-
ing the burdensomeness of the demands. Hearings are held on the objections--often before a
magistrate with appeals to the court." Second Circuit Commission Proposal, supra note 11, col. 3.
336. Identifying interrogatories would still be possible and available under proposed rule 4, as
discussed in pt. V supra. Rule 5(c) would, however, attempt to give the requesting party an
opportunity to proceed directly to document requests if it believes it already has sufficient informa-
tion to frame a meaningful request. This is consistent with the current rule that concurrent discovery
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 33 and 34 is generally acceptable and that no specific order or sequence of
discovery requests is required. See note 113 supra.
337. See, e.g., Lodge 743 v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19, 20 (D. Conn. 1963),
aft'd, 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965). Compare Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352-54 (1978) (a class action defendant need not sort out and
analyze its files and documents for its adversary when the information is sought to facilitate tile
sending of notice rather than to define or clarify the issues in the case) with Kozlowski v. Sears,
Roebuck Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) (a party cannot defeat production by claiming
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task of determining what constitutes a single document or a single file
can be onerous in itself, debilitating the requesting party even before it
reaches the substance of the documents. To end this practice, rule 5(c)
makes explicit the common-sense requirement that copies produced in
lieu of originals must be legible; further, the copies produced must be
"stapled and otherwise copied in such manner as to duplicate the form
of the originals in the files of the producing party or witness."
C. Computer Runs and Summaries
In the past twenty years, computer technology has progressed sig-
nificantly. These technological developments have spawned two prob-
lems in complex litigation: first, testing the trustworthiness of data
processing records and, second, determining their admissibility into
evidence. Although the courts, and many commentators, recognize a
computer's utility in storing and quickly retrieving large quantities of
information, they express the fear that the potential for abuse is great
because of the inherent difficulties in verifying the reliability of the
records so produced. 338 Also troublesome is the extent to which such
evidence should be usable when created specifically for the lawsuit,
rather than having been kept in the ordinary course of the parties'
business operations. 339 The aura of efficiency that computers create in
the lay person's mind can clothe such evidence with an unconscious
presumption of verisimilitude beyond the narrow point to which it may
relate, or at which it is directed to prove.
With respect to the trial phase of complex litigation, the Manual for
Complex Litigation340 specifically addresses these problems, and es-
pouses precise guidelines that favor the wider use and admissibility of
computer runs as well as other forms of voluminous document sum-
maries. 34 1 The Manual cautions, however, that the producing party
that its files are so disorganized that it is difficult to locate the requested documents). See also
Fisher v. Harris, Uphan & Co., 61 F.RD. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed mem., 516
F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975).
338. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240 (6th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
(1974); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1969); Tapper, Evidencefrom
Computers, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 562, 592 (1974); cf. Sunset Motor Lines, Inc. v. Lu-Tex Packing Co., 256
F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1958) (form comprising punch card for machine accounting inadmissible when not
certified as required). See also Comment, Admissibility of Computer-Kept Business Records, 55
Cornell L.Q. 1033 (1970); Comment, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Business Records as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 687 (1970).
339. Fed. R. Evid. 1006 contemplates admission of such evidence at trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 82S (1970). See also
Fromholz, Discovery, Evidence, Confidentiality, and Security Problems Associated With the Use of
Computer-Based Litigation Support Systems, 1977 Wash. U. L.Q. 445, 452; note 338 supra.
340. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14.
341. Id. § 2.716, at 155-56.
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must provide assurances of their pertinence to the matter at issue and
of their trustworthiness, accuracy and completeness. 342
Different problems regarding computer-produced evidence and other
such summaries are involved in the discovery phase of complex
litigation. Because admissibility at trial is not the standard for permis-
sible discovery, 343 requests for computer runs, as well as the tapes and
other input from which they are developed, are generally not objec-
tionable. 344 Indeed, the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee has
made it clear that the definition of "documents" includes electronic
data compilations. 345 Discovery of computer programs (software) and
the details of computer hardware is also generally permitted and,
indeed, essential to enable the discovering party to comprehend the
data processing output. 346 For example, in Adams v. Dan River Mills,
Inc., 347 the court directed the defendant in an employment discrimi-
nation action to produce its print-outs and related software programs
to enable the plaintiff to prove the defendant's prior payroll history.
The court explained that "[b]ecause of the accuracy and inexpensive-
ness of producing the requested documents . . . , this court sees no
reason why the defendant should not be required to produce the
computer cards or tapes and the W-2 print-outs to the plaintiffs.
3 48
The more perplexing issue has been to what extent a party may be
compelled, in pretrial discovery, to generate data processing output
which it does not currently possess, but which it can specially create to
provide a response to a particular question. Decisions that antedated
the development of speedy and inexpensive data processing refused to
require preparation of special materials to respond to document re-
quests. 349 The growth and widespread availability of such information
systems and equipment, however, has engendered a new attitude on
the subject. 350 Thus, the Manual for Complex Litigation states that
342. Id. §§ 2.714-2.716.
343. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., United States v. Davey, 404 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 543
F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976). Fisher v. Harris, Upham & Co., 61 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
appeal dismissed mem., 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Manual for Complex Litigation,
supra note 14, § 2.715.
345. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 257; see Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, reprinted in 48 F.R.D. 487, 527
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Revised Draft of 1970 Amendments].
346. See Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972); Fromholz,
supra note 339, at 455. See also United States v. Davey, 404 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976).
347. 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972).
348. Id. at 222.
349. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 7 F.R.D. 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).




"such processing should be required where programs exist to print out
the records in the form desired, or when it would require a minimum
of effort to prepare a program to secure the requested information. ' 35 1
The case of Lodge 743, International Association of Machinists v.
United Aircraft Corp.35 2 is illustrative. In response to a union's discov-
ery request in a complex labor law case, the defendant employer
delivered to plaintiff's counsel "approximately 120,000 photographic
copies of selected individual personnel records weighing over 450
pounds. '353 On the plaintiff's motion for assistance in interpreting the
production, the court directed that the defendant prepare, at its own
expense, an electronic analysis of the records via data processing
equipment. 334
The correct test of when to require the creation of such material in
connection with a production request is summarized in the Advisory
Committee Note to the 1970 amendment of rule 34(a):
[When the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only
through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to
translate the data into usable form. In man), instances, this means that respondent will
have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden thus placed on respondent
will vary from case to case, and the courts have ample power under Rule 26Jc) to
protect respondent against undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or
requiring that the discovering pafty pay costs.ss
The other side of the issue, however-the right of a part) to produce
computer print-outs and other summaries in lieu of the voluminous
documents from which they are generated-has not as yet been
adequately addressed. Accordingly, rule 5(d) of the Proposed Rules
authorizes the party responding to a document request to produce
''computer print-outs or other comparable or similar summaries" in
lieu of producing voluminous documents, provided that (1) the re-
351. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 2.7 IS.at 154-55 (footnotes omitted) Using
the same rationale, the courts have also expanded the scope of permissible document requests and
trial subpoenas for documents, reasoning that "with the advent of office copier technology there is
little danger that a substantial document request would denude a corporation of files and records
essential to its continued operation." United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 109 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); FTC v. Rockefeller, 441 F. Supp. 234, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aftd, 591 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.
1979). But cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906) (mass production of documents will effectively
halt business operations); In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 6 F.R.D. 347, 348-49 (D. Mass. 1947)
(same).
352. 220 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S
908 (1965).
353. Id. at 20.
354. Id. at 21. Lodge 743 does not represent a general rule, however, because the decision has
an obvious overtone of sanctions, resulting from the unsegregated and huge mass of the document
production. Id. at 20.
355. Revised Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 345, at 527; see Preliminary Draft of 1970
Amendments, supra note 5, at 256-57.
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sponse is accompanied by "a readily comprehensible written state-
ment" fully explaining the print-out or other summary and any sym-
bols or abbreviations on them, and (2) the underlying documents from
which it is generated are "also made available promptly to any party
that thereafter requests discovery and inspection thereof." The rule is
intended to encourage the voluntary use of such computer or other
technologically-created summaries as an alternative to a "sea of paper"
production typified in Lodge 743, and to avoid the necessity for
extraneous additional discovery merely to decipher the significance or
meaning of a voluminous document production.
Rule 5(d) derives its rationale from rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 35 6 which permits summaries or charts to be admitted into
evidence if the underlying documentation "cannot conveniently be
examined in court," provided the producing party makes such
documentation available to its adversary to verify the accuracy of the
summary or chart. 35 7 Furthermore, as the Manualfor Complex Litiga-
tion observes: "In complex cases, it is necessary to make pervasive use
of summaries during the discovery period as well as in the trial of the
case. Early and effective use of summaries may result in many
foreshortenings of what otherwise might be nearly interminable peri-
ods of discovery. '35
8
Although such a rule permitting the responding party -to provide a
computer run or summary may appear unrealistically altruistic, the
practice is already commonplace in complex litigation.3 5 9 Responding
counsel realize that a great deal of effort and administrative burden
can be avoided by such summary material. If counsel wish to use
voluminous documentation at trial, they will probably have to produce
it in summary form anyway. 360 By producing the summary during
discovery, therefore, counsel can shortcut the process of organizing its
own evidence for trial. Thus, it seems preferable simply to provide the
summary or print-out in the first instance.
356. Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
357. Fed. R. Evid. 1006 provides: "The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photo-
graphs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or
copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be
produced in court."See also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
358. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 14, § 2.71, at 142.
359. See, e.g., State Wholesale Grocers v. Great A & P Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471, 497 (N.D. Ill.
1957), modified, 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959); see Manual for
Complex Litigation, supra note 14, §§ 2.711-2.717. See also Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54
F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972); King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393
(Miss. 1969); Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965); Freed,
Computer Print-Outs as Evidence, in 16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 273 (1965).
360. Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
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Rule 5(d) also accepts the concept that computer materials are, at
least prima facie, reliable36 1 and that print-outs will often precisely
detail the point at issue, obviating debate and confusion as to the
meaning and content of voluminous documents. The requirement of a
further "readily comprehensible written statement," explaining the
meaning of the print-out or summary, is designed both to facilitate an
investigation of the print-out's reliability and to ensure its easy and
correct use by the court and counsel.
D. Personal Assistance at Document Productions
To further counsel's comprehension of the massive documents pro-
duced in complex civil litigation, rule 5(e) of the Proposed Rules
requires the responding party or witness, upon request, to "collect the
documents in a single location . . . and arrange for a knowledgeable
person to be available at any such production" to assist other counsel
in interpreting the documents and any "symbols and other matters" on
them.
The rule does not require that a deposition be taken of the "knowl-
edgeable person" present, or that he or she be sworn, or that any
record be made of the proceedings. It simply ensures the presence of a
guide to answer obvious questions of a non-substantive or identifying
nature. Although the requesting party may desire to create a record or
take a formal deposition of such a person, 362 rule 5(e) intentionally
leaves that matter open. Thus, the rule permits a deposition and a
record but, because a deposition in most instances will increase the
cost of discovery and induce the formal posturing of counsel, the
procedure envisioned is a form of informal itinerary. The rule assumes
that counsel will volunteer honest and forthright responses, and that
the "knowledgeable person" will provide unhesitating assistance, in-
spired by the relaxed atmosphere of an untranscribed meeting or
session. Producing parties generally have someone present at document
productions, more as a safety precaution than anything else. Often,
however, the person is a paralegal with only limited familiarity with
the documents and with strict instructions not to communicate with
the inspecting counsel. 363 Under rule 5(e), such a practice could be
361. Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir 1969). D & H Auto
Parts, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548, 551 (E.D N.Y. 1973)
362. As discussed above, Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(S) permits a deposition to be accompanied by a
document request, subject to the procedural requirements of rule 34. When used in this manner, a
deposition notice is a form of subpoena duces tecum. See pt. IV(D) supra
363. Such a"monitor" of the document production is present to ensure that the papers produced
are not removed, damaged or disheveled in the inspection process. In some instances, he or she also
attempts to collect information with respect to the portions of the production upon which the
inspecting party is concentrating.
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curtailed without fear of turning document custodians into formal
witnesses.
There does not appear to be direct legal authority supporting rule
5(e)'s procedure. By the same token, there is no contrary authority
either. A case such as Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 364 indicates that not all judges believe that the produc-
ing party presently has an obligation to undertake what rule 5(e) would
require; but this does not mean that such authority cannot now be
created. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 3 65 and Lodge
743, International Association of Machinists v. United Aircraft
Corp.3 66 provide analogous support for the concepts underlying rule
5(e). In Pearl Brewing, the court ordered that the plaintiffs make
available two experts to help the defendant comprehend a highly
technical computer print-out produced by the plaintiffs. 367 In Lodge
743, moreover, the court ordered the defendant to prepare an elec-
tronic analysis of its voluminous records using its data processing
equipment. 368 Rule 5(e) is effectively no more than a corollary to the
power of the courts to require such assistance.
Although collecting the documents at a single location can greatly
aid inspection, rule 5(e) recognizes that there may be circumstances in
which it is impractical or too costly for the document production to
take place at a single location, such as if the document request requires
particularly voluminous productions from many different plants or
branches. 369 Rule 5(e), therefore, allows an exception to the single
location requirement if it is not "reasonably feasible" to fulfill it. The
exception applies only to the truly burdensome situation;370 it is not
intended to create a loophole for avoiding the purposes of the single
location requirement. Rule 5(e) should be interpreted to compel counsel
to make the number of productions as few and the inspection sites as
conveniently located as possible. Otherwise, the expense of conducting
a document inspection could rise drastically, and the inspecting party
may be confronted with a massive jigsaw puzzle to assemble, thus
undermining the purposes of rule 5(e).
364. [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,543 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see notes 331-33 supra and accom-
panying text.
365. 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1138 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
366. 220 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1963), affd, 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
908 (1965).
367. 415 F. Supp. at 1139.
368. 220 F. Supp. at 21.
369. The court can, of course, determine the time and place of the production and direct that the
cost be shared or borne by either party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2); see, e.g., La Chemise Lacoste v.
General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596 (D. Del. 1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1973). See also United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). But cf. GFI Computer Indus. Inc. v,
Fry, 476 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1973) (jurisdictional limits on subpoena power of court).
370. See note 304 supra and accompanying text.
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E. Use of Written Responses At Trial
The written responses to document requests required under subparts
(c) and (d) of rule 5 of the Proposed Rules may contain important
information about the existence of documents or their prior mainte-
nance. Such information may be pertinent to the issues at trial. For
example, the response may contain evidence that there exists or does
not exist a reply to a particular communication or that certain proce-
dures were or were not followed. Recognizing the potential relevance
of these written statements, rule 5(f) provides that they "shall be
admissible at trial in the same manner, for the same purposes and to
the same extent as sworn interrogatory answers."137' Consistent with
that concept, and analogous to answers to written interrogatories, rule
5(f) also requires that they be "signed under oath" and identify "which
persons (other than counsel) participated in preparing the response to
which specific requests." Rule 5(f) will not pose an additional undue
burden upon the responding party, and will provide the requesting
party with a potentially admissible response. Furthermore, use of the
rule's provisions is expected to lead to information that may assist
counsel in determining whether to conduct further discover), and in
deciding which witnesses to call at trial.
VII. RULE 6: SANCTIONS IN COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
In rule 6, the Proposed Rules declare open warfare on willful
discovery abuses. Rule 6 is designed to remove any doubt in the minds
of counsel that if they flout the letter or the spirit of the rules
sanctions will be imposed. Moreover, the rule is designed to eliminate
any judicial reluctance to impose such sanctions. The primary goal of
rule 6 is deterrence, not punishment. Nevertheless, the rules are
founded on the theory that without the real threat of punishment there
can be no effective deterrence. 372
371. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) governs the use ofinterrogatory answers at trial; it provides simply that
they "may be used to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence." See Treharne v. Callahan, 426
F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1970); Grace & Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 278 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1960); Bullard v.
Universal Millwork Corp., 25 F.RID. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Ware v. Garvey, 139 F. Supp. 71 (D.
Mass. 1956).
372. Several courts have noted that the goal of deterrence is particularly important in complex
civil litigation" 'where efficient and effective discovery procedures are essential to orderly adjudica-
tion.' "In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (quoting
TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964)) (emphasis deleted), rev'd on other grounds,
531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976); see Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 18-19 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd sub nor. Mangano v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir.
1971).
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Chief Judge Kaufman recently summarized the use in the federal
courts of sanctions for discovery abuses:
On their face, the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] deal harshly with the recusant
deponent and the dilatory answeror. Courts have been reluctant, however, to impose
the full range of sanctions available under Rule 37. Preclusion of testimony and
dismissal are, to be sure, extreme sanctions, to be deployed only in rare situations. But
unless Rule 37 is perceived as a credible deterrent rather than a "paper tiger," .. the
pretrial quagmire threatens to engulf the entire litigative process.
3 73
Rule 6 seeks to transform the "paper tiger" into one poised to strike,
and to instill in all involved in the discovery process the sure knowl-
edge that a judicial response for failure to comply with the new
discovery rules will be forthcoming.
Valid considerations underlie the judicial reluctance to impose sanc-
tions. Primarily, judges are hesitant to deny a day in court on the
merits to a litigant or to unduly iestrict the litigant's ability to present
its full case because of a precedural error or failing. 374 Secondarily, but
also important, judges recognize that discovery abuses are most often
attributable to counsel's misconduct; courts are reluctant to punish a
litigant for acts or omissions over which the litigant is not likely to
have control, and about which it may not even be aware. 373
Rule 6 does not ignore these considerations, but proceeds on the
373. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062,
1063-64 (2d Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted). For a comprehensive survey of the standards for tile
imposition of discovery sanctions being followed in the various federal circuits, see Epstein, Corco-
ran, Krieger & Carr, supra note 248. The authors conclude: "[A] [flinding of willfulness is still, in most
circuits, a crucial prerequisite for the imposition of sanctions for dilatory abuse of the discovery
process." Id. at 169.
374. Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 376 F.2d 118, 121 '5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
815 (1968); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 956 (1956);see Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 1974); General Dynamics Corp.
v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
375. Britt v. Corporacion Peruana De Vapores, 506 F.2d 927, 932 (5th Cir. 1975); Dorsey v.
Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Link v. Wabash R.R.
370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (no abuse of discretion to dismiss action because of counsel's failure to
attend pretrial conference without adequate excuse); Marshall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 36 F.R.D. 186 (W.D. La. 1964) (dismissal with prejudice for disobeying court order), aff'd,
353 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 910 (1965). See also In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030,
1037 (2d Cir. 1976). The problem confronting judges is not the exclusive province of the
American judicial system. Addressing discovery abuse that has arisen under Canadian procedural
rules, a Canadian commentator recently warned: "[Sanctions] are only as effective as courts are
willing to make them, and are invoked only with tremendous reluctance. There is reason for this
reluctance; to deprive someone of the opportunity to defend or assert his case is to deny him the
resort to law; to deprive him of this freedom may well be to punish him out of all proportion to
the misdeed. Moreover, such sanctions fail to take into account the lawyer's responsibility for the
wrongful activity or inactivity of his client." Gold, Controlling Procedural Abuses: The Role of
Costs and Inherent Judicial Authority, 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 44, 84-85 (1977) (footnotes omitted);
see, e.g., Moffat v. Rawding, 11 D.L.R.3d 216, 224-28 (N.S. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 14 D.L.R.3d 186
(N.S. Ct. App. 1970). But see Cook v. Szott, 68 D.L.R.2d 723, 725-27 (Alta. Ct. App. 1968).
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premise that, when the courts afford too much deference to the
wrongdoer, it is necessarily at the expense of the victim of the
discovery abuse; justice and due process must also be preserved for the
latter. 37 6  Imposing sanctions, however, need not deprive the
wrongdoer of its day in court. Other more pragmatic sanctions,
unrelated to the merits, 377 can be invoked in the event of lesser
transgressions, to underscore the purposes of the Proposed Rules and
to make compliance and good faith the norm in complex civil litiga-
tion. Sanctions of a more drastic nature, however, can and should be
imposed for the most serious discovery transgressions. 378
A. Nature of Sanctions
Subparts (a) and (e) of rule 6 of the Proposed Rules enumerate the
sanctions available to the court to remedy failures to abide by the
discovery rules. Rule 6(a) allows the court to impose any sanctions set
forth in rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 379 the
additional sanctions suggested in rule 6(e) "or any combination
thereof." Rule 37 permits a variety of sanctions ranging from monetary
fines equivalent to the cost of having to seek court relief to preclusion
orders, striking of pleadings, contempt of court, and even entry of a
default judgment, depending on the nature of the discovery abuse. 380
With respect to certain deposition, interrogatory and document in-
spection abuses, rule 37(d) gives the court the power to "make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just.138 I The Advisory Committee
explained that this provision was intended to afford the court "flexibil-
ity" in determining the appropriate relief for discovery abuses.
382
376. See Renfrew, supra note 6. "The judicious use of sanctions on litigants and lawyers who
abuse the judicial process is one effective way to make justice achievable and affordable for the
citizens who turn to the courts for the vindication of their rights." Id. at 267.
377. See, e.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 (4th Cir. 1977)
(sanctions permitted only to the extent necessary to prevent prejudice to movant), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1020 (1978); Bardin v. Mondon, 298 F.2d 235, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1961) (court dismissed action but
allowed reinstatement of suit contingent on attorney's payment of court costs and fine); Humphreys
Exterminating Co. v. Poulter, 62 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D. Md. 1974) (penalty of $250 as attorneys fees);
White v. Beloginis, 53 F.R.D. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (award of plaintiff's expenses in obtaining
order); Palma v. Lake Waukomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D. 366, 369 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (same) See also
SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1975).
378. See, e.g., Affanatov. MerrillBros., 547 F.2d 138, 140-41 (1stCir. 1977)(default judgment),
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Inmobiliaria Melia de P.R., Inc., 543 F. Zd 3. 5-6 (2d Cir
1976) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977). But see CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp., 59 F.R.D
394 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (one last opportunity to comply with document production granted before more
drastic sanction imposed).
379. Fed. R- Civ. P. 37.
380. Id. 37(b)-37(d). Rule 37(f) excludes the United States from possible sanctions
381. Id. 37(d).
382. Preliminary Draft of 1970 Amendments, supra note 5, at 271
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Despite the broad powers given the courts by rule 37, the ABA Task
Force concluded in 1977 that, "[a]s written, present Rule 37 is too
narrow, fragmented and cumbersome." 383 The Task Force, therefore,
recommended even greater flexibility and new, more serious sanc-
tions. 384 It proposed the adoption of a new rule 37(e) which would
empower the court to impose "such sanctions as may be just" on any
party or counsel who refuses to cooperate in or otherwise abuses
discovery, leaving it to the court to determine what form the sanctions
should take. 385 The Judicial Conference, however, has rejected the
Task Force's recommendation. 386
The principal shortcoming of rule 37 is that it enumerates neither
the different sanctions nor the preconditions to invoking them that, on
its face, the rule appears to contemplate. Because of the patch-work
manner in which it is drafted, 387 its provisions are difficult to recon-
cile. Rule 6(e) of the Proposed Rules attempts to alleviate this confu-
sion by empowering the court to impose the following specific sanc-
tions, in addition to those available under rule 37, without regard to
the nature of the cause of the discovery abuse:
(1) forfeiture of the right to conduct further discovery on any aspect of the case; (2)
waiver of the right to tax costs with regard to the discovery involved; (3) payment of
reasonable counsel fees or other costs of the discovery involved; (4) contempt of court;
and (5) notification to any disciplinary or other supervisory body with respect to any
person so involved with a recommendation of professional, administrative or other
sanctions by such body.
The court is expected to determine which sanctions are most appro-
priate under the circumstances. 388
383. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 24.
384. Id.
385. The Task Force's proposed rule 37(e) would provide: "In addition to the application of those
sanctions specified in Rule 26(d) and other provisions of this rule and those authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, the court may impose upon any party or counsel such sanctions as may be just,
including the payment of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees, if any party or counsel (i) fails
without good cause to cooperate in the framing of an appropriate discovery plan by agreement under
Rule 26(c), or (ii) otherwise abuses the discovery process in seeking, making or resisting discovery.
"In an appropriate case, the court may, in addition to other remedies, notify the Attorney General
of the United States in a public writing that the United States, through its officers or attorneys, has
failed without good cause to cooperate in discovery or has otherwise abused the discovery process."
Id. at 23-24 (emphasis deleted).
386. See notes 413-14 supra and accompanying text. Compare Revised Judicial Conference
Amendments, supra note 37, at 346-47 with Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra
note 36, at 652-53.
387. For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) provides sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery
order, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides sanctions for failure to attend a deposition or serve answers
to interrogatories or respond to a document request. But the rule does not explain what difference is
intended for mere failures to answer, attend or respond as opposed to failures to comply with an
order. Cf. Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970) (default judgment entered for failure to
produce documents).
388. See Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1976); Hunter v. Interna-
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By particularizing additional sanctions, rule 6(e) broadens the
panoply of possible sanctions available in complex civil actions. For
example, the imposition of costs or fines is not limited to the costs of a
motion for sanctions; the amount could include any and all co'sts of the
discovery involved. 38 9 The court can also order forfeiture of the right
to have the costs of discovery assessed against an unsuccessful party
after trial, for offenses such as unduly delaying that or other aspects of
pretrial discovery. 390 Also, the scope of possible preclusion orders is
broadened to allow preclusion of discovery in addition to preclusion of
proof at trial; the latter, because of its severe nature, is rarely imposed
under the present rules anyway. 39' Finally, the threat of contempt of
tional Syss. & Controls Corp., 56 F.R.D. 617 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Stricker v. Milwaukee Inn, Inc.,
285 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Wis. 1968). See also Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir.
1976) (sanctions to be tailored to the particular situation).
389. These costs would include, but not be limited to, deposition costs, travel expenses and fees
paid to experts for their review of documents. Such imposition of broader costs is possible under the
omnibus provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. See Bell v. Automobile Club, 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich.
1978), appeal dismissed, 601 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1979); notes 394-96 infra. Rule 6, however, would
make this an express provision.
390. See TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 515 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1975) (unsuccessful party awarded a
set-off against costs for expenses incurred in preparation for a deposition of successful party when
successful party did not appear for deposition), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). As a general rule,
the successful party is entitled to an award of costs after trial, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1927,
1929 (1976). Compania Pelineon de Navegacion v. Texas Petroleum Co., 540 F.2d 53, 56-57 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Brown v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 18 F.R.D. 433, 434
(D. Del. 1955). The court, however, has broad discretion whether to allow costs. Berner v.
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 362 F.2d 799, 801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
948 (1966); Bank of America v. Loew's Intl Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "[i]tems proposed by winning parties as costs should always be
given careful scrutiny." Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964). Under rule
6(e) of the Proposed Rules, however, the court can strike or limit any item of taxable costs, even if
it does not relate specifically to discovery. Because it is not unusual for such costs in complex
litigation to total several thousand dollars, to lose the right to have costs assessed can be a
meaningful sanction. Items of taxable costs generally include depositions that are read into
evidence or otherwise used at trial, Lockett v. Hellenic Sea Transps., Ltd., 60 F.R.D. 469,
472-73 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Advance Business Syss. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143,
165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of Cas. & Sur.
Cos., 41 F.R.D. 76, 77 (W.D. Okla. 1966); Hancock v. Albee, 11 F.R.D. 139, 141 tD. Conn.
1951), the cost of the trial transcript, Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 999 (2d Cir. 1973);
Advance Business Syss. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. at 162; Donato v. Parker Pen
Co., 7 F.R.D. 148, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), the cost of transcripts of pretrial conferences, Syracuse
Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 319 F.2d 683, 690 (2d Cir. 1963); Bank of America v. Loew's
Int'l Corp., 163 F. Supp. 924, 931-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and even fees paid to expert witnesses,
WeIsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589, 596-97 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975). But cfi.
TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 81 (2d Cir. 1971) (expert's fees not allowed), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 47
F.R.D. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (deposition costs limited); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermans Mut.
Cas. Co., 46 F.R.D. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (same); Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F.
Supp. 565, 593 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (cost of trial transcript not allowed), qff'd and ret,'d in part, 270
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 967 (1960).
391. Compare Mangano v. American Rad. & Std. San. Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971)and
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court and disciplinary action places the reputations and professional
standing of counsel who permit or engage in discovery abuses in
jeopardy. 392 These sanctions, although they have some isolated sup-
port in the case law, 3 93 become readily available to the court under the
Proposed Rules. Bell v. Automobile Club39 4 provides an example of
the severe consequences these new sanctions can have. In an action
alleging civil rights violations, the defendants concealed the existence
of a relocation study and a collection of materials known as the " 'book
of blacks.' ,,395 Finding no excuse for the failure to produce these
materials and that this failure needlessly provoked further discovery,
the court fined the defendants $52,089.73 for the full cost of the
additional discovery as well as for the costs of obtaining the order.
396
Under rule 37, a court has the power to impose sanctions on the
parties, their attorneys, or both. 397 Rule 6 of the Proposed Rules
incorporates this provision but, because counsel appear to be the
principal cause of discovery abuses in complex litigation, 398 the rule
contemplates a more vigorous imposition of sanctions against them.
3 99
The power to impose such sanctions is not new, 400 but it is not often
Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97(D.D.C. 1974)with Krieger v. Texaco, Inc., 373 F. Supp.
108 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) and Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Fisher
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 115 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1940).
392. Compare United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
925 (1975) and Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 985 (1964) with Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947) and In re
Johnson & Johnson, 59 F.R.D. 174 (D. Del. 1973). The concept of disciplinary action against counsel
is new, but contempt orders against counsel are not new. In re Serra, 484 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1973).
393. See, e.g., Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1977) (a contempt citation is a
form of lesser sanction preferable to an order precluding evidence or dismissing the action); Flaksa v.
Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). But
cf. In re Adams, 505 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1974) (error to hold attorney in contempt for negligently
overlooking notice of preliminary hearing); Sykes v. United States, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (same). See also Schleper v. Ford Motor Co., 585 F.2d 1367 (8th Cir. 1978); Crosley Radio
Corp. v. Hieb, 40 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Iowa 1941).
394. 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal dismissed, 601 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1979).
395. Id. at 231.
396. Id. at 235. The court explained its holding as follows: "[I]t is clear to the court that if acting
in good faith with the court, defendants should have disclosed the existence of these materials.
Discovery is not to be treated as a game of hide and seek. It should be a forthright effort to expedite
litigation so that there is no unnecessary waste of time or expense. This is particularly important in a
complex case such as this one." Id. at 231.
397. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b), (c), (d).
398. See notes 8-18 supra and accompanying text.
399. Judge Oakes recently summarized the philosophical basis for this concept: "[D]ismissal of an
otherwise meritorious cause of action for the misconduct of counsel is rarely, if ever, an appropriate
remedy .... Rather, the trial court should first consider the more specific and perhaps even more
deterrent remedy of imposing costs personally on the offending attorneys. Imposing a penalty on
those responsible for wasting the court's time, while not dismissing a party's potentially valid claim,
seems.., to make the punishment better fit the crime, especially where ... the opposing party and Its
counsel have been equally neglectful of their obligations to the court." Ali v. A & G Co., 542 F.2d 595,
597 (2d Cir. 1976) (Oakes, J., dissenting); see Thomas v. United States, 531 F. 2d 746 (5 th Cir. 1976).
400. 28 U.S. C. § 1927 (1976) specifically authorizes the imposition of fines on counsel to make up
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used.40 ' Thus, in contrast to the typical present situation, 40 2 it is
intended that the courts more readily invoke any and all of the
enumerated sanctions under rule 6(e) and not limit their orders to the
costs of making a motion for sanctions. This is not intended to
encourage the wholesale sanctioning of counsel for every disputed
decision they make, but rather to hold counsel accountable for any
plainly unreasonable or frivolous discovery positions they may take
and for conduct calculated to obstruct rather than to facilitate discov-
ery. The courts should, when necessary, 403  also hold counsel in
contempt of court and notify the appropriate disciplinary body with a
recommendation of professional discipline. 40 4
Finally, rule 6(f) warns parties that they too face sanctions based
upon the failures of their counsel. Sanctions against counsel and
sanctions against their clients can be equally salutory. In the former
situation, the deterrence factor is counsel's fear for their pocketbooks
and professional reputations; in the latter, the deterrence factor is
counsel's fear that clients that have been penalized will sue their
attorneys for malpractice. If counsel know that, either way, they are
going to be called to task for discovery abuses, they will likely hesitate
before serving abusive discovery demands or blocking the legitimate
discovery requests of their adversaries. Of course, parties should not
be permitted simply to pass off all responsibility for discovery failures
on their attorneys. 405 Rule 6(f) does not intend that the courts refrain
for any "excess costs" caused by their conduct, when it "so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously." See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63
(2d Cir. 1912); cf. Bone v. Walsh Constr. Co., 235 F. 901 (S.D. Iowa 1916) (court only had
statutory authority to impose costs on attorneys, not on opposing party as sought by defendant)
401. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1976); Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F 2d
697, 700 (2d Cir. 1972); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir ). cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); cf. Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda. Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir- 1968)
(intentional conduct amounting to serious breaches of canons of ethics warranted assessment of costs
against defense attorney), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969). See generally Court Sanctions, supra
note 12, at 623-29;see also Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 78 F RD.
192 (E.D. La. 1978).
402. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1976); 1507 Corp- v. Hender-
son, 447 F.2d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp., 53 F. Supp. 1013. 1014
(E.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 156 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) (regarding costs imposed under 28 U.S C_ § 1927
(1976)); cf. Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (imposition of costs on counsel
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37); Austin Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc, 22 F .RD_ 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (same).
403. See pL VII(B) infra.
404. See rule 6(e)(4), (e)(5) of the Proposed Rules, Appendix.
405. In Link v. Wabash R.R, 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the Court states that there is "no merit to
the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes
an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected
agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in
which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of
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from ever imposing the more severe sanctions of preclusion of discov-
ery or proof at trial, or dismissal of the action. Sanctions should be
fashioned, justly and appropriately, to meet the circumstances of the
case.
B. Types of Conduct Subject to Sanctions
A crucial limitation upon the effectiveness of rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is that it normally applies only to refusals to
comply with court orders to make disclosure. 40 6 The rule does not
apply to excessive or unreasonable discovery requests and other abuses
by the discovering party. 40 7 Nor does it apply to other forms of
obstructive conduct, such as coaching by counsel at depositions 40 8 or
"shuffling the deck" with documents,40 9 which are among the most
serious discovery abuses in complex civil actions. Although other
statutory bases for sanctions in such circumstances exist, 410 few attor-
neys are aware of them, and the courts invoke them even more rarely
and hesitatingly than they invoke rule 37. 4'"
The ABA Task Force took special note of this unfortunate limita-
tion, and recommended that rule 37 be altered to permit sanctions "if
any party or counsel (i) fails without good cause to cooperate in the
framing of an appropriate discovery plan by agreement under Rule
26(c), or (ii) otherwise abuses the discovery process in seeking, making
or resisting discovery. ' '4 12 The Judicial Conference initially incorpo-
rated that recommendation in its 1978 proposal. 413 In its 1979 redraft
of the amendments, however, the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee deleted the provision without explanation, 41 4 rendering
bleak the prospect of any significant broadening of rule 37 in the near
future.
The concept of imposing sanctions for all failures to abide by the
discovery rules is hardly a radical one. Several federal district courts
all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.' "Id. at 633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer,
101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
406. Cohn, supra note 5, at 291; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 24. But cf. Schroeder
& Frank, supra note 8, at 487 (criticizing any attempt to broaden rule 37 to cover other than failures to
make discovery).
407. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 24.
408. See pt. IV(E)(2) supra.
409. See pt. V(B) supra.
410. See note 400supra. See generally Court Sanctions, supra note 12, at 623-29; see also Flaksa
v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885,888 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968).
411. See cases cited note 401 supra.
412. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 31, at 23-24 (emphasis deleted).
413. Preliminary Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 36, at 652.
414. Revised Judicial Conference Amendments, supra note 37, at 347.
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have adopted local rules that so provide. 41 s For example, the District
of Arizona allows its judges to penalize any failure to comply "in good
faith with the rules governing pretrial discovery. 4 16 Other districts
specifically condemn excessive and unreasonable discovery requests, as
well as failures to respond. 41 7 And others, most prominently the
Eastern District of New York, permit limited sanctions, such as the
imposition of costs, for any failure to comply with court directives "to
set a schedule for the case, including for discovery, pre-trial and
trial., 418
Drawing on the proposal of the ABA Task Force and on these local
court rules, rule 6(a) of the Proposed Rules authorizes sanctions for any
"failure to abide by any of the dictates" of the Proposed Rules.
Furthermore, rule 6(c) enumerates illustrative, although not exhaus-
tive, examples of the types of conduct, other than outright failure to
answer, which are deemed the equivalent of a "failure to abide by...
the dictates" of the Proposed Rules. Under rule 6(a), any of these
abuses triggers the sanction provisions of rule 6(e). Finally, rule 6(c)
distinguishes mere failures to abide from willful failures to abide by the
rules. As discussed below, under rule 6(a) the nature of the failure
affects the likelihood and degree of sanctions imposed.41 9
C. When Sanctions Should Be Imposed
Subparts (a) and (c) of rule 6 of the Proposed Rules fill the void that
currently exists with respect to the types of conduct deserving of
judicial reproach. Unfortunately, this will have little discernible effect
if the courts are left without guidelines to follow regarding when
sanctions should be imposed. One observer recently commented on the
rare use of existing sanction rules:
[T]he provision of a sanction in a rule is not the whole answer. [One such provision]
has been the law since 1813, yet, there are very few reported instances of its
utilization. The cost sanctions of pre-1970 Rule 37 were used in only one of fifty cases.
And, while no exhaustive research has yet been published, there is reason to believe
that the situation has not changed appreciably since 1970.40
415. Cohn, supra note 5, at 292-93. Some states also so provide. See, e.g., Kiely, supra note 112,
at 218-19.
416. D. Ariz. Civ. R. 42(E).
417. D. Alaska Gen. R. 35(D); W.D. Tenn. R. 9(c).
418. E.D.N.Y. Calendar R. 7. Rule 8(b) permits imposition of such costs on counsel who fail to
comply with rule 7 or "whose action has obstructed the effective administration of the court's
business." Id. 8(b). See also In re -Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030. 1036 (2d Cir. 1976).
419. See notes 443-45 infra and accompanying text.
420. Cohn, supra note 5, at 294-95 (footnotes omitted). Even more recent research on this point
concludes that the situation remains substantially unchanged. Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Cohen,
supra note 248, at 147, 169.
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Much of the hesitancy over when to impose sanctions is traceable to
the Supreme Court's decision in Societe Internationale pour Partici-
pations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers.421 The issue in
Societe Internationale was whether to impose sanctions against a
Swiss company that refused to produce documents because a Swiss law
made it a criminal offense to disclose their contents. 422 The district
court dismissed the action pursuant to rule 37.423 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding dismissal to be inappropriate when the producing
party's failure to comply with a pretrial production order was "due to
inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault. '424 In the
wake of Societe Internationale, the courts have correctly searched for
willfulness, bad faith or fault on the part of the litigant or counsel
against whom sanctions are sought.425 The infrequency of sanction
imposition, however, is not due to this search. Rather, it is due to the
courts' hesitancy to find much 4uestionable conduct within the pa-
rameters of the test, and their overemphasis on preclusion-type sanc-
tions as opposed to other less drastic sanctions, such as costs, discussed
above. 426 Because of this prevalent attitude of the courts, they rarely
invoke the sanction provisions of rule 37 at an early stage of the
litigation process in complex civil cases-during discovery-despite the
need for sanctions as a deterrent for discovery abuse. 427 The previous
section of this Article explains the guidelines proposed in rule 6 for
identifying the types of conduct that should be sanctioned. 428 If the
Proposed Rules are adopted, it is intended that the courts interpret
these types of conduct as satisfying the Societe Internationale test. 429
Once this has occurred, the courts can, in turn, address the issue of
when to impose sanctions, as discussed below.
The courts, understandably, endeavor to allow counsel every oppor-
421. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
422. Id. at 200.
423. Id. at 201-02.
424. Id. at 212. The Court explained its holding as follows: "The provisions of Rule 37... must
be read in light of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law .... [T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even
in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a
hearing on the merits of his cause. The authors of Rule 37 were well aware of these constitutional
considerations." Id. at 209; see Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir. 1974); cf. In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F. 2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (corporation
prevented from removing atomic energy related documents from Canada).
425. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860 (5th
Cir. 1970).
426. See note 389 supra and accompanying text.
427. See notes 372-78 supra and notes 433-38 infra and accompanying text.
428. See pt. VII(B) supra.
429. 357 U.S. 197, 209, 212 (1958).
[Vol. 48
PROPOSED DISCOVERY RULES
tunity to correct their discovery failings before imposing sanctions.43°
Many judges, having been litigators themselves, know the work
pressures to which the litigator may be subjected, particularly when
juggling voluminous discovery requests in several cases, a deposition
schedule, and perhaps even a trial. Unfortunately, this judicial toler-
ance condones and encourages discovery abuses because counsel know
they will have many chances to absolve their defalcations before rule
37's hammer falls. One commentator recently described this process:
The judge will usually order the recusant party to comply with the discovery request;
this order leaves open the possibility of continued resistance, necessitating further
resort to the court for a more severe sanction. Rule 37, then, generally offers a built-in
second chance for parties resisting discovery, and the judge may in effect provide a
third chance by conditioning the ultimate sanction upon further noncompliance. 43'
The same commentator nonetheless discerned a developing trend
away from excessive judicial indulgence to a more willing use of
sanctions, particularly in those courts whose dockets have experienced
a rapid increase in civil caseloads. 432 In National Hockey League v.
Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 4 3 3 the Supreme Court encouraged
this trend by strongly endorsing the dismissal of an action because of a
prolonged failure to answer interrogatories. The Court intended to
signal the lower courts that sanctions serve not only to punish, but also
to deter future abuses by others: "[I]t might well be that these
respondents [will] faithfully comply with all future discovery orders
.... But other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think
Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of
other district courts. '4 3
4
The intended effect of National Hockey League is reflected in the
Second Circuit's opinion in Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp.43- The trial court had refused to accept
the recommendation of a magistrate that the plaintiff be precluded
from proving damages due to its failure to answer defense inter-
rogatories requesting a detailed explanation of the plaintiff's damage
theories and evidence. 436 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
430. See Discovery Sanctions, supra note 18. "Since the discovery process is designed to proceed
generally under the control of the parties, the need for supervision of the court can be avoided where
the parties themselves agree upon a certain course of conduct. This form of resolution of disputes in
the discovery area seems to be an efficient one, and courts have not hesitated to enforce extrajudicial
agreements relating to the pre-trial proceedings." Id. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted). See also
Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 330 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1964).
431. Emerging Deterrence, supra note 18, at 1037 (footnotes omitted); see D. Siegel, New
York Practice § 367, at 465 (1978).
432. Emerging Deterrence, supra note 18, at 1034; see Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Cohen,
supra note 248, at 147-49.
433. 427 US. 639 (1976).
434. Id. at 643.
435. 602 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1979).
436. Id. at 1065-66.
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although the plaintiff may not have openly and consciously disre-
garded the magistrate's direction to answer the interrogatories, its
responses were so deficient as to constitute "gross negligence amount-
ing to a 'total dereliction of professional responsibility.' ,437 Thus, the
court authorized severe sanctions without requiring a prior finding of
bad faith or willfulness, stating: "[G]ross professional incompetence no
less than deliberate tactical intransigence may be responsible for the
interminable delays and costs that plague modern complex law-
suits. "
4 3 8
These decisions support the proposition that the courts are becoming
more willing to impose sanctions to achieve greater deterrence of
discovery abuses and failures, and less willing to be bound by the
constraints of prior holdings restricting the use of sanctions. In accor-
dance with these views, rule 6 of the Proposed Rules liberalizes the
requirements for when the courts can impose sanctions, thereby en-
couraging their even more frequent use.
First, as noted above, subparts (a) and (c) of rule 6 authorize
sanctions for any discovery abuse, not merely failures to answer or
make disclosures. 439 Second, rule 6(b) permits the court to order
sanctions either "on its own motion or upon application of any party."
Third, rule 6(a) makes it clear that the court can and should impose
sanctions without first having to enter an order directing discovery or
permitting correction of the conduct deemed abusive. Even though the
latter is technically possible for egregious abuses under rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 440 the courts rarely, if ever, impose
sanctions in that manner. 44 1 Normally, the courts do not impose
sanctions until a party, witness or counsel has failed to comply with a
prior order. 442 If, in fact, a prior discovery order has been issued and
then violated, rule 6(a) forces the offender to justify its conduct.4 43 If
the court finds that the offender has willfully failed to comply with the
order, sanctions are mandatory. Willfulness is to be determined by
reference to the standards set forth in rule 6(c), which deems certain
437. Id. at 1067.
438. Id. (footnote omitted).
439. See notes 418-19 supra and accompanying text.
440. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
441. See 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 124, 128-29 (1975).
442. See, e.g., Charron v. Meaux, 66 F.R.D. 64, 68-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hendricks v. Alcoa
S.S. Co., 32 F.R.D. 169, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See also Kropp v. Ziebarih, 557 F,2d 142,146 n.7 (8th
Cir. 1977); SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir. 1975). The prior order
may be oral. Henry v. Sneiders, 490 F.2d 315, 318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974).
443. See, e.g., Margoles v. Johns, 587 F.2d 885 (7th Cir 1978); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. Dunn v. TWA, Inc., 589 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978) (conduct
justified because medical records no longer in existence); Wilson v. Volkeswagen of America, Inc., 561
F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977) (manufacturer claimed unavailability of documentary evidence relating to
vehicle safety tests), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
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types of conduct, as well as any other "willful or grossly negligent
failure," the equivalent of a "willful failure" to abide by the discovery
rules, whether or not willfulness was actually involved.4 4 4 Thus, the
court would consider the nature of the prior discovery order and
determine whether one of the willful failures enumerated in rule 6(c)
was the cause of the failure to comply with the order.
Fourth, if any party, counsel or witness willfully fails to abide by
any of the Proposed Rules, rule 6(d) orders the court "not [to] hesitate
to impose sanctions." Willfulness under rule 6(d) would again be
determined by reference to the illustrative examples in rule 6(c) with
the proviso that "[a]ny other willful or grossly negligent failure to
comply with [the] rules shall be deemed the equivalent of a willful
failure to abide by [the] rules." Although rule 6(d) stops short of
requiring mandatory sanctions as provided in rule 6(a), the rule is
clearly intended to eliminate any reluctance on the courts' part to
invoke the sanction provisions of rule 6(e). Fifth, if any party, counsel
or witness fails to abide by the proposed rules, other than by a willful
failure to abide, and cannot "provide a reasonable justification" for
that failure, the court again should "not hesitate to impose sanctions."
The intent is the same as that stated with respect to willful failures to
abide by the Proposed Rules.
Finally, rule 6(f) requires that
[i]n determining whether and which sanctions should be ordered or applied, the court
shall take into account the prior and causative conduct of the persons involved, the
pertinence and importance of the matter at issue to the determination of the action, the
need to deter similar defalcations, the purposes of these rules and rule I of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the interests of justice." -
The flexibility that this provision grants the court should not be
mistaken, however, for leniency.
Rule 6 seeks to embody the conclusion of the 1976 Pound Confer-
ence Follow-Up Task Force that the best results can be attained by
the "creative use of sanctions." 446 As its report stated: "In our view,
such creative use of sanctions offers a significant potential for increased
efficiency to the benefit of the litigants immediately involved and to the
ultimate benefit of all who depend on the availability of an efficient
judicial system." 1447 To be sure, not all judges and litigators agree with
this conclusion. Some continue to believe that "[s]trengthening sanc-
tions is again to approach the virus with the wrong antidote. '44 8 The
444. See pt. VII(B) supra.
445. See cases cited note 388 supra. See also Sales, Pre-Trial Discovery in Texas, 31 Sw. L.J.
1017, 1031-32 (1977).
446. Pound Conference Follow-Up, supra note 42, at 194.
447. Id.
448. Pollack, supra note 8, at 226.
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more prevalent view, however, appears to be that a more ready and
innovative use of sanctions will materially reduce discovery abuses.
Indeed, one judge, a member of the Pound Conference Follow-Up
Task Force, has expressed the view that "[c]reative use of sanctions, as
developed and refined by state, local and federal court systems, and
the complimentary role of disciplinary proceedings, may be the future
means of eliminating noncompliance with the spirit of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 449
Experience has demonstrated that only the sure knowledge that
sanctions await all who flout or undermine the discovery rules can
ensure compliance with them. 450 Rule 6 forewarns all concerned that
the days of excessive leniency with harassment and evasion will be
ended with the adoption of the Proposed Rules. It is hoped that the
courts will give the Proposed Rules that interpretation.
CONCLUSION
For years, the courts and the Bar have attempted to achieve the
kind of decorous conduct envisioned by the draftsmen of the discovery
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45 1 through ad hoc judicial
determinations and general pleas for cooperation. Unfortunately, these
determinations and pleas have gone, to too great an extent, unheeded.
The time has come for more direct and specific regulation of the
discovery process in complex civil litigation.
The approach currently recommended by the Judicial Conference of
the United States, which places great emphasis on the court's ability to
frame discovery at a pretrial discovery conference, does not go far
enough to prevent the abuses that have plagued complex litigation
over the past decade. 45 2 A discovery conference can be merely the first
449. Erickson, supra note 30, at 290 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
450. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633, 635-36 (N.D. Tex.
1977); SCM Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D.
110, 112-13 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
451. See note 452 infra.
452. Shortly after enactment of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Judge MacMahon poignantly summarized the problem of discovery abuses in complex litigation:
"The purpose of discovery is to provide an orderly, efficient and effective means for ascertaining the
truth in order to expedite a determination of the controversy on the merits .... The federal rules
envision that discovery will be conducted by skilled gentlemen of the bar, without wrangling and
without the intervention of the court. The vision is an unreal dream. Regrettably, hostility, and
bitterness are more the rule than the exception in unsupervised discovery proceedings. Perhaps this is
inevitable, for litigation at all stages and under the best of circumstances is fertile ground for conflict.
The opposing self-interest of the parties, as each vies for advantage, often spawns not only bitterness
but abuse of the discovery process. . . . The ultimate curtailment of abuse requires the constant
vigilance of the bench and bar to insure that any conduct threatening the orderly progress of
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step in controlling abuses. The courts, however, are too busy to
oversee every phase of discovery in complex cases. New rules of
conduct tailored to the specific abuses and characteristics endemic to
complex civil litigation, and precise enough to be truly self-executing,
are needed. The Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Actions
proposed in this Article seek to provide the standards needed to guide
both counsel and the courts through complex discovery.
APPENDIX
FEDERAL DISCOVERY RULES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL ACTIONS
Rule 1: Designation of "Complex Civil Actions"
(a) Any party may apply to the court at any time after commencement of an
action for designation of the action as a complex civil action. Such application
shall be made on notice to all parties that have then appeared in the action;
notice thereof shall be given to any party that appears thereafter but before
the return date of the application. The court may also so designate an action
on its own motion, but only after giving all parties that have appeared an
opportunity to be heard on that matter.
(b) Following the court's designation of an action as a complex civil action
under subpart (a) of this rule, all discovery in such action shall be conducted
pursuant to these rules, together with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
To the extent that these rules conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, these rules shall be deemed controlling.
(c) The court will decide, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the action
should be designated a complex civil action, taking into account such factors
as the court deems appropriate in the particular circumstances presented. In
general, but without limitation of the court's discretion in this regard, the
designation "complex civil action" is intended to apply to those civil actions in
which any of the following circumstances appears likely to exist: production of
voluminous documents has been or is expected to be requested from any
party; or more than five (5) pretrial depositions have been noticed or are
expected to be conducted by any party; or more than twenty-five (25)
interrogatories have been or are expected to be propounded by any party. In
determining whether more than twenty-five interrogatories have been pro-
pounded, the court may deem the subparts of an interrogatory to be separate
interrogatories.
(d) Designation of an action as a complex civil action under subpart (a) of
this rule shall have no effect upon the merits of the action and the conduct of
discovery proceedings is nipped in the bud, lest the efficacy of modern discovery proceedings be




the trial except as specifically provided in these rules. Such designation and
these rules are intended to expedite, simplify and economize the conduct of
pretrial discovery, in order to advance the policy of rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that all litigants are entitled to a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action.
Rule 2: Scope of Discovery in Complex Civil Actions
(a) Discovery in any action designated as a complex civil action pursuant to
these rules shall be permissible as to any matter, not privileged, that has a
reasonable bearing upon any issue in the action. The court shall control the
conduct of discovery to ensure adherence by all parties and witnesses to this
"reasonable bearing" standard. Discovery shall be permissible beyond, and
shall not be limited to, the tests of relevance or admissibility of evidence at
trial.
(b) Any party or witness claiming a privilege as to any matter inquired into
in a complex civil action shall provide the inquiring party with a statement
(on the record of his deposition if the privilege was asserted there or otherwise
in writing promptly after the privilege is asserted) of the privilege claimed, the
basis for such claim of privilege and an identification of the factual circum-
stances in which the communication occurred and the matter to which the
privilege is claimed (that is, in the case of a discussion, the place, date and
persons present; or, in the case of a document, the author, recipients, date
and title or other description), to enable a court test of the claim of privilege if
the inquiring party desires. Counsel may agree among themselves that, to
facilitate pretrial discovery, information to which a privilege is claimed shall
be disclosed in discovery without waiver of either the privilege or the rights of
the responding party to assert it and any other party to contest it thereafter.
(c) If any question is objected to on the ground that the information
requested is confidential, the evidence shall be taken subject to such objec-
tion. For two weeks after such objection, all such allegedly confidential
information shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed to anyone
who either was not present at the deposition at which such objection was
asserted, or was a recipient of the paper in which it was asserted and who is
not counsel (or affiliated with counsel for any party in the action) and shall not
be used for any purpose other than the prosecution or defense of the action;
any person or party seeking an extension of such confidentiality shall make
application to the court with respect therto within such two week period.
(d) Duplication of discovery methods to obtain the same information in a
complex civil action should be avoided whenever possible. Counsel requesting
discovery should attempt to propound that form of discovery request most
likely to elicit the information sought without harassment and undue burden
to the responding party or witness.
(e) Discovery may be conducted of facts allegedly already known to the
inquiring party if it appears reasonably calculated to establish the admissibil-
ity of such facts at trial or the state of the responding party's knowledge about
them unless the facts involved are so obvious or so immaterial to the issues
that such discovery constitutes harassment.
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(f) In all other respects, except as otherwise specifically provided in these
rules, the scope of discovery shall be consistent with that permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 3: Depositions in Complex Civil Actions
(a) As promptly as possible and in no event more than twenty (20) days
after the designation of an action as a complex civil action pursuant to these
rules, counsel for all parties appearing therein shall agree upon and advise the
court (for its approval) of the schedule of depositions to be conducted by either
side, failing which, each side shall advise the court (no later than twenty (20)
days after designation of the action as a complex civil action) of the schedule
of depositions it proposes, in which event the court shall fix the schedule of
depositions. Thereafter, the parties may agree upon or notice further deposi-
tions (to be conducted in the sequence noticed after the schedule fixed as
aforesaid), subject to the right and power of the court, either on application
by any party or on its own motion, to alter or strike any such proposed
deposition as provided in subpart (a) of this rule. Depositions may be
scheduled by name of deponent or, if the identity of the proposed deponent is
not known, by such job or other description as is possible.
(b) The court, in fixing a schedule of depositions or receiving an agreed or
proposed schedule of depositions in a complex civil action, shall have the right
and power to determine that any deposition shall or shall not be taken, the
locale and date of the deposition, the subjects and time period to be covered
at the deposition and any other matters with regard to the scheduling or
conduct of any of the depositions (including, but not limited to, the sequence
of questioning to be followed, how long the deposition can last and whether
the deposition shall be conducted live or via telephone, videotape or other
alternative or reproductive method).
(c) The failure to complete any deposition within the time period scheduled
or allotted for it as provided in subparts (a) and (b) of this rule, shall not affect
or defer the conduct of any other deposition scheduled in accordance with
subparts (a) and (b) of this rule. The uncompleted deposition shall be
completed as soon as practical within the schedule of depositions on a date or
dates to be agreed upon by counsel or, failing that, fixed by the court.
(d) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, whenever possible, all document
requests with respect to any deposition in a complex civil action shall be made
and shall be responded to by both written response and production of any
documents to be produced prior to the scheduled date and conduct of such
deposition. Whenever possible, counsel who plan to question at a deposition
shall request those specific documents that he or she believes are needed for
the orderly, complete and uninterrupted flow of the deposition at least ten (10)
days before the deposition; whenever possible, such documents shall be
provided to such counsel (subject to objection, if any) at least three (3) days
before the deposition. Although other documents can be requested on or after
the deposition, the deposition may not be kept open or delayed for questions
relating to or for the production of documents that could readily have been
but were not requested prior to the deposition.
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(e) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, counsel in a complex civil action
may not instruct a witness not to answer a question except on the ground of
privilege; all testimony shall be taken subject to and over the objection of the
witness or his counsel.
(f) Counsel shall not interrupt the questioning in any deposition to confer
with a witness off the record between the imposition of a question and the
answer to be given, or confer with the witness about the questioning by any
party during any temporary break in that questioning during a deposition
session, or suggest answers to the witness by counsel's objections or any other
means in the course of the questioning, or otherwise disrupt or interfere with
the orderly and fair conduct of the deposition.
(g) The transcript of the deposition shall be presented to the deponent for
review and signature (unless waived by the parties) promptly after the
deposition session involved. The deponent shall sign and return the transcript
within twenty (20) days of receipt thereof or shall be deemed to have signed it
as transcribed without correction or ehange. No change or correction in the
transcript of a deposition which is made either without stating the reason
therefor as required by rule 30(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
after the time period prescribed in this rule shall be permitted or deemed
effective at trial. Any deponent who makes any change or correction of
substance in its deposition transcript may be recalled for further questioning
by any party, but only with respect to the subject matter of the change or
correction and only if such recall is requested within twenty (20) days of
receipt of such correction or change. Any party may read any deposition
correction or change at the trial. When a portion of a deposition that is
corrected or changed for a reason other than grammatical or transcription
error is read at trial, the party reading the transcript shall read both the
original answer and the change and the reason therefor, subject to the right of
any party to object to any portion thereof on evidentiary grounds.
(h) Cross-examination by any party on any deposition in a complex civil
action shall not be limited in scope to the subject matter covered on direct
examination, regardless of whether a cross-notice of deposition has been
served by the cross-examining party.
Rule 4: Interrogatories in Complex Civil Actions
(a) Interrogatories in an action designated as a complex civil action pur-
suant to these rules shall be of three types: (1) identifying interrogatories (that
is, those which elicit merely the names and addresses of witnesses and
potential witnesses or the file description or title, location and custodian of
documents and other physical evidence); (2) expert interrogatories (that is,
those seeking the information discoverable under rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); and (3) substantive interrogatories (that is, all other
interrogatories, such as those asking for the factual circumstances of the
underlying transactions involved in the action, those directed at the merits of
the action and those seeking to amplify upon the contentions of the parties).
(b) Any party in a complex civil action may serve such identifying and
expert interrogatories as it determines are necessary to enable it to prepare for
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trial or conduct other permissible pretrial discovery, provided that they are
reasonable in number, scope and subject matter.
(c) Any party in a complex civil action may serve, as of right, a total of
thirty-five (35) substantive interrogatories upon any other party; further such
interrogatories may be served only with the court's permission following
application to the court (accompanied by a copy of the proposed inter-
rogatories) on a showing of reasonable need therefor. The parties and the
court shall ensure that duplicative substantive interrogatories are not served
upon any party and that substantive interrogatories are not used to burden,
harass or delay, but rather represent good faith inquiries into matters of
substance in the action. In determining whether more than thirty-five (35)
substantive interrogatories have been propounded, the court may deem the
subparts of an interrogatory to be separate interrogatories. If the court finds
that separate interrogatories have been listed as subparts of an interrogatory
to avoid the thirty-five (35) interrogatory limit, the court shall strike the entire
set of interrogatories and the interrogating party shall be deemed to have
forfeited the right to serve interrogatories as of right.
(d) Identifying interrogatories, expert interrogatories and substantive inter-
rogatories shall be served in separate sets, each limited to one type and titled
to indicate which such type of interrogatories are involved. Identifying and
expert interrogatories shall be responded to within fourteen (14) days of
service; substantive interrogatores shall be responded to within thirty (30)
days of service thereof. Each interrogatory shall be separately stated and
numbered and shall ask a single question without unnecessary or excessive
subparts. Answers shall be confined to the questions asked and shall respond
directly to them, without evasion, obfuscation or unnecessary self-serving
matter.
(e) A party in a complex civil action may avail itself of the option under rule
33(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to produce documents in lieu of
providing a discursive answer to an interrogatory only when the interroga-
tory calls for computations, statistical data, summaries or other such abstracts
of documents. When such option is elected by the answering party, the
answer shall (1) provide a specific and detailed identification of the documents
from which the answer may be obtained so that the interrogating party can
readily identify the individual documents from which the answer should be
ascertained; (2) supply a clear explanation of how the interrogating party
should proceed to obtain the answer from the identified documents; and (3)
promptly produce the pertinent documents, in a form that is easy to utilize
(that is, segregated by identifying category and tagged or labeled, if necessary
to enable their easy use) to obtain the answer in accordance with rule 5 of
these rules. The rule 33(c) option may not be used to respond to inter-
rogatories seeking a narrative or other factual summary, except that the
answer may identify the principal events involved (for example, chronological
events) and refer to individually identified documents for the balance of the
answer, provided that each such document is specifically identified and keyed
to each specific event to which it relates and that the documents readily
provide the other information sought by the interrogatory.
(f) Each set of answers to interrogatories in a complex civil action shall
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include a statement identifying which persons (other than counsel) partici-
pated in making the answer to which interrogatories.
Rule 5: Document Productions in Complex Civil Actions
(a) Document requests in a complex civil action shall be framed as spe-
cifically as feasible, but may call for categories of documents rather than
individually identified documents. Document requests should attempt in good
faith to avoid broadside verbiage, duplication and subject matter not actually
believed pertinent to discovery in the action.
(b) Responses to document requests in a complex civil action shall specify
which documents or categories of documents respond to which particular
requests, with sufficient specificity and identification to enable the requesting
party to ascertain readily the documents being referred to.
(c) Documents shall be produced in complex civil actions in the same form
and categories as they are kept in the ordinary course of business or otherwise
organized and labeled to correspond to the particular requests. Each docu-
ment production shall be accompanied by a readily comprehensible written
statement listing the groups and types of documents being produced, the titles
and folder legends of the files from which they came, the names of the persons
and department for whom any specific file was maintained, the location where
the files were and are maintained, the persons knowledgeable as to the
organization and maintenance of the files involved and (to the extent rea-
sonably feasible) the identity of the persons whose handwriting appears on the
documents produced. When copies rather than originals are produced, the
producing party or witness shall attempt to ensure that the copies are legible
and are stapled and otherwise copied in such manner as to duplicate the form
of the originals in the files of the producing party or witness.
(d) Computer print-outs or other comparable or similar summaries may be
produced (either in answer to interrogatories or in response to document
requests) in lieu of production of voluminous document categories, provided
that they are accompanied by a readily comprehensible written statement
identifying the matters reflected on the print-out or summary, defining each
symbol on the print-out or summary, identifying the underlying documents
from which it has been created or generated, and stating the other informa-
tion normally included in the written statement required under subpart (c) of
this rule, and provided further that the underlying documents are also made
available promptly to any party that thereafter requests discovery and inspec-
tion thereof.
(e) Any party or witness making a voluminous document production in a
complex civil action shall, upon request, collect the documents in a single
location (to the extent reasonably feasible) and arrange for a knowledgeable
person to be available at any such production to help those reviewing the
documents understand or learn the identity, nature and location of particular
documents or categories of documents and the meaning or identification of
symbols and other matters on or regarding the documents being produced.
(f) Each written response to a document request and written statement
accompanying a document production (either in answer to interrogatories or
response to a document request) shall be signed under oath by the party or
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witness making the production and shall include a statement identifying
which persons (other than counsel) participated in preparing the response to
which specific request. Written responses to document requests and written
statements included therein or otherwise supplied therewith shall be admissi-
ble at trial in the same manner, for the same purposes and to the same extent
as sworn interrogatory answers.
Rule 6: Sanctions in Complex Civil Actions
(a) The court in a complex civil action may impose any sanctions contem-
plated or provided for in rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
any other sanctions provided herein or any combination thereof for failure to
abide by any of the dictates of any of these rules. A discovery order of the
court shall not be necessary before such sanctions may be imposed, but
sanctions shall be mandatory for willful failure to comply with a discovery
order.
(b) Sanctions may be imposed by the court on its own motion or upon
application of any party in a complex civil action. Sanctions may be imposed
by the court in which the action is pending or the court in which the discovery
involved is conducted, or both.
(c)(1) For purposes of this rule, the following shall be deemed the equivalent
of a failure to abide by these rules: an evasive or incomplete response to any
question, interrogatory or document request; excessive discovery requests
beyond the permissible bounds prescribed by these rules; a failure to answer
as defined by rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) For purposes of this rule, the following shall be deemed the equivalent
of a willful failure to abide by these rules: gross negligence in failing to
provide a complete response; a frivolous assertion of privilege or a claim of
confidentiality asserted without good cause or in bad faith; discovery
requests which the court finds to have been unreasonably excessive or made
for purposes of harassment.
(3) For purposes of this rule, any other willful or grossly negligent failure
to comply with these rules shall be deemed the equivalent of a willful
failure to abide by these rules.
(d) The court shall not hesitate to impose sanctions against any party or
witness or counsel who makes a willful failure to abide by these rules in a
complex civil action or otherwise fails to provide a reasonable justification for
any failure by it to abide by these rules.
(e) In addition to or in lieu of the sanctions provided under rule 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court in a complex civil action may
impose the following sanctions against the party or witness or counsel
involved: (1) forfeiture of the right to conduct further discovery on any aspect
of the case; (2) waiver of the right to tax costs with regard to the discovery
involved; (3) payment of reasonable counsel fees or other costs of the discov-
ery involved; (4) contempt of court; and (5) notification to any disciplinary or
other supervisory body with respect to any person so involved with a
recommendation of professional, administrative or other sanctions by such
body.
(f) In determining whether and which sanctions should be ordered or
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applied, the court shall take into account the prior and causative conduct of
the persons involved, the pertinence and importance of the matter at issue to
the determination of the action, the need to deter similar defalcations, the
purposes of these rules and rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the interests of justice. Parties shall be responsible for the conduct of their
counsel in discovery; and, although the court should not impose punitive
sanctions lightly, it should not hesitate to do so when warranted merely
because the sanctions may affect the merits of or the parties' rights in the
action involved.
